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Internal control disclosures mandated by section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
are designed to provide information about a firm’s financial reporting quality and in doing so 
may offer information on firm-specific tax planning activities. Internal control weaknesses 
disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm’s tax function (Ge and McVay, 2005; 
Gleason, Pincus and Rego, 2010) and thus raise the question of whether or not these frequent 
problems affect corporate tax avoidance. 
In this thesis, I test hypotheses that tax-related disclosures, particularly those that contain 
company-level internal control weaknesses (ICWs), provide information with respect to long-run 
tax avoidance. Furthermore, I test hypotheses that the combination of internal control quality and 
aggressive tax avoidance aid in assessing shareholder returns. To conduct these tests, I collect 
and construct firm-level SOX disclosure data from 2004 to 2006 across 1,286 publicly-owned 
corporations. I begin with an empirical analysis of the association between tax avoidance and 
firm-level ICWs and generally find that the presence of tax ICWs and company-level tax ICWs 
constrain long-run tax avoidance. For firms with low cash constraints however, company-level 
tax ICWs appear to lead to an increase in tax avoidance. Nevertheless, subsequent analysis of 
monthly abnormal returns implies that the stock market reacts negatively to the disclosure of 
company-level tax ICWs, regardless of whether or not tax aggressiveness is also present.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by documenting the first evidence that internal 
control disclosures provide information regarding firm-level tax planning. Although the number 
of internal control weakness disclosures is decreasing over time, the availability of these SOX 
disclosures represents a previously unavailable opportunity to examine and further understand 
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internal governance mechanisms within the firm and their influence on tax planning. In addition, 
this thesis further corroborates prior literature that argues for the importance of the pervasiveness 
of internal control weaknesses by showing that the pervasive, company-level tax internal control 
weaknesses are associated with tax avoidance and lower shareholder returns.  
Finally, my dissertation implies that the presence of tax internal control weaknesses 
constrains tax avoidance and thus a focus on improving internal controls could help improve the 
tax planning function. However, my firm-level analysis also implies that effective tax planning is 
a sustainable process and thus a firm and its stakeholders may require several periods before the 
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1.1 Motivation and Summary of the Thesis 
In this dissertation I examine how internal governance mechanisms affect a firm’s 
capacity for strategic tax planning. More specifically, I investigate a possible relation between a 
firm’s system of internal control and long-run corporate tax avoidance. Tax planning 
encompasses the strategies that a firm uses to lower the present value of its income tax payments 
(Rego, 2003) and long-run tax avoidance reflects the outcome of this planning over a sustained 
time period. According to Doss and Jonas (2004), a system of internal controls contains the 
policies and procedures that ensure the effectiveness of operations and the attainment of business 
objectives, and thus by extension internal controls represent an underlying component that 
facilitates tax planning. 
Tax planning is not typically publicly observable. However, empirical constructs of tax 
avoidance allow researchers to infer the extent of a firm’s tax planning activities. As discussed 
more fully in Chapters 2 and 4, long-run tax avoidance can be measured using five-year average 
Cash ETR following Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2008). Similarly, internal control systems 
are proprietary but recent changes to financial statement disclosure regulations in the United 
States provide a window to examine publicly-available information regarding the quality of these 
internal mechanisms. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), enacted in 2002, requires companies to provide opinions 
about the effectiveness of their internal controls and to identify significant problem areas as part 
of an initiative to ensure the credibility of financial statements. Although SOX was designed 
with financial reporting quality in mind, the disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) 
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within the tax function are frequent under SOX (Ge and McVay, 2005; Quimby and Pearce, 
2006), with reports citing that 20% or more of weaknesses in SOX disclosures are tax-related 
(European Audit Committee Leadership Network, 2005; Elgood, 2006). Given the extent of 
these reported issues in the tax function, I examine whether these disclosed tax-related internal 
control weaknesses provide information about firm-level, long-run tax avoidance. Furthermore, I 
examine whether the combination of tax-specific internal control disclosures and tax avoidance 
provide relevant information for assessing shareholder returns. 
At least two reasons explain why a relation between tax-specific internal control 
disclosures and tax avoidance may exist. First, firms must consider tax risk to effectively address 
tax issues and opportunities. This process includes integrated assessments of internal control 
aspects and operational aspects of risk (Wunder, 2009). By assessing the firm’s tax-related 
internal controls a manager can improve the overall tax risk management strategy. Failure to 
document controls, maintain documentation, or communicate across divisions reflects poor 
internal processes that could result in missed tax planning opportunities or reassessments by tax 
authorities that follow poorly conducted tax planning. In summary, weak tax-related internal 
controls can directly reduce the effectiveness of a firm’s tax planning function. Second, such 
internal control weaknesses can also suggest the presence of financial constraints. Financial 
constraints influence firms to allocate fewer resources to strategic tax planning. The point is that, 
either directly or indirectly, firms with weak tax-related internal controls may avoid less tax. 
On the other hand, recent studies suggest that for firms that operate in environments that 
allow significant management discretion, earnings management and aggressive tax avoidance are 
positively correlated, as found by Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009a) and Wilson (2009). If tax 
ICWs result in an environment that is conducive to discretionary activities, then earnings 
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management and aggressive tax avoidance could occur, as suggested by anecdotal evidence that 
argues that firms involved in significant accounting scandals, i.e. Enron and WorldCom, jointly 
set income-increasing and tax-decreasing objectives (US Congress, 2003; McGill and Outslay, 
2004). As described more fully in Chapter 2, concurrent evidence by Gleason, Pincus and Rego 
(2010) is consistent with earnings management occurring in an environment with tax ICWs. 
Whether the presence of tax ICWs is also associated with more tax avoidance has not been 
empirically demonstrated and is thus the subject of Hypothesis 1. 
To further clarify the relation between tax-related ICWs and tax planning activities, I 
separate tax-related ICWs into account-level and company-level components, consistent with 
studies by Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007a and 2007b) and Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare 
(2008). These studies argue that the pervasiveness of the weakness determines whether or not it 
influences overall firm behaviour. Doyle et al. (2007a and 2007b) interpret their findings as 
evidence that account-level ICWs lead to unintentional errors that are unrelated to lower accruals 
quality. Consequently, my Hypothesis 2 states that tax avoidance is unrelated to account-level 
tax weaknesses because unintentional tax misstatements do not benefit active tax planning.  
As described in Chapter 2, prior research observes that company-level ICWs are more 
likely for firms with financial risk, resource constraints and various personnel issues, consistent 
with less effective tax planning for firms with “competency” issues. Company-level ICWs are 
also associated with lower accruals quality, earnings management and can reflect a “tone at the 
top” that results in management override and inadequate oversight, consistent with an 
environment that would be conducive to risky tax minimization because of “integrity” issues. 
Thus Hypothesis 3 states in the null form that company-level ICWs could have either a negative 
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or positive association with tax avoidance because competency issues and integrity issues have 
opposing relations with tax avoidance.  
The next step in my hypothesis development is to consider the relative stock return 
performance of firms conditional on how aggressively they avoid tax and the quality of their 
internal control systems. As Wilson (2009) describes, effective tax planning can lead to the 
creation of wealth for shareholders but ineffective tax planning can lead to “managerial 
opportunism” and ultimately wealth destruction. Weak internal controls may also be associated 
with ineffective tax planning. If firms lack the capacity or resources for strategic tax planning 
they will have difficulty creating positive returns for shareholders. Furthermore, the use of more 
discretionary activities in the presence of tax-related ICWs suggests managerial opportunism and 
lower abnormal returns, even when more tax is avoided. On the other hand, I expect that tax 
aggressive firms with strong tax-related internal controls will provide positive abnormal returns 
to shareholders. In Chapter 3, I present these hypotheses in the null form, consistent with my 
earlier arguments. Hypothesis 4 states that firms with weak tax-related internal controls do not 
underperform firms with strong internal controls, and Hypothesis 5 states that among firms with 
weak tax-related internal controls, there is no difference between firms that are tax aggressive 
and firms that are not tax aggressive.  
Chapter 4 describes a unique unbalanced panel dataset that I construct from multiple 
sources and use to evaluate my hypotheses. Basic material weakness disclosure data from Audit 
Analytics is matched with detailed, manually-collected material weakness information obtained 
from company 10-K filings in EDGAR. The combined material weakness data is then matched to 
firm-level accounting information from Compustat. The resulting panel dataset allows for control 
 
5 
of unobserved heterogeneity that could affect coefficient estimates. For my shareholder returns 
analysis, I further match this dataset with Fama-French risk factors and CRSP stock return data. 
In Chapter 5, I report the tests of the relation between tax avoidance and tax-related 
ICWs. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, with Cash ETR as the dependent 
measure, reveals that the coefficient on overall tax ICWs is positive. The positive coefficient is 
consistent with the argument that tax ICWs correlate with less tax avoidance. After separating 
the weaknesses into account-level and company-level components, I show that account-level tax 
ICWs are unrelated to tax avoidance but company-level tax ICWs, like overall tax ICWs, are 
positively associated with my dependent measure, Cash ETR. These findings continue to hold in 
rolling average regressions, annual regressions using the Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax 
difference (BTD) measure as the dependent variable, regressions with alternative internal control 
weakness classification methods and regressions that control for the strength of corporate 
governance. Overall my results support prior research on the importance of pervasive internal 
control weaknesses and extend this literature to suggest that they negatively influence the ability 
to plan and minimize taxes effectively. 
The main results also suggest a strong direct effect of resource constraints on tax 
avoidance. The coefficient on one of the two proxies of resource constraints indicates an 
eighteen percentage point increase in five-year average Cash ETR for firms with consecutive, 
cumulative accounting losses. Drawing on supplemental factor analysis that provides a single 
resource constraint factor and interactions between this factor and tax ICWs, coefficient 
estimates reveal that firms with tax ICWs and low constraints avoid more tax on average than 
firms without ICWs but the negative association between tax ICWs and tax avoidance is 
strengthened for firms with high constraints. 
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In additional supplemental analysis I investigate the influence of internal control 
weakness remediation on tax avoidance. In annual specifications of my empirical model, the 
presence of remediation is associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. In other words, tax 
planning appears to improve after ICWs are remediated. However, further analysis with 
overlapping, annual regressions of average variables implies that these improvements occur in 
the short-term and that it likely requires several periods until a subsequent improvement in long-
run tax planning occurs. 
Chapter 6 presents the analysis of stock return performance. In these tests, I estimate 
abnormal returns from the Fama-French (1993) four-factor model. I find that tax aggressive 
firms with strong internal control systems have positive abnormal returns. Consistent with my 
expectations and contrary to my hypothesis stated in the null form, I document a negative 
association between company-level tax-related ICWs and stock returns. This negative 
association holds in regressions with out-of-sample and in-sample measurement of tax 
aggressiveness and regressions with any type of ICW as well as general tax ICWs. The negative 
association is weaker in regressions with the Manzon-Plesko (2002) measure of book-tax 
differences as a proxy for tax aggressiveness. The negative association does not hold in 
regressions before or after my sample period or in regressions with the Wilson (2009) measure of 
tax shelter participation as a proxy for tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, my tests fail to reject 
Hypothesis 5 and thus do not provide evidence that this negative association increases for firms 
that are tax aggressive. 
My research makes the following contributions. First, the specific link between internal 
controls and tax avoidance has not been shown previously and thus my research extends our 
understanding of how internal governance influences tax planning. I demonstrate that the high 
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incidence of tax-related material weakness disclosures is correlated with less tax avoidance. Such 
evidence answers the call by Graham (2008) for more research that examines why firms do not 
pursue tax benefits more aggressively. Second, this evidence implies that company-level internal 
control disclosures provide information other than on financial reporting quality and thus 
corroborates the conjectures in the extant literature that company-level ICWs affect 
management’s ability to control their overall operations. Third, I show that tax-related ICWs are 
associated with lower stock performance such that tax aggressive and non-tax aggressive firms 
with weak tax controls under-perform tax aggressive firms with strong tax controls. This 
evidence extends the research on the shareholder benefits of tax aggressiveness and implies that 
weak internal governance reduces these benefits.  
Finally, this research provides a new component to the growing SOX-related tax 
literature. SOX-related tax research has generally focused on auditor independence, knowledge 
spill-over and non-audit fees (Maydew and Shackelford, 2007; Gleason and Mills, 2007; Cook, 
Huston and Omer, 2008; and Elder, Harris and Zhou, 2008). Elder et al. (2008) consider the 
influence of auditor independence and tax consulting on tax and other internal control 
weaknesses but they do not consider tax avoidance, while Cook et al. (2008) investigate the 
association between auditor-provided tax services and tax planning (using changes in effective 
tax rates or ETR) but they do not consider internal control disclosures. Bedard and Graham 
(2011) focus on the determinants of tax internal control deficiencies, both publicly and privately 
disclosed. My dissertation suggests that disclosed issues in the tax function constrain tax 
planning and any related shareholder returns, and thus recognition and remediation of such issues 
as a result of SOX regulation is a benefit to the firm and its stakeholders. 
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My dissertation contrasts in several ways with concurrent research of Gleason et al. 
(2010), which investigates the influence of general tax weaknesses on earnings management via 
reductions in ETR. First, they examine tax ICWs and financial reporting aggressiveness, not tax 
avoidance. Second, Gleason et al. (2010) do not identify the pervasiveness of tax ICWs and thus 
their results could be stronger if company-level ICWs are distinguished. Third and finally, their 
results are consistent with tax ICWs allowing managers to engage in tax-related earnings 
management on average in the short-run, while my results are consistent with less long-run tax 
avoidance on average in the presence of tax ICWs. 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
This dissertation is organized into five main chapters, excluding this introduction and a 
conclusion. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature relevant to this dissertation. This review 
includes separate discussions of tax avoidance and internal control disclosures and weaknesses, 
as well as specific discussions of tax-related internal control weaknesses and a link between 
internal controls and tax planning. This review emphasizes the lack of empirical research on tax 
avoidance and internal controls. 
Chapter 3 develops the thesis hypotheses, which are motivated by the frequency that tax-
related internal control weaknesses are disclosed under SOX regulation and the resulting 
potential implications of this disclosed information. The first set of three hypotheses examines 
the influence of tax-related internal control weaknesses on tax avoidance, both in general and 
when the pervasiveness of the internal control weakness is considered. Recognizing the 
implication of pervasive, company-level internal control weaknesses for the tax function, the 
second set of two hypotheses examines the joint influence of internal control quality and 
aggressive tax avoidance on stock return performance. 
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Chapter 4 details the sample selection procedure and the specific empirical models 
designed to test each of my hypotheses. This chapter reports the construction of my panel dataset 
and the firm-level measures of tax avoidance and internal control weaknesses that are critical for 
my subsequent empirical analysis. The first two empirical models are intended to estimate the 
influence of general, account-level and company-level tax-related internal control weaknesses on 
the rate of taxes paid (i.e. Cash ETR) for S&P 1500 firms that file a SOX report. The third 
empirical model is intended to examine the abnormal stock returns associated with binary 
rankings of a firm’s Cash ETR estimate and internal control quality. Overall, the purpose of these 
tests is to show that long-run tax planning is influenced by tax-related internal control 
weaknesses and that the stock market reacts to the combination of these two factors. 
Chapter 5 reports results from the empirical analysis of Hypotheses 1 through 3 regarding 
the relation between long-run tax avoidance and tax-related internal control weaknesses. The 
primary evidence in this chapter is from empirical tests that use firm-level, average values of the 
dependent and independent variables. Implicit in this analysis of the panel dataset is the 
smoothing of within-firm variation using these firm-level, average values. Furthermore, this 
chapter includes sensitivity analysis that reports results from overlapping, annual regressions of 
average variables used to identify the empirical models. This sensitivity analysis also includes 
tests designed to determine whether alternative tax avoidance proxies, the classification method 
of account-level and company level ICWs, the inclusion of corporate governance measures, the 
influence of resource constraints, or remediation of internal control weaknesses affect the results 
and inferences relating to Hypotheses 1 through 3. 
Chapter 6 reports results from the empirical analysis of Hypotheses 4 and 5 regarding the 
potential joint influence of aggressive tax avoidance and internal control quality on shareholder 
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returns. The tests use cross-sectional variation from a Fama-French four factor model to compare 
the monthly abnormal returns for four groups of firms that result from the interaction of tax 
aggressive/non-tax aggressive and strong/weak internal control indicators. Additional analysis 
tests the robustness of the results to alternative internal control weakness variables, sample 
periods and tax aggressiveness proxies. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by providing a summary of the evidence in and the main 






In this chapter I introduce extant research that is relevant to my dissertation. Two main 
themes are apparent in my work: tax avoidance and internal control quality. The first part of this 
review describes how the literature defines, measures and empirically examines tax avoidance, 
an outcome of strategic tax planning. The second part of this review begins with a general 
discussion of the importance of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) regulation for internal control research 
and concludes with a specific discussion of internal control research with respect to taxes. The 
third and final part of this review introduces the concept of tax risk management, a concept 
which could help to integrate the previously unexplored connection between tax avoidance and 
internal control quality. 
This chapter is intended to provide a review of the main themes of this paper, and thus 
subsequent chapters may introduce additional research that is important to the concepts being 
discussed in those particular chapters. This chapter is divided into six sections, including this 
introduction and a conclusion. 
Section 2.2 begins by defining tax avoidance and explaining why the broad concept of 
tax avoidance is suitable for my context. This section also identifies proxies of tax avoidance that 
are commonly explored by researchers and the traditional determinants of tax avoidance that are 
associated with these proxies. Finally, this section reviews recent studies that consider new 
relations between tax avoidance and its underlying factors, as well as a brief discussion of the 
implications of tax avoidance for shareholder returns. 
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Section 2.3 summarizes the disclosure requirements under SOX 302 and SOX 404 and 
the firm characteristics that are typically associated with the presence of material internal control 
weaknesses. This section follows with a discussion of the dichotomy of pervasiveness that is 
common in the literature and explains how firm characteristics can differ depending on whether 
an internal control weakness relates to company-level issues or account-level issues. This review 
also details literature that examines the outcomes that result from internal control weaknesses 
and how certain negative outcomes can be mitigated by the process of remediation. 
Section 2.4 examines the extant literature that specifically investigates tax-related internal 
control weaknesses. This review reveals two main points: (1) despite a high frequency of 
disclosed issues in the tax function, tax-related internal control research is sparse, and; (2) extant 
research has not yet attempted to triangulate the themes of tax avoidance and internal control 
quality. 
Section 2.5 begins with a discussion of the concepts of tax risk and tax risk management 
and follows with a description of the links between tax risk management, internal control 
assessments and strategic tax planning. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Tax Avoidance 
Rego (2003, p.808) defines tax planning as: “[a reduction of] the present value of tax 
payments”. Thus in a general sense tax planning is a strategy of minimizing taxes. Effective tax 
planning seeks to minimize taxes but only to the extent that such planning maximizes after-tax 
returns (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin, 2009).1 
Beginning with Scholes and Wolfson (1992), modern concepts of tax planning have been 
explored. Recently, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) delineate concepts of tax avoidance – including 
                                                     
1 Their definition of effective tax planning requires consideration of the three components of the ‘Scholes-Wolfson’ 
paradigm: all parties, all taxes and all costs.  
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tax aggressiveness, tax sheltering and tax evasion – as degrees of tax reductions that result from 
tax planning, and often the bounds of these concepts overlap. In a broad sense, tax avoidance is a 
term that suggests a firm is avoiding taxes by all means, which may or may not include tax 
aggressiveness, tax sheltering or tax evasion (Dyreng et al., 2008). Furthermore, tax avoidance 
firms are often considered to be tax aggressive when they report a tax rate that is significantly 
lower than the prevailing statutory rates (Dyreng et al., 2008). Frank et al. (2009a, p.468) define 
tax aggressiveness as “downward manipulation of taxable income through tax planning that may 
or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion”.2 Tax sheltering is a specific type of tax 
planning that is considered aggressive and often to represent evasion (Wilson, 2009). Tax 
evasion, therefore, defines an area of aggressive tax planning that circumvents the law. 
Ultimately, tax avoidance could be considered to be synonymous with tax 
aggressiveness. The former is typically associated with broad descriptions of tax planning, the 
latter with extreme descriptions of tax planning. Consistent with the Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) discussion of the inter-related terms tax avoidance, tax planning and tax aggressiveness, I 
refer to tax avoidance throughout this dissertation unless I write aggressive tax avoidance or tax 
aggressiveness specifically. In this regard I attempt to remain neutral towards a large cross-
section of the literature. 
Turning to the extant research, a number of different proxies are used to capture tax 
planning or tax avoidance because actual tax planning is unobservable from publicly available 
information. Gupta and Newberry (1997), Mills et al. (1998), Rego (2003) and Ayers, Jiang and 
Laplante (2009) use effective tax rates (ETR), generally estimated as current tax expense divided 
by pre-tax book income. Mills et al. (1998) also measure investments in tax planning using 
                                                     
2 While some researchers would argue that tax planning does not include tax evasion, which is fraudulent reporting 




proprietary data on tax department salaries and fees paid for external tax consulting (legal, 
accounting, etc.).  
While these two measures represent traditional proxies, more recent research has relied 
on alternative measures of tax avoidance, such as book-tax differences (BTDs). In general, BTD 
measures require an estimate of taxable income to be subtracted from pre-tax income, where 
taxable income is often defined as current tax expense grossed-up at the statutory tax rate. 
However, Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009a and 2009b) and Wilson 
(2009) each estimate more sophisticated BTD proxies. In the following three paragraphs, I 
describe each of these measures more fully. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) construct a discretionary or residual BTD that adjusts for 
earnings management. They regress the annual domestic BTD measure of Manzon and Plesko 
(2002) on annual total accruals estimates from Healy (1985). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
argue that their correction for accounting accruals results in an estimated residual value that 
represents the discretionary, tax shelter component of a firm’s BTD. 
Frank et al. (2009a and 2009b) also develop an annual discretionary BTD based on 
empirical regressions that rely specifically on permanent BTDs rather than total BTDs. In other 
words, temporary deferred tax expense is removed from their BTD proxy. They then regress this 
permanent BTD on what they argue are non-discretionary items that are unrelated to tax 
aggressiveness, such as intangible assets, state taxes, change in net operating losses and lagged 
permanent BTD. The residual from this regression is a discretionary permanent difference 
otherwise known as DTAX (Frank et al., 2009a). 
Wilson (2009) begins with a standard estimate of BTD as pre-tax income minus grossed-
up current tax expense. However, he focuses on tax shelter activity and accordingly adjusts the 
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BTD estimate for the value of tax benefits derived from tax sheltering. Wilson (2009) calculates 
the grossed-up federal tax savings from tax shelter activity based on financial statement 
information collected for known tax shelter participants. In addition, Wilson (2009) uses the 
standard BTD estimate to help identify his model of tax shelter participation. I will describe this 
predictive model of tax shelter participation in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
Cash ETR is another recently developed proxy that researchers use to measure tax 
avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008 and 2010). Like ETR, Cash ETR is a tax rate 
estimate based on financial statement information. However, Cash ETR includes taxes paid in 
the numerator and pre-tax income adjusted for extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
in the denominator. More importantly, Cash ETR is meant to be an average of values over 
several periods so as to smooth out the measurement error resulting from timing differences in 
installments, refunds, tax settlements, etc. I will discuss the estimation method of Cash ETR in 
greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Several recent studies compare the relative effectiveness and aggressiveness of these 
proxies when investigating different aspects of tax avoidance (e.g. Frank et al., 2009a; Rego and 
Wilson, 2010; Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin, 2010). Frank et al. (2009a) show that their DTAX 
measure performs as well or better than other BTD measures in their various tests that examine a 
relation between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. Rego and Wilson 
(2010) show that their tests of association between senior management compensation and tax 
aggressiveness are robust to using measures of Cash ETR, DTAX, and tax sheltering as 
independent variables. Chen et al (2010) show a consistent result that closely-held firms exhibit 
less aggressive tax avoidance than widely-held firms, regardless of how they measure tax 
avoidance (ETR, Cash ETR, Manzon-Plesko BTD, Desai-Dharmapala residual BTD). However, 
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as Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argue, not all tax avoidance measures are suited for every tax 
avoidance context. In Chapter 4, I discuss why I use the Dyreng et al. (2008) measure of Cash 
ETR as my primary proxy for tax avoidance in my dissertation. 
Within the tax avoidance literature researchers use these proxies to investigate the firm 
characteristics that drive tax planning. The common explanatory variables tested include size, 
profitability, foreign operations, leverage and intensity (capital, R&D, etc.), and thus these 
determinants can be control variables in my empirical regression analysis. The literature is mixed 
on the association between size and these various measures of tax avoidance. Mills et al. (1998), 
using investments in tax planning, and Dyreng et al. (2008), using Cash ETR, show that larger 
firms avoid more tax. Using ETR measures, Zimmerman (1983) and Rego (2003) show that 
larger firms avoid less tax, a finding corroborated by Frank et al. (2009a) using BTD proxies. 
These negative associations are generally attributed to the influence of political pressure. Gupta 
and Newberry (1997), on the other hand, find no relation between size and ETR-based tax 
avoidance proxies.  
Evidence on the influence of profitability on tax avoidance is also mixed. Rego (2003) 
and Frank et al. (2009a) show that more profitable firms avoid more tax when ETR and BTD 
proxies are used. Gupta and Newberry (1997) again find the opposite result using ETR. Dyreng 
et al. (2008), using Cash ETR as a proxy for tax avoidance, report results consistent with Gupta 
and Newberry (1997). Generally the evidence regarding foreign operations is consistent across 
these studies and proxies: more foreign operations or foreign income leads to greater levels of 
tax avoidance.  
 Beyond firm characteristics, recent research on tax avoidance focuses on new relations. 
Dyreng et al. (2010) investigate the influence of management characteristics on ETR and Cash 
 
17 
ETR proxies of tax avoidance using a sample of firms where the manager (CEO or CFO) has 
switched from one firm to another. Their model develops a method to estimate the influence of 
“manager” fixed-effects on tax avoidance. They show that CEOs and CFOs have a significantly 
positive influence on tax avoidance. Robinson, Sikes and Weaver (2010) use survey data to form 
a prediction model of a firms’ choice to structure their internal tax department as a profit center 
or a cost center. Consistent with their theoretical predictions, they show that firms with tax 
departments as profit centers have lower ETRs. They do not find an association with Cash ETR, 
however. Finally, as described previously in this section, Chen et al. (2010) document a negative 
relation between aggressive tax avoidance and closely-held firms. 
 Finally, some research has examined the stock returns to shareholders that are associated 
with aggressive tax avoidance. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) investigate the market’s reaction to 
press releases that inform the public of a firm’s involvement in a tax shelter. Using event study 
methodology and cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day announcement window, they find a 
decline in stock price for firms with news reports linking them to tax shelter activity. Wilson 
(2009) extends the findings of Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) and examines the joint influence of 
corporate governance quality and known tax shelter participation on abnormal market returns. I 
describe his method in greater detail in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. Wilson (2009) 
observes that both actual and predicted tax shelter firms with strong corporate governance 
outperform actual and predicted tax shelter firms with weak corporate governance. Thus tax 
shelter firms with strong corporate governance in his model avoid the price declines documented 
by Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), and in fact generate wealth for shareholders. 
 Frank et al. (2009b) examine the stock market reactions to firms that are considered to be 
aggressive for both financial and tax purposes. Using size-adjusted twelve-month buy-and-hold 
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returns as a dependent variable, Frank et al. (2009b) provide evidence that the market typically 
rewards firms with aggressive reporting. They do find that aggressive firms in the time period 
from 1995-1999 experience lower abnormal returns in the years following that period. Overall, 
the market appears to attach a premium to firms that are jointly aggressive for financial reporting 
and tax purposes in their sample period.  
2.3 Internal Control Disclosures under Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations 
Internal control disclosures are required under Sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Section 302 became effective for fiscal years ending after August 29, 2002 for all 
SEC registrants. Section 404 became effective for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004 
for accelerated filers, and for years ending on or after December 15, 2007 for management 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control and December 15, 2008 for the auditor’s 
attestation report. In addition to differences in their effective dates, these two sections of SOX 
differ in regards to who assesses the effectiveness of internal controls. Although Sections 302 
and 404 require management to certify that they have evaluated the effectiveness of their internal 
controls over disclosures and financial reporting, respectively, Section 404 further requires the 
auditor/public accountant to attest to the assessment of internal controls. Doyle et al. (2007a) 
conclude that some material weakness disclosures under SOX 302 are, in effect, voluntary. To 
avoid issues regarding “voluntary” disclosures I investigate SOX 404 disclosures only with this 
dissertation. However, I do comment on the results of both SOX 302 and 404 studies in this 
section. 
The availability of SOX internal control disclosures has spawned a series of archival-
empirical research papers that examine firms with poor internal control quality. The disclosures 
provide a set of previously unavailable qualitative information that researchers have quantified in 
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an effort to understand the factors that give rise to poor internal controls. Two papers at the 
forefront of this investigation of determinants of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) are Doyle 
et al (2007a) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007). 
Doyle et al. (2007a) investigate material internal control weakness disclosures from SOX 
302 and SOX 404. A material internal control weakness represents a significant deficiency or a 
series of significant deficiencies that could result in material financial misstatement and thus is 
the most severe type of deficiency in SOX disclosures. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) focus on 
all types of deficiencies, material or not, and restrict their investigation to SOX 302 disclosures 
in the pre-SOX 404 period.3 Both studies use logistic regressions to investigate the association of 
internal control weaknesses with firm characteristics, including size, financial health, reporting 
complexity, rapid growth, restructuring and corporate governance.4 In general, both studies show 
that ICWs are more likely for firms that are smaller, financially weaker, more complex, growing 
rapidly, and/or undergoing restructuring. Both papers also state that firms with ICWs have likely 
fewer resources available for internal control. 
Doyle et al. (2007a) further sub-classify these internal control weaknesses into account-
level and company-level categories. Doyle et al. (2007b), Chan et al. (2008), Hammersley et al 
(2008) and Goh (2009) also rely on similar sub-classifications.5 According to Doyle et al. 
                                                     
3 Doyle et al. (2007a) refer to internal control weaknesses or ICWs while Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) refer to 
internal control deficiencies or ICDs. Having stated that Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) investigate deficiencies with 
varying levels of severity, for expositional purposes I use the term ICWs only. 
4 Doyle et al. (2007a) also include age as a determinant of interest and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) include auditor 
variables, the incidence of restatements and the potential for litigation. 
5 In theory, all of these studies are interested in how serious or pervasive an internal control weakness is. However, 
the individual studies may refer to these concepts using different terminology. Doyle et al. (2007a and 2007b) refer 
to pervasiveness and how easily one can “audit around” an ICW, borrowing terminology put forth by Moody’s 
Investor Services (Doss and Jonas 2004). Doyle et al. (2007a and 2007b) dichotomize the term into account-level 
i.e. less pervasive and company-level i.e. more pervasive. Goh (2009) uses identical classifications. Chan et al. 
(2008) refer to account-level and company-level ICWs as specific and general ICWs, respectively. Finally, 
Hammersley et al. (2008) use the terms auditability and seriousness, and like Doyle et al. (2007a and 2007b), they 
base their terminology on Moody’s “audit around” concept. Instead of account-level and company-level ICWs, 
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(2007a), account-level internal control weaknesses include incorrectly recorded balances and 
improper application of accounting principles. On the other hand, Doyle et al. (2007a) and 
Hammersley et al. (2008) state that company-level internal control weaknesses reflect issues in 
the company’s overall control environment and thus by their nature have a much more pervasive 
effect on the company’s operations. 
Doyle et al. (2007a) document that specific firm characteristics differ across these two 
types of weaknesses. Account-level internal control weaknesses are more likely for firms that are 
larger, older, financially healthier, more complex and growing more rapidly. Company-level 
internal control weaknesses are more likely for firms that are smaller, younger and at greater 
financial risk. Again, resource constraints are considered a significant issue for the firms with 
company-level internal control weaknesses. 
The availability of SOX disclosures allows researchers to study the determinants of 
internal control weaknesses but it also allows researchers to investigate the implications of 
having a weak system of internal control. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss various 
studies that examine associations between internal control weaknesses and subsequent financial 
outcomes, namely shareholder returns and earnings quality.  
Hammersley et al. (2008) examine market reactions to the disclosure of SOX 302 internal 
control weaknesses. Particularly relevant to my thesis, they investigate the market reactions to 
the severity or pervasiveness of those weaknesses. Hammersley et al. (2008) show that the 
market reacts negatively to internal control weakness disclosures and that it reacts more 
negatively to disclosures as the pervasiveness of the weaknesses increases. The authors conclude 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Hammersley et al. (2008) refer to “more auditable” and “less auditable” ICWs, respectively. In my dissertation, I 
choose to use the terms pervasiveness, account-level and company-level. 
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that these SOX disclosures are informative to investors and thus influence market revisions of 
firm value.  
Corroborating these results, Beneish, Billings and Hodder (2008) show that the market 
reacts negatively to disclosures of SOX 302 internal control weaknesses, and that the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding these disclosures are more negative for firms with 
company-level ICWs. For non-accelerated filers, they typically find more negative reactions, as 
well as a negative market reaction to account-level ICWs. They do not find a market reaction to 
SOX 404 disclosures, however, regardless of ICW pervasiveness or type of filer. Beneish et al. 
(2008) conjecture that the lack of market reaction to SOX 404 disclosures could be due to the 
independent confirmation from the auditor’s report, the typically stronger firm-level attributes of 
SOX 404 filers, or the noise induced by the clustering of SOX 404 filings. 
With respect to earning quality, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) suggest that weak internal 
controls lead to both unintentional errors and intentional misstatement, both of which reflect 
inaccurate accruals and therefore lower accruals quality. In cross-sectional tests, they show that 
firms disclosing SOX 404 internal control weaknesses have lower accruals quality. In within-
firm tests, they document that firms that remediate internal control weaknesses have a 
subsequent improvement in accruals quality. Furthermore, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) provide 
evidence that ICWs are associated with both large positive and large negative accruals. 
Therefore, they conclude that the bias in accruals is more likely related to unintentional errors 
rather than intentional misstatement. 
Doyle et al. (2007b) also provide evidence that ICWs lead to lower accruals quality in 
cross-sectional tests. In general, the negative relation between ICWs and accruals quality exists 
only for SOX 302 disclosures. However, when internal control weaknesses are classified at the 
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account-level and the company-level, this negative relation also exists for SOX 404 disclosures. 
Although they make no conclusion about whether lower accruals quality results from 
unintentional or intentional errors, Doyle et al. (2007b, p.1146) concede that certain company-
level weaknesses could “facilitate earnings management”. Overall this study provides further 
evidence that pervasiveness is critical to understanding the impact of an ICW on firm-level 
outcomes. 
Contrary to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), Chan et al. (2008) provide modest evidence 
consistent with earnings management and intentional misstatement in their cross-sectional study 
of SOX 404 disclosures and earnings quality. Like Doyle et al. (2007b), Chan et al. (2008) find 
that firms with company-level weaknesses have lower earnings quality than firms with account-
level weaknesses. Furthermore, firms with company-level weaknesses appear to bias earnings 
upwards. As I discuss in the next section, Gleason et al. (2010) also provide evidence consistent 
with upwards earnings management in the presence of tax-specific ICWs. Thus the extant 
literature consistently shows that internal control weaknesses are associated with lower earnings 
quality, however it cannot yet be concluded whether lower earnings quality is a product of 
unintentional errors or, more seriously, earnings management. 
Finally, although the disclosure of an internal control weakness can suggest that various 
issues, such as lower earnings quality, exist within a firm, the aforementioned study by 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) suggest that these issues can be mitigated through subsequent 
improvements in the problem areas. Typically, SOX disclosures contain a section where 
management discusses the steps they plan to undertake or the plans currently underway to 
remediate internal controls weaknesses. In addition to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), Feng, Li, 
and McVay (2009) compare firms that report ICWs in two consecutive years to firms that 
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remediate their ICWs by the second of the two years. They also include a benchmark set of firms 
that do not report any ICWs in the two-year period. Feng, Li, and McVay (2009) find that failing 
to remediate internal control weaknesses are firms that are also less likely to provide timely, 
precise and relatively frequent management guidance.  
2.4 Tax-Related Internal Control Weaknesses 
A recent report issued by Deloitte (2011) suggests that although material weakness 
disclosures continue to show an overall decline, tax-related issues remain the most prevalent of 
all internal control weaknesses. Even with overall declines and planned remediation, the report 
comments that remediation efforts are an on-going process for firms and that many organizations 
still have much room for improvement in their tax function. The empirical literature also shows a 
significantly high incidence of disclosed weaknesses within the tax function under SOX (Ge and 
McVay, 2005). Gleason et al. (2010) document that as of June 2007 more than one-third of 
reports included in Audit Analytics indicate tax ICWs.  
Nevertheless, analysis of tax-related internal control weaknesses within the academic 
literature is sparse. Elder et al. (2008) examine a relation between auditor-provided tax services 
and internal control weaknesses (both tax-related and other) and provide some evidence that 
suggests that a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and internal control 
weaknesses is indicative of a lack of auditor independence. However, Elder et al. (2008) attempt 
to understand the factors that give rise to tax-related ICWs and I view internal control systems as 
an underlying part of a firm’s tax function. Thus I investigate the role of tax-related internal 
control weaknesses as a determinant, rather than a result, of firm-level activities. 
Like Elder et al. (2008), Bedard and Graham (2011) also focus on the determinants of 
tax-related internal control deficiencies. In their research, Bedard and Graham (2011) use a 
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proprietary dataset of internal control disclosures that are privately known to the firm and its 
auditor. Several findings in their research support the importance of further investigating the 
implications of tax-related internal control weaknesses. First, publicly disclosed tax issues are far 
less frequent than privately disclosed tax issues. Thus inferences drawn from SOX disclosures 
are just the “tip of the iceberg”. Second, more than 80% of the tax issues identified in the Bedard 
and Graham sample are determined by auditors. Without SOX regulation, one could argue that 
many tax issues would likely still exist undetected. This evidence therefore further suggests that 
SOX regulation provides an opportunity to investigate internal governance of the tax function. 
Third, resource constraints contribute to the disclosure of tax internal control deficiencies. 
Concurrent research by Gleason et al. (2010) investigates the implications of tax-related 
internal control weaknesses and looks specifically at the relation between tax ICWs and earnings 
management. They report that in the year prior to disclosing a tax ICW, firms with such 
weaknesses are more likely to reduce their ETR from the third to fourth quarter to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks than firms without such weaknesses. Thus evidence in this study suggests 
that firms with tax ICWs engage in upwards earnings management, consistent with the relation 
between general ICWs and earnings management reported by Chan et al. (2008). 
In related research, the prior literature on book-tax differences argues and provides 
evidence that a larger book-tax discrepancy is indicative of discretionary behaviour, such as 
earnings management or aggressive tax planning (e.g., Gleason and Mills, 2002; Dhaliwal et al., 
2004; Blouin and Tuna, 2007; Frank et al., 2009a; Frank et al., 2009b). Gleason et al. (2010) do 
not test a BTD measure but their findings on tax-related earnings management support the 
general theme of this research stream. However, these book-tax difference studies do not 
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consider the influence of tax ICWs, and Gleason et al. (2010) are silent on the implications of tax 
ICWs for tax avoidance. 
Finally, Gleason et al. (2010) show that the remediation of internal control weaknesses 
subsequent to their initial disclosure is associated with decreases in tax-accrual earnings 
management and ETR persistence, consistent with the benefits of remediation reviewed in the 
previous section. Remediation is implicitly relevant to my thesis because I investigate long-run 
tax planning. Although internal control weaknesses can be remediated from one year to the next, 
I argue in subsequent chapters that tax planning is a sustainable process that cannot be easily 
changed. Furthermore, Bedard and Graham (2011) find that tax deficiencies are more likely to be 
unremediated at year-end than non-tax deficiencies. Thus it is an open empirical question 
whether, in the same way that remediation appears to have an immediate influence on earnings 
management activities, the identification and improvement of a tax-related internal control 
weakness can have an immediate influence on tax planning outcomes. 
2.5 Tax Risk Management 
The ability of a firm to successfully avoid a higher level of taxes paid relates in part to the 
certainty or uncertainty of its tax plans. In other words, tax avoidance relates to tax risk. A 
universal definition of tax risk is elusive but Arlinghaus (1998) provides a reasonable one: “the 
likelihood that a tax outcome differs from what is expected, due to a variety of reasons, for 
example, the judicial process, changes in the law, changes in business assumptions, an increased 
intensity of audits, and uncertainty in the interpretation of the law; and any action emanating 
from the tax function that subjects the company to adverse publicity.” 
Managing tax risk requires well-functioning internal controls. A framework of tax risk 
management adapted from the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
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Commission (COSO) states that there are seven areas of tax risk that a firm must manage 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004), which implies integration of internal control assessment and 
tax planning. Specifically, these seven risks fall into two sub-categories, specific and generic, 
which map into the Arlinghaus (1998) definition of tax risk. Specific risk areas include: 
transactional risk (e.g., acquisitions, mergers); operational risk (e.g., new business ventures, new 
operating models, new operating structure); compliance risk (e.g., weak records and controls, 
data integrity issues, legislative changes), and; financial accounting risk (e.g., changes in systems 
and policies). Generic risk areas include: portfolio risk (e.g., combination of any of the risks); 
management risk (e.g., changes in personnel, new/inexperienced resources), and; reputational 
risk (e.g., revenue authority investigation, press comment, legal actions). Each risk area is 
relevant to internal control policies because, as Wunder (2009, p.16) states, the COSO 
framework represents “‘the gold standard’ for assessing internal controls.” 
SOX disclosures that accompany a firm’s year-end audit are a valuable source for 
assessing tax risk management within the tax function because public companies “must include 
in their annual financial reports an assessment of the effectiveness of [their] internal controls” 
(Wunder, 2009, p.16; emphasis added). Ineffective internal controls imply ineffective tax risk 
management. Furthermore, audit standards (e.g., SAS No. 55, AICPA 1988) state that internal 
controls help to achieve entity objectives, thereby implying that internal control procedures for 
the tax function go beyond the reporting of tax elements in the financial statements. Tax-related 
internal control disclosures could provide information about tax reporting and tax operations. 
Thus successful strategic tax planning and tax avoidance may require a strong process that 




In summary, this chapter reviews research that investigates the relation between 
commonly identified factors, such as size and profitability, and several proxies for tax avoidance. 
The more recent research investigates the influence of less commonly identified factors, such as 
family ownership, on tax avoidance as well as the influence of tax avoidance on shareholder 
returns. However, tax researchers have yet to consider the implications that underlying systems 
of internal controls could have on corporate tax avoidance. 
This chapter also reviews extant literature that identifies firm characteristics and 
management incentives that are associated with the likelihood of disclosing a weakness in 
internal control. Several studies in this review argue that the relation between firm characteristics 
and weaknesses depends on whether a weakness is at the account-level or the company-level. 
Researchers also consider the role of internal control weaknesses in evaluating accruals quality 
and earnings management. In certain select cases, research examines the determinants of tax 
internal control weaknesses as well as earnings management and auditor independence for firms 
with tax-related internal control weaknesses. Given their relative high frequency however, tax 
internal control weaknesses appear to be an under-investigated area of research and thus provide 






This chapter develops testable hypotheses that build on the themes reviewed in the 
previous chapter. The chapter begins by providing arguments that relate concepts of internal 
control quality to strategic tax planning and explaining how tax-related internal control 
weaknesses could either negatively or positively influence corporate tax avoidance. These 
arguments move from a discussion of general tax internal control weaknesses to a discussion of 
specific account-level and company-level tax internal control weaknesses. Continuing with the 
theme of pervasive internal control weaknesses, this chapter provides arguments regarding the 
shareholder wealth effects that result from the joint influence of tax avoidance and company-
level tax internal control weaknesses. All hypotheses are stated in the null form. 
Section 3.2 of this chapter relates tax internal control weaknesses in general to tax 
avoidance. Hypothesis 1 is determined by contrasting management’s capacity or competency for 
strategic tax planning with management’s integrity and any resulting discretionary tax planning 
activities. Section 3.3 expands on this comparison and presents Hypotheses 2 and 3 regarding the 
importance of pervasiveness and how account-level and company-level tax internal control 
weaknesses could influence tax avoidance. 
Section 3.4 develops hypotheses regarding the influence of internal control quality and 
aggressive tax avoidance on shareholder returns. I argue that weak internal control quality 
signals wealth destruction and that when paired with aggressive tax avoidance, the destruction of 
wealth increases. Hypotheses 4 and 5 state these predictions in the null form. Section 3.5 
concludes with a summary of the chapter. 
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3.2 Internal Control Quality and Tax Avoidance 
The frequent incidence of tax-related internal control weaknesses is documented in the 
previous chapter. Given that SOX was designed with financial reporting quality in mind, one 
would expect tax-related internal control disclosures to provide information about financial 
reporting quality. Of relevance to this thesis, however, is whether these frequent disclosures 
provide information about management’s capacity for strategic tax planning. One concept 
discussed in the previous chapter that relates internal control to tax planning capacity is tax risk 
management because tax risk management relies on integrated assessments of operational, 
financial and internal control risks, among others. A weak tax risk management process could 
reflect weak tax-related internal controls and thus firms with tax-related internal control 
weaknesses would have a diminished capacity for tax planning compared to firms with strong 
tax-related internal controls. 
Determining nexus or permanent establishment for tax purposes is an example of a tax 
issue with significant risk for multijurisdictional and multinational firms. When a firm has a 
physical or technical presence (i.e. employees, sales, offices, etc.) in a particular jurisdiction (i.e. 
state, country, etc.) then it is considered to have nexus or permanent establishment and thus must 
ensure that it remits the appropriate taxes to the relevant tax authorities. Anecdotally, as 
organizational structures increase in complexity, it becomes more difficult for a manager to 
adequately assess the related costs and risks. Furthermore, transfer pricing and the maintenance 
of contemporaneous documentation is a significant concern among firms (Wunder, 2009). 
Transfer pricing requires the establishment of internal policies to assign costs between 
organizational units, and tax authorities require firms to maintain a specific and significant 
amount of documentation to justify the costs that are chosen. These arguments and anecdotes 
imply the need for firms to set strong internal controls at the outset of their activities in order to 
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ensure and sustain successful tax strategies in the long-run. Weak risk assessment or a lack of 
policies and documentation reflect ICWs that imply greater likelihood of reassessment by tax 
authorities or missed opportunities, ultimately resulting in higher taxes paid in the long-run.  
The prior literature discussed in Chapter 2 also suggests that the availability of resources 
for various firm-level functions has a significant influence on the likelihood of internal control 
weaknesses, including in the tax function. Thus this review suggests that one of the contributing 
factors to ineffective tax planning is the resources a firm is able to allocate to its tax function, 
including internal controls considerations. Regardless of the specific reason to forego tax 
planning opportunities, firms with weak tax-related internal controls could avoid less tax than 
firms with strong tax-related internal controls. 
Alternatively, tax internal controls may not relate directly to the effectiveness of the tax 
planning function, but may relate more directly to the checks and balances within it. The “tone at 
the top” of a firm may reflect poor management integrity such as management override, evidence 
of fraud and inadequate communication/oversight. In this case, the likelihood of engaging in 
risky tax minimization strategies may be greater because of senior management’s underlying 
objectives and less invasive oversight. For example, according to McGill and Outslay (2004) 
WorldCom management would set effective tax rate targets and instruct their tax department to 
achieve those targets through any means necessary. This approach likely contributed to the 
significant accounting irregularities and ultimate fraud that was unearthed at WorldCom, 
resulting in, at that time, the largest bankruptcy filing in the United States and severe penalties 
subsequently handed down by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
According to Gupta and Laux (2008), accounting practices at companies such as Enron 
suggest that internal control weaknesses and tax-related deficiencies lead to a larger gap between 
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book income and taxable income. Furthermore, the Joint Committee on Taxation reports that 
Enron management fostered an aggressive corporate culture that would use off-balance sheet 
structures and off-shore entities to achieve both income-increasing and tax-decreasing objectives 
(US Congress, 2003). The literature on book-tax differences provides evidence consistent with 
these arguments. As discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, a larger book-tax discrepancy can 
signal earnings management or tax aggressiveness. 
The aforementioned research of Gleason et al. (2010) provides evidence of upward 
earnings management for firms prior to the disclosure of a tax internal control weakness. 
Furthermore, Wilson (2009) documents that book-tax differences and aggressive financial 
reporting are significant firm characteristics of tax shelter firms. Taken together, these two 
studies suggest that in certain circumstances aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax 
reporting are positively related, an assertion tested directly in Frank et al. (2009a). Such a 
positive relation supports the possibility that firms with weak tax-related internal controls can 
avoid more taxes than firms with strong tax-related internal controls.  
Based on the foregoing arguments, the relation between internal control quality and tax 
avoidance could be positive or negative, thus I propose the following null hypothesis: 
H1null: Tax avoidance is unrelated to tax-related internal control weaknesses. 
3.3 Pervasiveness of Internal Control Weaknesses and Tax Avoidance 
In the previous section, internal control weaknesses are discussed in general. However, 
the literature review of Chapter 2 suggests that the pervasiveness of the internal control weakness 
matters. Citing comments made by Moody’s, Doyle et al. (2007a, p.196) write, “While account-
specific weaknesses are auditable, company-level weaknesses are more difficult to audit around 
and call into question not only management’s ability to prepare accurate financial reports but 
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also its ability to control the business.” These comments imply that company-level ICWs are 
more pervasive and can extend to the operating of the business, but account-level ICWs relate to 
financial reporting only. 
This dichotomization of pervasiveness is important when considering the influence of 
tax-related internal control weaknesses on corporate tax avoidance. In general, account-level 
ICWs include incorrectly recorded balances and account-level tax ICWs usually reflect issues 
such as improperly recorded deferred tax account balances and inaccurate valuation of tax 
amounts according to GAAP.6 Furthermore, the improper recording of amounts can be 
influenced by the manual information systems and spreadsheets that many organizations use to 
facilitate financial reporting. These errors give rise to internal control weaknesses disclosed in 
SOX reports (Boritz, Hayes and Lim, 2010). 
Despite the possibility for these recording errors and the inherent complexity of tax 
accounting that can make it difficult to estimate and evaluate balances, these issues are less 
pervasive. A firm’s auditor can detect recording errors when carrying out their audit procedures. 
In fact, audit firms offer services to help potential clients assess the integrity and accuracy of 
their spreadsheet models.7 Overall, I expect that account-level ICWs will reflect unsystematic, 
random errors that will cancel on average in a cross-section of firms or that will be mitigated by 
audit review, particularly in the long-run. I propose my next hypothesis in the null form: 
H2null: Tax avoidance is unrelated to account-level tax internal control weaknesses. 
Company-level ICWs have a significant influence on the firm-level outcomes discussed 
in Chapter 2, namely accruals quality and earnings management. In addition, Hammersley et al. 
                                                     
6 A further description of a general classification scheme and specific examples of both account-level and company-
level weaknesses are available in Appendices A, B and C. 




(2008) find that the market reacts more negatively to firms disclosing a company-level ICW in 
their control environment than to firms disclosing an account-level ICW. This collective 
evidence strongly suggests that company-level controls are important in understanding the 
relation between internal control disclosures and tax planning.  
As described previously, weaknesses in the control environment include ineffective 
assessment of tax risk, lack of key personnel for planning and the absence of key procedural 
controls or documentation. These weaknesses are all at the company-level. Resource constraints 
are also considered a significant issue for firms with company-level weaknesses in general 
(Doyle et al., 2007a) and in the tax function (Bedard and Graham, 2011). Companies lacking 
sufficient procedures or human resources to manage their tax function, or the financial resources 
to develop procedures or secure expertise, will have difficulty planning effective tax strategies 
and thus will avoid less tax than firms with stronger controls. 
On the other hand, control environment issues may also lead to riskier tax minimization 
schemes, as described for internal controls more generally. Although Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2008) suggest that control weaknesses lead to unintentional errors and not to manipulations, that 
Chan et al. (2008) find evidence consistent with earnings management for company-level ICWs 
suggests a failure “to control the business” that leads to intentional manipulations. Previous 
examples suggest that a corporate culture of management override, fraud and/or inadequate 
communication or oversight allows tax managers to engage in opportunistic and risky tax 
minimization or avoidance that is aggressive. Thus tax planning by managers with weak controls 
could also border on, or cross into, evasion. Therefore I state the following hypothesis in the null 
form: 
H3null: Tax avoidance is unrelated to company-level tax internal control weaknesses. 
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A negative relation between tax avoidance and company-level tax ICWs is evidence 
consistent with competency issues that manifest in inadequate tax risk management procedures 
or resources leading to less tax avoidance. A positive relation between tax avoidance and 
company-level tax ICWs is evidence consistent with a lack of controls that reflect integrity 
issues, allowing opportunities for risky tax strategies and more aggressive tax avoidance by 
management. 
3.4 Internal Control Quality, Tax Avoidance and Stock Return Performance 
 In this section I look to combine internal control quality and aggressive tax avoidance to 
explore whether investors can use knowledge of such a relation to assess the value of the 
underlying tax planning. Tax avoidance encompasses activities which may or may not involve 
wrongdoing; Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) posit that shareholders may be concerned that a firm 
that will deceive tax authorities is also a firm that will deceive them. By examining the market 
performance of firms based on tax aggressiveness and internal control quality, I plan to 
demonstrate that internal control quality helps differentiate between firms that avoid taxes while 
creating positive returns for shareholders and firms that avoid taxes to the detriment of 
shareholders. 
 Agency theory suggests that public corporations continue as going concerns by 
separating operational decisions from oversight decisions using three mechanisms: decision 
hierarchies, mutual monitoring systems and boards of directors (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Decision hierarchies and mutual monitoring interact to produce organizational policies and 
procedures that incent managers to develop their human capital value and to achieve company 
objectives, and to specify performance targets and reward structures. The board of directors 
monitors management actions and carry the ability to compensate or terminate individuals as a 
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result of their performance. Within the policies and procedures is the internal control system of a 
firm and thus the need for internal controls to achieve firm objectives, including tax planning 
objectives, is rooted in agency theory. 
 Consistent with agency theory, managers are aware that firm outputs, including 
information disclosures, are signals to the market about their firm’s operational effectiveness 
(Fama 1980). Furthermore, these signals inform labour markets about a manager’s individual 
talents and capital markets about a firm’s value. Managers understand that public information 
and any resulting stock price revaluations can affect their future wage revisions (Fama 1980). 
Thus tax-related internal control disclosures signal information to the market about 
management’s ability to tax plan and the market is free to adjust firm prices accordingly based 
on their evaluation of the signal. 
Wilson (2009) investigates the degree to which actual and predicted tax shelter activity 
signals “wealth creation for shareholders [or] managerial opportunism”. I conjecture that among 
tax aggressive firms, strong internal control quality is a signal of wealth creation and weak 
internal control quality is a signal of value destruction. Following from my previous hypotheses, 
weak tax-related internal controls can create tax avoidance opportunities through discretionary 
activities and risky tax minimization, but these opportunities are difficult to sustain in the long-
run and could reflect integrity issues. Firms with weak tax-related internal controls that are not 
tax aggressive also create less wealth for shareholders but such an outcome likely results from 
(1) an inability to comply with the law, (2) foregone opportunities, or (3) resource constraints, 
but is less likely to result from wealth destroying actions. Thus I predict that although firms with 
weak tax-related internal controls create less value for their shareholders relative to firms with 
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strong tax-related internal controls, this relation is amplified for tax aggressive firms. My formal 
hypotheses are stated in the null as follows: 
H4null: Stock return performance is weakly positively related to company-level tax 
internal control weaknesses. 
H5null: The negative relation between stock return performance and company-level tax 
internal control weaknesses is less negative among tax aggressive firms. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I posit five hypotheses to be tested in subsequent empirical analyses. I 
present my first three hypotheses in support of a relation between tax avoidance and tax internal 
control weaknesses. In the null, I predict that tax avoidance is unrelated to general, account-level 
and company-level tax internal control weaknesses. I present my second two hypotheses in 
support of an interaction between tax aggressiveness and tax internal control weaknesses that 
affects shareholder returns. In the null, I predict a positive relation between abnormal returns and 




SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe all aspects related to the empirical design of my sample and 
primary analysis. The chapter begins by describing the method for selecting my sample firms 
and follows with separate discussions of my selection and construction of proxies for internal 
control weaknesses and long-run tax avoidance. This chapter also presents the empirical models 
used to test Hypotheses 1 through 5. Overall, this chapter includes seven sections, including this 
introduction and a conclusion. 
Section 4.2 outlines my sample selection criteria and primary sample period. SOX 404 
disclosures are obtained for firms that report weaknesses in their internal controls during the 
period 2004 to 2006. These firms must also be included in the S&P 1500 at one point in time 
during this sample period. 
Section 4.3 describes the manual coding procedure I use to quantify the information 
contained in the internal control weakness disclosures. I rely on a modified version of the 
Hammersley et al. (2008) classification method. This method permits me to separate individual 
internal control weaknesses into account-level and company-level components. Section 4.4 
provides rationale for my decision to use Cash ETR as a proxy for long-run tax avoidance and to 
justify why it is the most appropriate measure for my specific context. 
Section 4.5 presents two similar models to test Hypotheses 1 through 3. Equation (2) is a 
model that includes general tax and non-tax internal control weakness variables while Equation 
(3) is a model that includes account-level and company-level tax and non-tax internal control 
weakness variables. Both models are tested empirically using OLS methods.  
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Section 4.6 presents a model to test Hypotheses 4 and 5. Equation (4) is a model that is 
based on Wilson (2009) and includes separate variables for the four comparison groups that 
result from the interaction of dichotomous aggressive tax avoidance and internal control quality 
variables. Like Equations (2) and (3), Equation (4) is also tested empirically using OLS methods. 
Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Sample 
Annual SOX 404 internal control data are obtained from Audit Analytics. After 
determining the firm-year observations with disclosed weaknesses, I collect 10-K filings in order 
to appropriately categorize account and company-level weaknesses. I do not rely on Audit 
Analytics internal control weakness coding because many of their categories blend together 
individual internal control weaknesses that would otherwise be account-level or company-level 
only. I restrict my sample of firms in Audit Analytics to those that trade on any of the S&P 500, 
400 or 600 indices (i.e. S&P 1500) to reduce the extent of required manual coding. S&P index 
composition is provided in Table 1.8 The data are merged with additional information from 
Compustat and CRSP to allow for analysis of other company variables included as covariates in 
the empirical regressions, described below. 
The data collection begins in 2004 when accelerated filers were first obligated to produce 
internal control reports under SOX 404 and ends in 2009. Additional data is collected prior to 
2004 in order to construct relevant five-year averages as described subsequently in this chapter. I 
have also restricted my primary sample to the firms that filed SOX 404 reports between 2004 and 
2006 to avoid overlap associated with two changes in financial reporting. First, Financial 
                                                     
8 Although the primary analysis in my thesis is based on the years 2004 to 2006, supplemental tests include years 
2007 to 2009 and as a result my initial data collection includes all years from 2004 to 2009. Consequently, a firm 
that trades in the S&P 1500 during any one of the years from 2004 to 2009 can be included in my sample and thus 
the number of unique S&P 1500 firms in my final sample is greater than 1,500 observations. 
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Interpretation No. 48’s Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FIN 48) became effective 
January 1, 2007. FIN 48 standardizes the reporting of uncertain tax positions (i.e. positions that 
often result from strategic tax planning) and requires disclosure of the aggregate amount of these 
uncertain reserves. Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes (2007) acknowledge that firms had an 
incentive to release their reserves prior to January 1, 2007 and furthermore, the Internal Revenue 
Service offered to accelerate resolutions and settlements of reserves with corporate taxpayers. 
Any resolutions or settlements are likely to affect taxes paid, my dependent measure of tax 
avoidance, and thus FIN 48 represents a potentially endogenous shock that could confound my 
subsequent results. Second, Boritz et al. (2010) document that the wording of the risk of material 
misstatement in the definition of “material weakness” changed slightly as Auditing Standard No. 
2 (PCAOB 2004) was replaced by Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007) in 2007. To the 
extent that this change in wording has an effect on management or auditor judgment of reported 
material weaknesses, another potential confounding event exists. 
Table 1 includes the sample and industry composition for my tests. Panels A and B report 
the composition that pertains to my primary firm-level sample and Panels C and D report the 
composition that pertains to my secondary overlapping, annual firm-year sample. My main tests 
use average values for each firm and not annual firm-year observations. For internal control 
weakness variables, the averages include data from 2004 to 2006 and for all other variables the 
averages include data from 2002 to 2006. Table 1, Panel A shows that there are 1,286 unique 
firms in the sample with available data to estimate Equations (2) and (3).9 208 of these firms 
(16.2%) have at least one material internal control weakness during the period 2004-2006 and 
                                                     
9 Initially, 1,827 firms exist in my dataset with some combination of the necessary variables to estimate Equations 
(2) and (3). Thus 541 firms are excluded because of data restrictions, where 267 of these excluded firms lack five 
consecutive years of data to estimate CASH_ETR5. For the overlapping, annual panel sample, 4,826 firms exist 
initially. 1,475 observations are excluded due to data restrictions, 720 of which relate specifically to a lack of 
consecutive years to estimate CASH_ETR5. 
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1,078 of these firms (83.8%) do not have any disclosed material weaknesses during the period. 
As shown subsequently in Table 3, 83 of the 208 ICW firms (39.9%) identify tax-related ICWs. 
ICWs are most frequent in the smallest firms (i.e. S&P 600) consistent with evidence in the prior 
literature. 
Table 1, Panel C shows that there are 3,351 total firm-year observations in the 
overlapping sample with available information to estimate Equations (2) and (3). 271 firm-year 
observations (8.1%) report at least one instance of any type of ICW. Of these observations, 118 
firm-year observations (3.5% of total sample; 43.5% of ICW sample) have at least one tax ICW. 
Table 1, Panels B and D present the industry composition of the firm-level and firm-year 
samples respectively. Industry membership is based on two-digit NAICS classifications and an 
NAICS industry is excluded from my sample if it does not contain any internal control weakness 
firms. I control for cross-industry variation in tax avoidance in my subsequent regression 
analysis, consistent with prior literature. 
4.3 Internal Control Weakness Classification 
Within Audit Analytics, there are four categories by which a firm’s internal controls may 
be considered ineffective: accounting rule (i.e. financial statement account), financial fraud, 
errors, and other reasons. Each observation with ineffective controls (i.e. a weakness) must have 
at least one accounting rule identified; frauds and errors are rarely identified. Thus I first identify 
tax-related ICWs by searching the Audit Analytics accounting rule category for the tax-specific 
number code, 41. Firms with non-tax related ICWs are also identified. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 differentiate between account-level and company-level ICWs. 
Appendix A provides a simple classification method used by Doyle et al. (2007a) however I rely 
on the more comprehensive classification method of Hammersley et al. (2008), included in 
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Appendix B. Their method categorizes the many possible company-disclosed reasons for 
material weaknesses into less-auditable (“Category A”) and more auditable (“Category B”) 
categories and sub-categories. The less-auditable and more-auditable categories map to the 
concepts of company-level and account-level, respectively.10  
Firm-years disclosing a tax weakness and at least one “Category A” weakness are coded 
as having a tax-related company-level ICW. Similar to Doyle et al. (2007a and 2007b), I code 
firms as having a company-level weakness if they describe three or more “Category B” 
weaknesses in their disclosure as a greater number of weaknesses suggest entity-wide issues. I 
evaluate the sensitivity of my results to this “three or more” classification in subsection 5.3.2.2 of 
Chapter 5. 
Firm-years disclosing a tax weakness and no more than two “Category B” weaknesses 
and no “Category A” weaknesses are coded as having a tax-related account-level ICW. Firms 
that disclose other types of weaknesses, but not tax weaknesses, are coded similarly as “non-tax” 
or “other” company-level and account-level ICWs. Appendix C contains excerpts of material 
weakness disclosures from sample 10-K reports. 
Table 1, Panel E shows coding as per Appendix B. Of the individual ICWs, 23.6% are 
company-level issues. Of these company-level issues, 8.4% relate to insufficient documentation 
and policies, and that figure translates to 34.7% of all firm-year observations having an instance 
of this specific issue. With respect to tax planning, insufficient documentation and policies could 
represent, among other issues, a lack of contemporaneous documentation necessary to support 
                                                     
10 The Hammersley et al. (2008) sub-categories generally are the same sub-categories as those identified by 
Moody’s (Doss and Jonas, 2004) but the classification as company-level or account-level differs slightly at the 
individual level. In addition, the “weak risk assessment” company-level weakness identified by Moody’s is not 
identified by Hammersley et al. (2008). For purposes of my primary analysis, I follow the Hammersley et al. (2008) 
method, modified to include disclosures related to risk assessments as company-level weaknesses. I evaluate the 
Moody’s classification as a robustness test in subsection 5.3.2.2 of Chapter 5. 
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transfer pricing or simply a general lack of controls to ensure that tax planning procedures are 
carried out consistently and effectively by personnel across all of a firm’s sub-units. The next 
three largest percentages of company-level ICWs are for issues in the financial statement close 
process (8.4%), poor communication (3.4%) and lack of key personnel (2.2%). Although issues 
with the financial statement close process do not have a direct tie-in to tax planning, they suggest 
a lack of reporting discipline within the organization that could extend subsequently to tax 
elections and filings. Inadequate communication with respect to the tax function can suggest the 
potential for a discretionary environment in which managers act opportunistically, while a lack 
of key personnel implies a lack of knowledge, resources and leadership for conducting strategic 
tax planning. 
Table 1, Panel E also shows that 76.4% of the individual ICWs are account-level issues. 
Lack of timely review (14.6%) and lack of training/staff (14.2%) are the two largest account-
level categories. Many of the “B2” weaknesses appear to relate to financial statement-related 
problems, such as a lack of timely reviews or account reconciliations. These types of issues are 
not likely to be associated with active tax planning. Some of the “B1” issues have a potentially 
pervasive undertone, such as lack of quality corporate governance and internal monitoring. 
Although these issues could contribute to a discretionary planning environment, consistent with 
Hammersley et al. (2008) they are categorized as account-level issues. Note again however that 
the presence of three or more of these account-level issues can signal a greater lack of control 
within the firm that ultimately results in a company-level categorization for that firm-year. 
4.4 Tax Avoidance Proxy 
As discussed in Chapter 2, common tax avoidance proxies include effective tax rates 
(ETR), various measures of BTD and Cash ETR. As explained below, in this thesis I use Cash 
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ETR following Dyreng et al. (2008). This continuous variable is a proxy for long-run tax 
planning that I measure as follows: 
CASH_ETR5it








The numerator is Cash Taxes Paid, a cash flow statement item. The denominator is the 
difference between PTBI, pre-tax book income, and Special Items, both income statement items. 
Observations in my sample are set to missing if the denominator is negative. Both the numerator 
and denominator can be accumulated over time, and for purposes of this dissertation are 
accumulated for firm i over the five year period from years t-4 through t. Dyreng et al. (2008) 
evaluate Cash ETR using one, five and ten year averages and document that the annual measure 
is a noisy predictor of long-run tax planning. The distribution of the five and ten year measures, 
however are relatively consistent. Requiring ten consecutive years of data results in half as many 
firms in their sample than requiring five consecutive years of data does. Thus I choose to 
measure Cash ETR as a five-year average to avoid any significant reduction of my sample size 
and survivorship bias. Ayers et al. (2009), Ayers, Laplante and McGuire (2009), and Rego and 
Wilson (2010) also measure Cash ETR over a five-year period.  
In this dissertation, Cash ETR refers to the theoretical concept of taxes paid and the 
measure as used in prior literature, whereas CASH_ETR refers to my annual empirical measure 
and CASH_ETR5 refers to my five-year average empirical measure. A lower value of 
CASH_ETR5 (or CASH_ETR or Cash ETR) represents a firm that avoids more tax – lower values 
equate to lower tax rates. 
The shareholder returns tests described in Section 4.5 require firms to be classified as tax 
aggressive and, conversely, not tax aggressive. I consider firms to be tax aggressive if they are 
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ranked in the lowest quintile based on CASH_ETR5.11 The variable TAG is a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CASH_ETR5 is in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. NON_TAG 
represents “control firms” that are not highly tax aggressive and is coded as 1 if a firm’s 
CASH_ETR5 is not in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. The use of quintiles and rankings of 
CASH_ETR5 allows me to identify tax aggressive firms with a proxy that, in continuous form, is 
a broad measure that captures varying degrees of tax avoidance. 
I use Cash ETR as a proxy for tax avoidance for several reasons. First, Cash ETR 
includes both permanent and temporary book-tax differences and thus is a broad measure of tax 
planning that reflects how firms may avoid paying taxes by various means (Dyreng et al., 2008; 
Chen et al., 2010). Cash ETR recognizes the tax benefits associated with stock options (Ayers et 
al., 2009) and persistent timing differences that do not reverse during the estimation period 
(Dyreng et al., 2008; Rego and Wilson, 2010). Conversely, measures that include permanent 
differences only are more appropriate for studies that reflect tax shelter activity (Frank et al., 
2009a), an extreme form of tax planning. Second, this study focuses on sustainable tax planning 
and not merely “one-off” transactions; Cash ETR is better suited as a long-run measure than as a 
short-term measure (Dyreng et al., 2008). For these reasons I believe Cash ETR is the 
appropriate measure to address my specific research question. 
Cash ETR does have limitations, however. The measure may be biased downward, in 
favour of more tax avoidance, for firms that engage in upwards earnings management (Frank et 
al., 2009a; Rego and Wilson, 2010). Although it captures non-conforming tax avoidance, that is, 
where tax and accounting treatments differ, like most measures it does not capture conforming 
                                                     
11 To alleviate concerns of in-sample data evaluation, subsequent tables typically report results from in-sample and 
out-of-sample tests. For in-sample tests, firms are ranked on CASH_ETR5 based on firm-level values obtained for 
my primary 2004-2006 sample firms (i.e. observations span the years 2002-2006). For out-of sample tests, firms are 
ranked on CASH_ETR5 for the period immediately preceding my sample period and so in this analysis each firm is 
ranked based on CASH_ETR5 spanning the years 1999-2003. 
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tax avoidance because the numerator and denominator are similarly affected by activities that 
reduce both taxable income and accounting income (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). In addition, 
the denominator reflects an estimate of income from the financial statements and thus has 
inherent measurement error as a crude proxy for taxable income. In sensitivity analysis, I identify 
two related BTD proxies which capture some of the same inferences as Cash ETR and test them 
as dependent variables in my empirical models. Finally, like most measures, Cash ETR cannot 
distinguish between firms that avoid less tax because they conduct little tax planning and firms 
that avoid less tax because they conduct unsuccessful tax planning. 
4.5 Empirical Models – Tax Avoidance and Internal Control Quality 
I test Hypothesis 1, that tax avoidance is unrelated to tax-specific internal control 
weaknesses, by estimating the following OLS regression model: 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3it + β2OICW3it + β3ROA5it + β4LEV5it + β5FORINC5it + 
β6FOROPS5it + β7BM5it + β8AGGR_LOSS5it + β9COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit 
 (2). 
I test Hypotheses 2 and 3 by modifying Equation (2) to separate the influence of account-
level and company-level tax ICWs. The modifications result in the following OLS regression 
model: 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5ROA5it + β6LEV5it + β7FORINC5it + β8FOROPS5it + β9BM5it + 
β10AGGR_LOSS5it + β11COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit  (3). 
The variables across these models are defined as follows: 
CASH_ETR5it = a proxy for long-run tax avoidance defined in Equation (1); 
 
TICW3it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a tax-related internal control weakness 




OICW3it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a non-tax-related internal control 
weakness between t-2 and t, and zero otherwise; 
 
TICW3_ACCT3it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a tax-related account-level 
internal control weakness between t-2 and t, and zero otherwise; 
 
TICW3_COMP3it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a tax-related company-level 
internal control weakness between t-2 and t, and zero otherwise; 
 
OICW3_ACCT3it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a non-tax-related account-level 
internal control weakness between t-2 and t, and zero otherwise; 
 
OICW3_COMP3it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has a non-tax-related company-
level internal control weakness between t-2 and t, and zero otherwise. 
 
ROA5it = the average Return on Assets for firm i for years t-4 through t, measured as five-year 
average operating income scaled by average lagged assets measured at t-5 and t-1; 
 
LEV5it = the average leverage for firm i for years t-4 through t, measured as long-term debt at t-4 
scaled by lagged assets plus long-term debt at t scaled by lagged assets, divided by two; 
 
FORINC5it = the average foreign income for firm i for years t-4 through t, scaled by average 
lagged assets measured at t-5 and t-1; 
 
FOROPS5it = an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5it is non-zero or non-missing, zero 
otherwise; 
 
BM5it = the average book-to-market ratio for firm i at the beginning of year t, measured as the 
book value of common equity scaled by the market value of common equity at t-5 plus the book 
value of common equity scaled by the market value of common equity at t-1, divided by two; 
 
AGGR_LOSS5it = an indicator variable equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items for 
years t-4 through t sum to less than zero, and zero otherwise; 
 
COCF5it = one minus the average operating cash flows (OCF5) of firm i, with OCF5 measured 
as five-year average operating cash flows scaled by average lagged assets measured at t-5 and t-
1; 
 
ΣtDYEARt = a vector of year-specific indicator variables (2006 is the omitted year); 
ΣjDINDj = a vector of industry-specific indicator variables (“Other” is the omitted industry). 
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CASH_ETR5 is measured as defined in Equation (1), and again observation values are set 
to missing if the denominator of CASH_ETR5 is negative.12 All control variables are based on a 
five-year average so as to be consistent with the measurement of CASH_ETR5, and only one 
observation per firm is used in the regression to avoid a lack of independent observations.13 
CASH_ETR5, ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the 
influence of outliers.14 Year and industry dummies are included in the regression equations to 
control for any unobserved, linear effects that result from time or industry differences.  
In addition, the standard errors in the empirical specification of Equations (2) and (3) are 
clustered by two-digit NAICS industry classification. I made this design choice to mitigate the 
influence of heteroskedasticity and further correlation of the residuals within industry. With the 
short duration of my sample period, it is difficult to determine whether the influence of industry 
is permanent or temporary and thus whether a linear specification of industry effects (i.e. 
including binary industry variables in my models) is sufficient (Petersen, 2009). Plots of residual 
values from the subsequent regressions in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 suggest a lack of 
independence, which is corroborated by post-estimation tests (individual and joint) of skewness 
and kurtosis that reject the null of normality. Such evidence supports the decision to cluster 
standard errors by industry, in addition to specifying industry fixed effects. 
TICW3, TICW3_ACCT3 and TICW3_COMP3 are indicator variables for overall, account-
level and company-level internal control weaknesses related to tax, respectively. These variables 
                                                     
12 Negative values of CASH_ETR5 are infrequent in my data. Despite the relative truncation of values between zero 
and one, zero values are also infrequent and thus most observations are strictly greater than zero. OLS is a suitable 
estimation method under these conditions. 
13 As shown in Table 2, Panel B, over 90% of the observations are from 2006. Some observations are observed in 
2004 or 2005 because of attrition. The term t refers to the current year in which the five-year average is observed. 
14 The winsorizing procedure adjusts all observations outside of the specified intervals (i.e. all observations in the 1st 
and 99th percentile of the distribution of CASH_ETR5) so that they equal the next closest value within the interval. 
Winsorized variables are used as a conservative approach to avoid Type I errors related to extreme outliers. Results 
are quantitatively similar when CASH_ETR5 is truncated at [0,1] and/or ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are not winsorized. 
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identify whether a firm has any of these levels of tax ICWs in the three-year period between 
2004 and 2006. OICW3, OICW3_ACCT3 and OICW3_COMP3 similarly reflect these three 
levels of non-tax ICWs. The non-tax ICWs are included because some firms with weaknesses in 
their tax functions may also have weaknesses in other areas of accounting, and arguments 
suggest that the disclosure of weaknesses is a negotiated process whereby only the most severe 
weaknesses are disclosed (Wolfe, Mauldin and Chandler, 2009). Thus the presence of non-tax 
ICWs, particularly those at the company-level, may influence tax avoidance. The intercepts in 
Equations (2) and (3) capture the average values of firms with no internal control weaknesses. 
TICW3_ACCT3 and TICW3_COMP3 are mutually exclusive indicator variables, as are 
OICW3_ACCT3 and OICW3_COMP3. If a firm has both an account-level weakness and a 
company-level weakness, the observation is coded as a company-level weakness, consistent with 
the method of Doyle et al. 2007a and 2007b.15 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 suggest two possible scenarios. If overall tax ICWs and company-
level tax ICWs signal an inability to manage the tax function, then TICW3 and TICW3_COMP3 
are consistent with a higher value of CASH_ETR5 and positive coefficients should result. If 
overall tax ICWs and company-level tax ICWs signal opportunities for managerial discretion, 
then TICW3 and TICW3_COMP3 are consistent with a lower value of CASH_ETR5 and negative 
coefficients should result. With respect to Hypothesis 2, I expect that the coefficient on 
                                                     
15 As a result of this construction, there is no need to estimate an interaction between company and account ICWs in 
my empirical analysis. However, the Pearson correlation between the raw annual overall tax ICWs and non-tax 
ICWs is 0.439 and significant. This correlation raises concerns about multicollinearity if both tax and non-tax ICWs 
are included as independent variables. Therefore I modify the ICW construction at the annual level such that tax and 
non-tax are mutually exclusive, consistent with Doyle et al. (2007a). When constructing TICW3 and OICW3 from 
these adjusted annual variables, I do not impose further mutual exclusivity. The Pearson coefficient for TICW3 and 
OICW3 is 0.104 and significant, but multicollinearity is not a concern.  
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TICW3_ACCT3 will be indistinguishable from zero. Such a result is consistent with account-
level tax ICWs having no influence on tax avoidance.16 
Consistent with prior studies in the tax avoidance literature (e.g. Gupta and Newberry, 
1997; Mills et al., 1998; Rego 2003; Dyreng et al,. 2008; Frank et al., 2009a; Wilson, 2009; Chen 
et al., 2010), I control for firm characteristics that are associated with tax avoidance and tax 
aggressiveness. The annual variables FORINC, FOROPS and BM are also associated with the 
internal control literature. The annual variable AGGR_LOSS is common to the internal control 
literature but not the tax avoidance literature.  
ROA5 reflects profitability and is measured as the five-year average of a firm’s pre-tax 
return on assets, scaled by average lagged assets measured at year t-5 and year t-1. LEV5 
represents leverage and is measured as the average of a firm’s long-term debt at year t-4 and at 
year t, with each year’s observation scaled by lagged assets. More profitable firms and firms with 
greater leverage or complex financing arrangements have greater incentives or opportunities to 
avoid taxes, so ROA5 and LEV5 should be negatively related to CASH_ETR5. Although I set 
CASH_ETR5 to missing if its denominator is negative, I do not impose a similar restriction if the 
numerator of ROA5 is negative. Thus some firms in my sample may have a negative ROA5 value 
if its five-year sum of pre-tax income is negative. 
FORINC5 and FOROPS5 are measures that capture the presence of firms in foreign 
jurisdiction. FORINC5 is calculated as foreign pre-tax income scaled by lagged assets and 
averaged over the years t-4 to t-1 and FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if 
FORINC5 is non-zero or non-missing. Firms that have missing foreign income in Compustat are 
coded as having zero, rather than missing, foreign income if domestic income is equal to total 
                                                     
16 The coefficients on the non-tax ICW variables would be interpreted in the same way as the tax ICW variables; 
however I generally do not posit a relation between non-tax ICWs and tax avoidance. 
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income. Foreign operations allow firms the opportunity to tax plan and avoid taxes, thus both 
variables should also be negatively associated with CASH_ETR5.  
BM5 represents growth and is measured as the average opening book value of equity to 
market value of equity ratio at year t-4 and year t.  Firms with greater growth opportunities (i.e. 
lower BM5) make less timely modifications of their internal controls for changes in their 
environment (Doyle et al., 2007a) and presumably make less timely modifications of their tax 
plans too. Thus BM5 should also be negatively associated with CASH_ETR5. 
Finally, firms that perform poorly have fewer financial resources to allocate to their 
internal control systems because they are concerned with remaining in business (Doyle et al., 
2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007). The same logic can be applied to poorly performing firms 
and allocation of time and effort to tax planning. Although these firms may pay less total tax 
relative to financially healthy firms, a lack of tax planning suggests that the rate at which they 
pay taxes should be close to the statutory rate. I include two proxies for resource constraints: 
AGGR_LOSS5 (Doyle et al., 2007a) equals one for firms with consecutive accounting losses, 
zero otherwise; COCF5 represents constrained firm resources, operationalized as one minus 
average operating cash flows. 
As reported in Table D.1 of Appendix D, to ensure a parsimonious set of control 
variables, I exclude from my analysis certain variables common in the tax avoidance literature 
that do not load consistently in my firm-level sample of data. The excluded variables are proxies 
for tax loss carry-forwards (NOL5), size (SIZE5), capital intensity (PPE5) and intangible assets 
(INTANG5). To test for their exclusion from Equation (2), and similarly Equation (3), I drop 
each variable from the model in the following sequence: INTANG5, PPE5, SIZE5 and NOL5.  
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Panel A of Table D.1 reports my examination of the firm-level sample of data with these 
four variables included. For additional analysis, I also report my examination of the firm-year 
sample with annual values (Panel B) and a firm-level sample of the Compustat universe with 
average values (Panel C). The above exclusion sequence is determined by each variable’s 
relative statistical insignificance at each stage of the process reported for the firm-level sample in 
Panel A. In Panels B and C however, NOL5 is typically statistically significant, and at times so is 
PPE5. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the majority of the coefficients of the Equation (2) 
variables are not significantly affected by the exclusion of these four variables. In particular, the 
coefficients of TICW and OICW are consistent across the columns in Panels A and B. 
This discussion of control variables and excluded variables also raises two inter-related 
issues: simultaneity of tax avoidance and internal control weaknesses, and correlated omitted 
variables. With respect to the potential for simultaneity (and endogeneity), it is highly unlikely 
that tax avoidance influences internal controls. Recall that the primary goal of SOX regulation is 
to improve internal controls and thereby subsequently improve financial reporting quality. 
Therefore, conceptually, the internal control decision cannot lag the financial reporting outcome. 
In the same manner, internal controls in the tax function cannot follow tax avoidance. On the 
other hand, it is plausible that managers jointly decide to avoid or not avoid taxes while they 
decide to address or not address internal control considerations. To that end, some factors that 
influence tax avoidance could also influence the presence of ICWs. The unexplained portion of 
CASH_ETR5 captured by the error terms of Equations (2) and (3) could be correlated with 
TICW3, OICW3, etc. and thus the resulting regression coefficients would be biased. 
However, Equations (2) and (3) include variables that relate to both tax avoidance and 
internal control weaknesses, as discussed previously in Chapter 2 and this subsection. In 
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particular, profitability, leverage and resources are three key variables in Equations (2) and (3) 
that appear prominently in the internal control literature. Given that these variables are controlled 
for, any bias in the internal control coefficients should relate to multicollinearity and not to 
omission. Subsequent analysis in this thesis will help to further alleviate the above concerns. 
First, univariate correlation analysis is reported in Section 5.2, including the associations 
between internal control variables and the other control variables. Second, I examine the 
inclusion of a corporate governance variable in Subsection 5.4.2, a previously omitted variable 
that is common in both the tax avoidance and internal control literatures. Third I examine the 
interaction between internal control quality and resources in Subsection 5.4.3. The availability of 
resources is arguably the key factor when tax avoidance and internal control decisions are 
considered to be simultaneous. 
4.6 Empirical Models – Stock Returns, Tax Avoidance and Internal Control Quality 
To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, I employ a technique based on Wilson (2009) and regress 
monthly returns on the four-factor Fama-French (1993) model and dichotomous tax 
aggressiveness and internal control quality variables. This technique allows me to compare the 
performance of tax aggressive firms and non-tax aggressive firms by their level of internal 
control quality and to rule out that any differences between the two are driven solely by the 
difference in internal control quality. The model is as follows: 
Rit = β0 + β1TICWC*TAGi + β2TICWC*NON_TAGi + β3TICSC*NON_TAGi + bMRFt + 
sSMBt + hHMLt + wUMDt + εit  (4) 
Where: 




TICWC*TAGi = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is tax aggressive based on the 
definition of TAG in Section 4.3 and has a company-level tax-related internal control weakness 
during period y, and zero otherwise; 
 
TICWC*NON_TAGi = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is not tax aggressive based on 
the definition of NON_TAG in Section 4.3 and has a company-level tax-related internal control 
weakness during period y, and zero otherwise; 
 
TICSC*NON_TAGi = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is not tax aggressive and has no 
company-level tax-related internal control weakness during period y, and zero otherwise; 
 
MRFt = the excess market return in month t, the value-weighted market return minus risk-free 
rate [rmt - rft]; 
 
SMBt = the size premium for month t, the difference in returns between the portfolios of small 
and big cap firms; 
 
HMLt = the book-to-market premium for month t, the difference in returns between the portfolios 
of high and low book-to-market firms; 
 
UMDt = the momentum premium for month t, the difference in returns between the portfolios of 
previously well performing (winners) and poorly performing firms (losers); 
 
Monthly returns will be regressed on the set of indicator variables and Fama-French 
(1993) factors for my sample period. In sensitivity analysis, I estimate the model for the twelve-
month periods preceding and following my sample period. Time-series data for each of the 
Fama-French factors are retrieved from Ken French’s website.17  
Firms are tax aggressive if they are ranked in the lowest quintile of CASH_ETR5 and not 
tax aggressive otherwise, resulting in the indicator variables TAG and NON_TAG as described in 
subsection 4.3. TICW3_COMP3 (as TICWC) is interacted with TAG and NON_TAG to identify 
tax aggressive and non-tax aggressive firms with weak company-level tax-related internal 
controls. TICSC, a variable coded 1 if a firm does not have a company-level tax-related 
weakness and 0 otherwise, is also interacted with NON_TAG to identify non-tax aggressive firms 




with strong internal controls; thus the intercept in this returns regression represents the effect for 
tax aggressive firms with strong company-level internal controls. 
Consistent with rejecting the null form of Hypothesis 4, I expect that the coefficients on 
the interaction terms TICWC*NON_TAG and TICWC*TAG will be negative. A larger negative 
coefficient on TICWC*TAG is consistent with rejecting the null form of Hypothesis 5. The 
coefficient on the intercept from the returns regression should be positive. Thus the coefficients 
on each indicator variable can be interpreted as that group’s incremental abnormal monthly 
return relative to the tax aggressive firms with strong internal controls. These predictions 
represent lower shareholder wealth in firms with weak tax-related internal controls, particularly 
tax aggressive firms with weak tax-related internal controls. Tax aggressive firms with strong 
tax-related internal controls on the other hand are predicted to create the most wealth for their 
shareholders. 
Although I adapt Wilson’s (2009) model of returns analysis, I distinguish my research 
from Wilson (2009) on several grounds. First, Wilson (2009) classifies firms as highly tax 
aggressive based on tax shelter participation, a specific and extreme type of tax planning. I use a 
more broad and long-run measure of tax avoidance, Cash ETR, to classify firms as highly tax 
aggressive in my analysis. In supplementary tests Wilson (2009) observes no significant relation 
between Cash ETR and his sample of tax shelter firms, further validating that our proxies do not 
capture the same type of tax planning. 
Second, I investigate a measure of internal governance that practitioners typically 
associate with corporate governance (Bedard, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009). Management designs 
the internal controls to govern internal processes of a firm and the Board of Directors monitors 
these controls. The Gompers et al. (2003) index of corporate governance (G-Index) used by 
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Wilson (2009) is a composite measure of shareholder protection rights and so it proxies for 
external monitoring.18 Internal and external monitoring represent different concepts and the 
scope of this dissertation is to evaluate the influence of internal monitoring through examination 
of internal control systems. In this regard, I focus on a less frequently studied construct and 
provide new insight about the individual influence of internal control quality (interacted with tax 
aggressiveness) on returns. Sensitivity analysis in Chapter 5 of this thesis, however, considers the 
potential influence of corporate governance in my empirical models. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reviews my sample selection and data collection methods, the construction 
of my long-run internal control weakness and tax avoidance measures, and the design of my 
empirical models. The majority of the subsequent empirical analysis will be conducted using 
long-run, average values of my variables, however certain tests are also conducted using annual 
values of the variables. Equations (2) and (3) in this chapter form the base of my tests for 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 and the results of these tests will be reported in Chapter 5. Equation 4 in 
this chapter forms the base of my tests for Hypotheses 4 and 5 and the results of these tests will 
be reported in Chapter 6. 
  
                                                     
18 In addition to being a measure of external monitoring outside of the primary scope of this thesis, the G-INDEX 
index has other limitations. Potential measurement error results because of the equal-weighting of individual factors; 
the relative importance of each individual factor or correlations between factors is not considered (Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna, 2007). The results of the Gompers et al. (2003) study also appear to be sensitive to the 
authors’ construction of certain portfolios, raising questions about the inferences that can be made (Cremers and 
Nair, 2005). Finally, G-INDEX only includes shareholder protection/anti-takeover provisions; greater likelihood of 
takeover represents good governance but in general firms that are targets for takeover perform poorly (Cremers and 




EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS – TAX AVOIDANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROL QUALITY 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I test my first three hypotheses and thus investigate the empirical relation 
between long-run tax avoidance and general, account-level and company-level tax internal 
control weaknesses. I empirically examine Equations (2) and (3) from Section 4.5 using firm-
level samples of data, with average values observed during the 2004-2006 time period. In 
supplemental tests in this chapter I test the sensitivity of this empirical analysis to alternative 
methods. These methods include estimation of overlapping, annual regressions of average 
variables, estimation of annual regressions of data with alternative dependent variables, factor 
analysis of resource constraint variables, and remediation of internal control weaknesses. This 
chapter includes five sections, including this introduction and a conclusion. 
Section 5.2 of this chapter examines the descriptive statistics relevant to my primary tests 
of Hypotheses 1 through 3. This examination also includes a review of a correlation table for my 
primary variables of interest and control variables. Section 5.3 of this chapter provides the main 
table of analysis for Hypotheses 1 through 3. Table 5 of this section reports the statistics 
estimated with firm-level, average values of my sample firms. 
Section 5.4 provides a number of different alternative regressions and additional analysis 
in an effort to support or extend the results documented in Section 5.3. This section includes four 
subsections, divided as follows: (1) alternative firm-year regressions; (2) alternative tax 
avoidance proxies and alternative independent variables, including additional classifications of 
my manually-coded internal control weakness data and the addition of corporate governance; (3) 
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further investigation of resource constraints, including factor analysis and interaction variables, 
and; (4) remediation of internal control weaknesses. Section 5.5 concludes this chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for both annual and average values of the variables. 
Panel A contains the annual values and Panel B contains average values for the firm-level 
sample of firms. For completeness, Panel C contains average values for the overlapping, annual 
sample of firms. Although Panel C contains more observations than Panel B, the summary 
statistics are similar because of the inherent smoothing in each set of average variables. I thus 
restrict my subsequent discussion to the results in Panels A and B of Table 2.  
For each type of ICW, the proportion of firms with at least one ICW in the firm-level 
sample of Panel B is higher than the proportion of firm-year observations with ICWs in the 
annual sample of Panel A. Of the firms reporting ICWs, more firms are categorized as having 
company-level issues than account-level issues, and more non-tax ICWs exist than tax ICWs.19 
As one might also expect, the mean, median and variance of continuous variables are generally 
smaller for firm-level values in Panel B than for annual values in Panel A, with typical right-
skewness for all continuous variables. The percentage of firms with FOROPS equal to one 
increases slightly in the firm-level sample. Finally, the annual observations are least frequent in 
2004, the first year of SOX 404 reporting for accelerated filers, and evenly split in 2005 and 
2006. In the firm-level sample, most observations occur in 2006, implying that 92% of firms 
with available data in 2004 survive to 2006. 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on five-year average values and makes comparisons 
for three sub-samples: firms with ICWs vs. firms without ICWs (Panel A), firm with tax ICWs 
                                                     
19 Among the 208 firms that have a firm-level ICW, 148 company-level ICWs exist and 75 account-level ICWs 
exist. Recall that mutual exclusivity occurs at the annual level, but not necessarily at the average or firm level. 
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vs. firms without ICWs (Panel B), and firms with tax ICWs vs. firms with non-tax ICWs (Panel 
C). Firms with tax-related ICWs have the highest mean (median) CASH_ETR5 at 30.8% 
(26.1%), and the mean is significantly different from the 22.2% reported for firms without ICWs. 
The mean (median) is not significantly different from the 24.9% (23.3%) reported for firms with 
non-tax-related ICWs. The mean and median CASH_ETR5 for all firms with ICWs are, however, 
significantly different from firms without ICWs. Comparing mean values for firms with ICWs to 
those without, ICW firms appear to be significantly less profitable, use significantly less 
leverage, engage in significantly more foreign activity (although with less foreign income on 
average), have significantly less growth opportunities and have significantly greater resource 
constraints than the control group. 
 ROA5 is highest for the control group and lowest for the tax ICW group (the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level). LEV5 is only significantly different, at the 5% level, 
when comparing firms with ICWs and firms without ICWs; this difference appears to be driven 
by the non-tax ICW group. Firms with tax ICWs, on average, have more foreign activity than 
both firms without ICWs and firms with non-tax ICWs, although only the median differences on 
FORINC5 and the mean differences on FOROPS5 are significant, where available. Firms with 
tax ICWs also have the highest percentage of aggregate losses and cash flow constraints, while 
firms with non-tax ICWs and firms without ICWs have, on average, similar values. BM5 is 
smallest for the control group although I would expect that firms with ICWs have a lower value, 
indicative of firms with more growth opportunities. Finally, the number of observations in 2006 
is consistent across the sub-samples and not significantly different across groups, suggesting that 
the rate of attrition for ICW firms is no greater than that of firms without ICWs. 
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Table 4 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the complete set of average 
variables, other than TICW3 and OICW3. Typically all correlations of more than 5% in absolute 
value are statistically significant at a 5% level or better. CASH_ETR5 shares positive 0.116 and 
0.084 associations with TICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_COMP3, respectively, both statistically 
significant at the 1% level. CASH_ETR5 is not significantly related to the account-level ICW 
measures. These results suggest that the presence of company-level ICWs lead to less tax 
avoidance (i.e. a higher Cash ETR value). As expected, greater leverage is associated with more 
tax avoidance but higher profitability is unexpectedly associated with less tax avoidance 
(correlation coefficients of -0.138 and 0.055, respectively); on the other hand, Dyreng et al. 
(2008) document similar univariate results for these two variables. Although negative as 
expected, FORINC5 does not have a significant relation with CASH_ETR5, and the presence of 
foreign operations is positively and significantly related to CASH_ETR5. An explanation for this 
positive relation is that foreign operations allow the opportunity to tax plan but other resource 
needs in those foreign ventures can reduce the resources to tax plan aggressively. AGGR_LOSS5 
and COCF5 are positively associated with CASH_ETR5, but only the association with 
AGGR_LOSS5 is significant. BM5 is not significantly correlated with CASH_ETR5.20 
5.3 Hypothesis Tests – H1 through H3 
 Table 5 contains the results of the main tests used to evaluate Hypotheses 1-3; the first 
column presents evidence related to H1 and the second column presents evidence related to H2 
and H3. The main tests rely on cross-sectional variation to estimate the coefficients. According 
to the first column of Table 5, and consistent with the univariate results, the presence of tax-
                                                     
20 As noted earlier, the ICW variables are constructed such that correlations with one another are not at levels that 
raise concerns about multicollinearity. FORINC5 and FOROPS5, BM5 or AGGR_LOSS5 or COCF5 and ROA5, and 
BM5 and COCF5 have significant magnitudes of association with one another. It is not critical that the coefficients 
of these control variables be completely and separately identified from the coefficients of other variables. 
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related ICWs is positively related to CASH_ETR5 and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The TICW3 coefficient suggests that CASH_ETR5 is 4.5 percentage points higher for the tax 
ICW group than the control group. In economic terms, this coefficient suggests that the mean 
firm in my sample would have a 19.6% increase in the rate of taxes paid in the presence of a tax 
ICW.21 This evidence rejects the null hypothesis and is consistent with the argument that tax 
ICWs are indicative of some combination of weak tax risk management, foregone tax planning 
opportunities and resource constraints that result in less tax avoidance. The OICW3 coefficient 
for the presence of non-tax ICWs is not significantly different from zero. 
 With respect to control variables, ROA5 and FOROPS5 are positively and significantly 
related to CASH_ETR5. These coefficient estimates are inconsistent with the majority of the 
prior literature but are consistent with the univariate results. The positive estimate of ROA5 is 
also consistent with evidence in Dyreng et al. (2008).22 LEV5 and FORINC5 are significantly 
related to CASH_ETR5 and in the predicted negative direction. These results suggest that greater 
leverage or use of debt-tax shields helps to reduce taxes paid. Furthermore, firms appear to invest 
in foreign jurisdictions to generate income that attracts a lower tax rate. Consistent with the 
univariate results, BM5 is not significantly associated with CASH_ETR5. The coefficients on 
AGGR_LOSS5 and COCF5 are positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on this 
AGGR_LOSS5 indicator variable reflects an 18 percentage point increase in CASH_ETR5 for 
firms with consecutive book losses, consistent with such firms being unable to spare scarce 
resources to invest in tax planning. Finally, the F-statistics and related probabilities suggest that 
                                                     
21 To estimate this economic effect, I divide the coefficient on TICW3 (0.045) from Table 5 by the mean value of 
CASH_ETR5 (0.230) from Panel B of Table 2. 
22 Dyreng et al. (2008) find that Cash ETR is negatively associated with R&D and conjecture that the higher 
spending on R&D for “tax avoiders” likely contributes to the positive relation between Cash ETR and ROA. 
Expensing R&D costs reduces the amount of pre-tax profit generated. I do not include an R&D variable in my study 
because data availability of R&D would greatly reduce my sample and the power of my tests. Of the 1,286 firms in 
my sample, 567 are missing long-run R&D data, including 82 of the 208 firms that report ICWs. 
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the time dummies for 2004 and 2005 are not statistically different from zero but the industry 
dummies are jointly statistically significant. 
 In the second column of Table 5, the coefficient for TICW3_ACCT3 is not significant. As 
a result, I am unable to reject the null of H2. However, company-level tax ICWs are consistent 
with an over 4 percentage point increase in CASH_ETR5 or an 18.7% increase in the rate of taxes 
paid for the mean firm in my sample; the coefficient on TICW3_COMP3 is significant at the 5% 
level (two-tailed). Thus I can reject the null form of Hypothesis 3 and, similar to the results for 
Hypothesis 1, this evidence implies that company-level tax ICWs indicate a failure to plan taxes 
rather than an opportunity for discretionary activities, on average. This evidence also could 
imply that increased attempts at aggressive tax planning in the presence of company-level tax 
ICWs are more often unsuccessful, also resulting in higher taxes paid. The coefficient on 
OICW3_ACCT3 is insignificant but the coefficient on OICW3_COMP3 is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. Prior research suggests that disclosed ICWs are negotiated (Wolfe et 
al., 2009) and thus issues with the tax function could be left undisclosed. If undisclosed ICWs 
are present in my sample, entity-wide ICWs could indeed have an influence on the tax function, 
on average. Alternatively, the research reviewed in Chapter 2 observes that company-level ICWs 
in general are associated with firms that are younger and financially constrained. Younger firms 
could have less sophisticated tax planning ex-ante, and resource constraints are argued to be and 
shown to be negatively associated with tax avoidance in this thesis. Thus the same characteristics 
that are associated with weaker tax planning could be as prevalent in firms with non-tax ICWs as 
they are in firms with tax ICWs. The results for the remaining variables are consistent with the 
first column in Table 5. 
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In summary, the results in the two columns of Table 5 suggest that tax avoidance is 
constrained by the presence of tax ICWs, in particular company-level tax ICWs. The evidence 
supports the conjecture that company-level ICWs call into question management’s ability to 
control its operations and that certain ICWs can provide information beyond financial reporting 
quality. This negative relation between tax ICWs and tax avoidance also provides an alternative 
perspective to recent evidence from Gleason et al. (2010). In their setting, material tax ICWs 
allow management to engage in short-term, discretionary reporting of ETR, leading to a positive 
association between tax ICWs and financial reporting aggressiveness.  
Although firms can make trade-offs between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax 
avoidance, evidence from Frank et al. (2009a) indicates that with non-conforming accounting 
standards and tax law the two, measured as annual constructs, are positively related rather than 
negatively related. Cook et al. (2008) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that the ETR 
management studied in Gleason et al. (2010) can be accomplished through earnings management 
or tax avoidance behaviour, further supporting a possible positive relation between financial 
reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness. The differing findings across my 
study and Gleason et al. (2010) could be the result of a difference in horizons. It could also be 
the result of different aggressiveness constructs.  
5.4 Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis 
5.4.1 Firm-year Regressions 
My previous tests rely on average variables to test long-run tax avoidance and thus 
smooth-out the short-run volatility of tax payments and refunds. Conservatively, I also restrict 
my sample to one observation per firm; I use this restriction to maintain independence among 
observations. As an alternative I regress overlapping, annual averages of all variables for the 
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sample period 2004-2006 to capture both time-series and cross-sectional variation and report the 
empirical results in Table 6. I attempt to alleviate concerns regarding independent observations 
by clustering the standard errors on two dimensions, industry and firm. In the next paragraph, I 
explain why average values of the ICW variables are used in this alternative regression. 
In firm-level analysis with average variables, a firm with an ICW in any year from 2004-
2006 is an ICW firm. However, in firm-year analysis with annual variables, a firm could have an 
ICW in the current year and none in the subsequent year, or have a tax ICW in the current year 
and a non-tax ICW in the subsequent year, etc. Implicit in my design to examine long-run tax 
avoidance is an assumption that it takes considerable time to change or improve strategic tax 
planning. Thus use of firm-level ICW values in the overlapping, annual regressions is consistent 
with the view that ICW firms, particularly tax ICW firms, do not necessarily alter their internal 
control profile in quick succession. 
 Table 6 shows that the coefficient estimates are generally consistent with the results in 
Table 5, although the fit of Equations (2) and (3) are not as strong when estimated with this panel 
of data. TICW and TICW_COMP are positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) and 
among the non-tax ICW variables, again only the coefficient on OICW_COMP is statistically 
significant (at the 10% level). All of the coefficients for the control variables are consistent in 
sign with the results in Table 5 although FORINC and FOROPS are not statistically significant in 
either column of Table 6. 
5.4.2 Alternative Proxies and Additional Variables 
5.4.2.1 Alternative Tax Avoidance Proxy 
In Chapter 4 I discussed why CASH_ETR5 is the appropriate measure of tax avoidance 
for my setting. Nevertheless, there is a lack of consensus in the literature concerning both the 
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definitions and constructs of tax avoidance and tax aggressiveness and so I evaluate the 
sensitivity of my results with an alternative proxy, total book-tax differences. Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) argue that, conceptually, total BTDs are similar to tax rate measures such as 
CASH_ETR5 because both constructs capture elements of book and tax as well as non-
conforming tax avoidance, and both constructs reflect deferral strategies. The extant literature 
argues that firms avoid more tax as the gap between book income and taxable income increases. 
To determine if my main results are robust to alternative measures of tax avoidance, I 
rely on two proxies of total BTDs – the measure of Manzon and Plesko (2002), BTD1, and the 
measure given in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), BTD2. These proxies are defined as follows: 
BTD1 = [US domestic pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense / US statutory 
rate) – state income taxes – other income taxes – equity in earnings] / lagged assets
 (5) 
BTD2 = [pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense + current foreign tax 
expense) / US statutory rate – change in NOL from t-1 to t] / lagged assets (6). 
Table 7 provides summary statistics for the new variables of interest that are empirically 
examined in Section 5.4. In Panels A and B, the average values of the relevant variables are 
reported. These variables are used in additional analyses of firm-level regressions in this 
subsection and subsection 5.4.3. In Panels C and D, the annual values of the relevant variables, 
including BTD1 and BTD2, are reported. The variables in these two panels, other than BTD1 and 
BTD2, are relevant to the analysis in subsection 5.4.4.  
Since my previous results hold for both Equations (2) and (3), I test BTD1 and BTD2 in 
regressions of Equation (3) only, and consistent with the prior literature I estimate BTDs in 
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annual regressions.23 Clustering of standard errors is again calculated both within industry and 
within firm. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8. 
TICW_COMP has a negative association with BTD1, consistent with the positive 
association with CASH_ETR5 in my main tests. The control variables are all statistically 
significant and generally significant at a 5% level, as expected given the majority of these control 
variables are common to the BTD literature. However, ROA and COCF have opposite signs than 
predicted. The results for BTD2 are generally weaker. None of the ICW variables, and only four 
of seven control variables, have statistically significant coefficients in the regression. The 
number of observations is significantly lower in the regression of BTD2 than in BTD1 because of 
missing values related to tax loss carryforwards. Combined, the annual BTD measures provide 
weaker evidence than Cash ETR regarding the influence of tax ICWs on tax avoidance. Several 
reasons explain why this BTD analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
First, it has been argued that BTDs are particularly associated with tax shelter activity 
(e.g. Wilson, 2009). Prior literature also demonstrates that BTDs are associated with earnings 
management. Thus, despite some similarities between BTDs and Cash ETR, the former captures 
elements of tax aggressive and financial reporting aggressive behaviour that is not captured by 
the latter. 
Second, in my particular setting, tax ICWs may proxy for ineffective tax planning and/or 
resource constraints. Firms with such issues are more likely to pay tax at a rate closer to the 
                                                     
23 Calegari (2000) argues that BTDs are transitory and thus their suitability as a long-run measure may be limited. 
Although Dyreng et al. (2008) conjecture that Cash ETR and BTDs will be associated with one another in the long 
run, they do not test this relation. Chen et al. (2010) demonstrate an association between BTDs and Cash ETR using 
annual proxies, but they also report results of a five-year average BTD measure identical to BTD1 in sensitivity 
analysis. Although the fit of the model is consistent in the annual and average regressions, the significance of most 
variables weakens in the average regression, including their variable of interest. Cash ETR is constructed as a long-
run measure to reduce misspecification due to the timing and variability of tax payments across taxation years but no 
such justification exists for measuring BTDs as a long-run measure. In effect, BTDs are relatively well-specified as 
annual measures and thus annual tests with BTDs are sufficient for comparison. 
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statutory rate, implying that they are less likely to make effective use of tax credits or foreign 
activities. A Cash ETR measure can distinguish these firms with higher tax rates from those 
firms that lower their rate through tax credits and foreign activity. Furthermore, since BTD 
measures use a domestic rate to estimate taxable income, greater measurement error exists for 
firms that are able to lower their tax rate through credits and foreign activity. This error narrows 
the gap between higher tax rate firms and lower tax rate firms in an empirical BTD measure. 
Since firms with company-level ICWs are less likely to have significant foreign transactions 
(Doyle et al., 2007a), this BTD issue is more pronounced in my setting. BTD1 is based on 
domestic taxable income and thus suffers from less measurement error than BTD2. In addition, 
BTD2 implicitly assumes that all foreign income is repatriated (global income is grossed up at 
the domestic rate) and such an implicit assumption is subject to challenge from the existing 
literature. 
5.4.2.2 Internal Control Weakness Classification 
 My categorization of internal control weaknesses into account-level and company-level 
components uses Hammersley et al.’s (2008) criteria. My calculation incorporates the adjustment 
of Doyle et al. (2007a and 2007b): three or more individual account-level issues constitute a 
company-level weakness. In this section, I analyze the sensitivity of my results to these two 
empirical design choices. 
 First, I examine the data when only firms disclosing an individual company-level 
weakness are coded as such. With this adjustment, more account-level ICWs than company-level 
ICWs result.24 The first column of Table 9 shows, after re-estimation of Equation (3), results 
generally consistent with prior evidence in this dissertation. TICW3_COMP3 is positive and 
                                                     
24 174 account-level ICWs and 142 company-level ICWs exist at the firm level with this adjustment. 
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significant at the 10% level, while no other internal control weakness variables are statistically 
significant. The control variables are consistent in both sign of the coefficient and statistical 
significance. 
Second, I use criteria provided by Moody’s (Doss and Jonas 2004) as an alternative 
classification method. Moody’s considers four general themes to reflect pervasive company-level 
issues: ineffective control environment; ineffective audit committee; ineffective internal audit or 
risk assessment function, and; ineffective financial reporting function. Using specific comments 
within the Moody’s commentary as a guide, I cross-reference these issues to the categories of 
Hammersley et al. (2008) presented in Appendix B. Consequently, Moody’s company-level 
internal control weaknesses generally include the “Category A” issues, several of the “Category 
B” issues in Appendix B, and the presence of three or more “Category B” issues.25 
The second column of Table 9 shows the empirical results for Equation (3) using the 
Moody’s classification method. The evidence is consistent with my main analysis. The 
magnitude and statistical significance of TICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_COMP3 are comparable 
to the results in Table 5, as are the magnitude and statistical significance of the control variables. 
As reported in the third column of Table 9, if I remove the restriction that three or more account-
level issues constitute a company-level ICW with the Moody’s classification scheme, the 
magnitude of TICW3_COMP3 increases, OICW3_COMP3 becomes statistically insignificant 
                                                     
25 In addition to the “Category A” weaknesses, the Moody’s commentary suggests that some “Category B” 
weaknesses in Appendix B are also pervasive. Lack of quality corporate governance, lack of internal audit function 
and poor segregation of duties are three “Category B” issues that I consider to be at the company-level under 
Moody’s criteria. The result is 104 account-level ICWs and 208 company-level ICWs at the firm-level. Inadequate 
training, staffing limitations, incomplete account analysis and inadequate account reconciliations are four “Category 
B” weaknesses that I do not code as company-level ICWs, despite Moody’s comments. These four issues are 
frequently disclosed by firms and their inclusion as company-level ICWs would cause company-level issues (243 
instances) to dominate account-level issues (60 instances) under the Moody’s classification scheme. 
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and results for all other variables generally remain consistent relative to the second column 
results.  
In summary, changes to the classification method of internal control weaknesses have 
little influence on the empirical results. The coefficient for non-tax-related company-level ICWs 
can lose statistical significance depending on the alternative method chosen. Most importantly, 
the effect on the tax-related ICWs does not change inferences. Tax-related company-level ICWs 
consistently show a positive and statistically significant association with my dependent measure 
of CASH_ETR5. 
5.4.2.3 Corporate Governance 
 In section 4.5 of Chapter 4, I discuss how systems of internal controls that reflect the 
internal monitoring within an organization are distinct from shareholder protection rights and 
other similar measures that reflect the external monitoring of an organization. These external 
forms of monitoring reflect typical themes of corporate governance in the literature, and in this 
section I control for the influence of corporate governance in Equations (2) and (3) when 
estimating the association between internal control quality and tax avoidance. 
 As my proxy, I calculate a multi-year average estimate of the Gompers et al. (2003) index 
(GOVERN) of corporate governance.26 A lower value of GOVERN indicates stronger external 
monitoring because defensive takeover tactics are reduced and thus existing managers are less 
likely to become entrenched. Evidence in Wilson (2009) argues that strong corporate governance 
                                                     
26 G-INDEX is a composite measure calculated for S&P 1500 firms. The data are available from Andrew Metrick’s 
website (http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html). GOVERN represents the mean of a firm’s time-series 
of G-INDEX scores and thus GOVERN varies by firm, but not by time period. Untabulated analysis of the means 
and standard deviations shows that the individual scores are quite “sticky”. The mean standard deviation is 0.709 
units, thus less than a one unit change in G-INDEX. In the 25th percentile and below, the standard deviation is 0.0 
and at the 75th percentile, the standard deviation is 1.0. Accordingly, use of the mean G-INDEX score appears 
justified. Although individual G-INDEX scores are not compiled after 2006, subsequent tests that include data from 
periods after 2006 can also use GOVERN. The “stickiness” of the variable suggests extrapolation is unnecessary.  
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can be associated with an increase in tax avoidance because tax planning activities in such firms 
create wealth for shareholders rather than divert rents to managers, implying a positive 
association between GOVERN and CASH_ETR5. 
 Table 10 presents the results for Equations (2) and (3) when estimated with GOVERN.27 
Consistent with earlier results, TICW3, TICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_COMP3 are all positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. OICW3 is also positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The other ICW variables are not statistically significant. The coefficient on 
FOROPS5 is not statistically significant in these regressions but all other control variables 
maintain the same sign and equal or better statistical significance than in previous regressions. 
As expected, the coefficient of GOVERN is positive and it is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. If I replace GOVERN with a dichotomous variable POOR_GOV that equals one for firms 
with above median GOVERN scores and zero for firms with at or below median GOVERN 
scores, the results and inferences do not change. These results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 10. 
In summary, strong corporate governance is positively associated with tax avoidance in 
my analysis. However, the presence of corporate governance does not diminish the influence of 
internal control quality on tax avoidance, nor does its exclusion significantly affect the estimated 
coefficients of the internal control variables. Overall, both internal control quality and the 
common Gompers et al. (2003) measure of corporate governance appear to be important factors 
in my model of tax avoidance. 
                                                     
27 Although the firms in my sample are S&P 1500 firms, they do not all have G-INDEX data available. Based on 
available data for my sample firms, GOVERN is negatively correlated with each of TICW3, OICW3, 
TICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_COMP3 but, in absolute value, the magnitude of correlation with each of these 




5.4.3 The Influence of Resource Constraints 
5.4.3.1 Factor Analysis 
The results thus far are consistent with tax ICWs limiting corporate tax avoidance, and so 
the tax ICW measures TICW3 and TICW3_COMP3 hypothetically capture elements of both risk 
management and resource issues. Furthermore, with resource constraints explicitly included in 
the empirical model, the importance of tax ICWs is not diminished. Although in the absence of a 
reasonable proxy I cannot further directly evaluate tax risk management, I can empirically 
examine how resource constraints relate to tax internal control weaknesses. 
My first step in this section is to consider the effect of the resource constraint proxies, 
AGGR_LOSS5 and COCF5, in my model. In general, no consistent proxy for resource 
constraints has emerged in the literature and so as a robustness check I analyze several known 
proxies using factor analysis. In addition to COCF5 and a continuous form of AGGR_LOSS5, 
similar to Klassen, Pittman and Reed (2004) I include debt and bond rating measures. DEBT5 
equals one minus a firm’s five-year average debt to asset ratio and NRATING5 equals one if the 
firm does not have a public bond rated by S&P at any time during a five-year period, zero 
otherwise.28 Since leverage is naturally highly positively correlated with the debt to asset ratio, I 
include CLEV5 (one minus LEV5) in the factor analysis as well. By construction, all five 
variables are expected to be positively related to CASH_ETR5. NRATING5 should be positively 
related to CASH_ETR5 because the absence of public debt suggests fewer options to obtain 
financing and thus fewer opportunities or incentives to avoid taxes (i.e. a higher CASH_ETR5). 
                                                     
28 DEBT5 = one minus [the average of long-term debt at t-4 scaled by lagged assets plus long-term debt at t scaled 
by lagged assets]; and NRATING5 = one if a firm lacks an S&P bond rating during all years from t-4 to t, and zero 
otherwise. I use a continuous measure of AGGR_LOSS5 (i.e. one minus [five-year sum of income before 
extraordinary items scaled by average lagged assets at t-4 and t]). 
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The factor analysis, reported in Panel A of Table 11, results in two factors: CC15 
represents constrained resource flows (i.e. income and cash) and CC25 represents constrained 
debt capacity. Thus both factors reflect resource constraints and are expected to be positively 
related to CASH_ETR5, my measure of tax avoidance. Panel B of Table 11 presents results from 
regressions of Equations (2) and (3) with the factors substituted for LEV5, AGGR_LOSS5 and 
COCF5.  
Across the two columns of results in Panel B of Table 11, CC15 loads significantly (at 
the 1% level) and in the predicted direction but CC25 does not load significantly in either model. 
In the first column, TICW3 is positive and significant (at the 1% level) and OICW3 is statistically 
insignificant. In the second column, consistent with prior results, TICW3_COMP3 and 
OICW3_COMP3 are positive and statistically significant (at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively). However, both TICW3_ACCT3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are statistically significant 
(also at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively) and while the coefficient on TICW3_ACCT3 is 
positive, the coefficient on OICW3_ACCT3 is negative.  The results for the remaining control 
variables are generally consistent with the main results reported in Table 5, but note that the 
overall fit of the models with factors included is not as strong as the fit of these main regressions. 
The reduced fit of this adjusted model suggests that the factor analysis constrains some of the 
important variation within the individual variables.29 
Overall, evidence from this table suggests rejection of the null form of Hypotheses 1 and 
3, consistent with prior analysis. However, the results also suggest rejection of the null form of 
Hypothesis 2. Further, although the presence of non-tax company-level ICWs continues to 
                                                     
29 Consistent with Appendix D, regressions on a parsimonious set of variables results in a higher adjusted R2 than 




suggest lower levels of tax avoidance, the presence of non-tax account-level ICWs is associated 
with a higher level of tax avoidance in this model. 
5.4.3.2 Interaction of Resource Factors and Internal Control Weakness Variables 
As a second step, I consider an interaction between resources available for tax planning 
and the ability to manage tax planning risks and opportunities. I use the statistically significant 
resource constraint proxy CC15 from the factor analysis to construct a parsimonious set of 
interaction terms that link with my account-level and company-level ICW variables. These 
interaction variables reduce the concern of multicollinearity that could be raised as a result of the 
theoretical influence that resource availability has on internal control decisions. I refer to these 
interaction variables as TACCT3*CC15, TCOMP3*CC15, OACCT3*CC15 and 
OCOMP3*CC15. I add these variables to Equation (3) and re-run the empirical model, with 
results presented in Table 12.  
With internal control weaknesses and a continuous factor of resource constraints 
interacted, the first column of results in Table 12 shows that the direct influence of company-
level tax and non-tax ICWs and resource constraints on tax avoidance remains, and in directions 
that are consistent with prior analysis. TICW3_COMP3 is positive and statistically significant 
and represents the effect for firms with company-level tax ICWs and a CC15 value equal to zero, 
which is close to the median value of CC15. Thus on average firms with company-level tax 
ICWs and intermediate resource constraints have a CASH_ETR5 that is approximately 5 
percentage points higher than firms without such ICWs. In addition, the coefficient on the 
interaction term for TCOMP3*CC15 is statistically significant and positive, which suggests that 
CASH_ETR5 increases as firms with company-level tax ICWs become more resource-
constrained. Overall, these combined effects suggest that while resource constraints are an 
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important factor in the relation between tax avoidance and material tax ICWs, other components, 
such as tax risk management, are also factors implicit in tax ICWs. 
To provide additional interpretation of the interaction coefficients, I separate CC15 into 
high, intermediate and low levels of resource constraints using their relative rank across three 
percentiles and I exclude the intermediate group. The use of three percentiles allows me to 
identify two relatively “extreme” groups based on resource constraints, and the exclusion of the 
intermediate group allows me to make a more interpretable, direct comparison between the high 
and low constraint groups. I include an indicator variable for the high resource constraint 
condition, and interact the high constraint indicator variable with the ICW variables in a 
modified regression model. The use of indicator variables aids in the interpretation of the 
interaction coefficients. The second column of Table 12 shows the results. 
This analysis comparing high and low levels of resource constraints provides some 
interesting insights. First, a significant and negative main effect is estimated for company-level 
tax ICWs. Second, firms with a high level of resource constraints do not have a statistically 
different association with CASH_ETR5 than firms with a low level of resource constraints, if 
there are no ICWs. Third, the coefficient on the interaction between company-level tax ICWs 
and highly constrained resources is positive and significant, with an absolute magnitude larger 
than the main effect. Results of an F-test demonstrate that the sum of TICW3_COMP3 and 
TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH is significantly different from zero (at the 1% level). These results imply 
that when firms with company-level tax ICWs have available resources, integrity issues that can 
manifest in discretionary behaviour may dominate competency issues, such that these firms are 
able to avoid a higher level of taxes. Furthermore, when firms with company-level tax ICWs 
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have significantly constrained resources, they do not appear to have the capacity to plan their 
taxes strategically, consistent with the primary evidence of this dissertation in Section 5.2.  
Reconciling the results in columns one and two, the impact of company-level tax ICWs 
and higher resource constraints is consistent. In addition, consider the observations in the 5th and 
95th percentiles of CC15 from Table 7, which have values of -1 and 1 respectively. Firms in the 
5th percentile have low resource constraints and when these firms do not have ICWs, the 
estimated effect on CASH_ETR5 is -0.076 (-1*0.076). However, when firms in the 5th percentile 
also have company-level tax ICWs, the estimated effect is -0.150. Thus firms with low resource 
constraints and company-level tax ICWs have a CASH_ETR5 value that is 0.074 lower than 
firms with low resource constraints and no ICWs.30 This difference is similar to the -0.083 
coefficient on TICW3_COMP3 in column two.  
On the other hand, firms in the 95th percentile of CC15 have high resource constraints 
and when these firms have no ICWs, the estimated effect on CASH_ETR5 is 0.076. When these 
highly constrained firms also have company-level tax ICWs, the estimated effect is 0.246, 
representing a difference of 0.150 between the two groups.31 This difference is comparable to the 
0.130 difference between the highly constrained group without ICWs and the highly constrained 
group with company-level tax ICWs in the second column. This estimated difference equals the 
sum of coefficients TICW3_COMP3, CC15_HIGH and TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH less the 
coefficient of CC15 in the second column. 
In summary, this analysis of the interaction between internal control weaknesses and 
resource constraints provides some evidence regarding the individual influence of each set of 
                                                     
30 The estimated effect for firms in the 5th percentile of CC15 that have a company-level tax ICW is equal to 
[0.048*TICW3_COMP3 + 0.076*CC15 + 0.122*TCOMP3*CC15]. Using summary statistics from Table 7 and 
coefficients from Table 12, the calculation is [0.048*1 – 0.076*1 – 0.122*1*1] = -0.150. 
31 The estimated effect 0.246 = [0.048*1 + 0.076*1 + 0.122*1*1]. 
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variables. Theoretically, the competence of management, i.e. tax risk management and tax 
planning execution, and the availability of resources have a primary role in the association 
between tax avoidance and tax ICWs. However, the integrity of management can also have an 
important theoretical influence on tax avoidance. The empirical evidence in this section directly 
supports the importance of resource constraints, on average, when all firms from the main 
sample are included. The combination of significant main effects and interaction effects suggests 
two contrasting results. One, for firms with the highest constraints, and perhaps firms with 
intermediate constraints, competency issues can also be an implicit factor in company-level tax 
ICWs. Two, for firms with low resource constraints, or in other words firms with available 
resources for tax planning, integrity issues could be an implicit factor in company-level tax 
ICWs that is associated with lower taxes paid. However, in the absence of suitable proxies it is 
not possible to comment on the strength of, for example, the risk management component 
relative to identifiable resource constraints. 
5.4.4 Remediation of Internal Control Weaknesses 
 Consistent with the literature review in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of Chapter 2, the analysis in 
this section investigates the potentially moderating role of remediation on the association 
between internal control weaknesses and tax avoidance. My long-run tests to this point in the 
dissertation have implicitly assumed that the influence of internal control weaknesses extend 
beyond the current reporting period, hence the use of firm-level measures of ICWs. The resulting 
evidence so far implies that long-run tax avoidance is typically constrained by these firm-level 
ICWs. 
As a more direct test, I follow the method of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) to construct 
remediation variables for use in firm-year regressions with annual values. I replace the firm-level 
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ICW variables in Equations (2) and (3) with a set of within-firm “WEAK” and “FIXED” 
variables that represent on-going internal control issues and remediated internal control 
weaknesses, respectively. For example, WEAK_TAX is equal to one if a firm has disclosed an 
individual tax-related ICW in the current or prior year, and zero otherwise. WEAK_OTHER is 
measured similarly for firms disclosing on-going other (i.e. non-tax) ICWs. Alternatively, 
TAX_FIXED is equal to one if a firm has disclosed an individual tax-related ICW in the prior 
year but has no such ICW present in the current year, and zero otherwise. Again, 
OTHER_FIXED is measured similarly for non-tax ICWs.  
Both sets of these general variables are separated into account-level and company-level 
components as well. WEAK_TAX_ACCT, WEAK_OTHER_ACCT, TAX_ACCT_FIXED and 
OTHER_ACCT_FIXED represent the account-level variables for on-going and remediated ICWs, 
respectively. WEAK_TAX_COMP, WEAK_OTHER_COMP, TAX_COMP_FIXED and 
OTHER_COMP_FIXED represent the company-level variables for on-going and remediated 
ICWs, respectively. I expect remediation (i.e. “FIXED”) to have the opposite influence on tax 
avoidance than the on-going ICWs (i.e. “WEAK”) have. 
Table 13 presents the results of this remediation analysis. In Panel A, the regressions use 
annual, not average, constructs of both the dependent and independent variables. In general, the 
coefficient estimates for the control variables in both columns are consistent with those reported 
earlier in the dissertation, both in terms of direction and statistical significance. FOROPS and 
BM are the only two control variables that are not statistically significant. The first column of 
results shows that coefficient estimates of WEAK_TAX and WEAK_OTHER are positive and 
significant and furthermore, TAX_FIXED and OTHER_FIXED are negative and significant. F-
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tests for the sum of the respective coefficients fail to reject the null and thus the “FIXED” 
variables are equivalent in magnitude to their “WEAK” counterparts.  
Turning to the second column in Panel A of Table 13, evidence on remediation is 
available when the pervasiveness of the ICW is taken into consideration. The company-level 
variables show a significant association with tax avoidance but the account-level variables do 
not. The presence of on-going company-level ICWs have a positive association with 
CASH_ETR, but their remediation has an equal or greater negative association. F-tests for the 
sum of the coefficients fail to reject the null that the sum is equal to zero. Overall this evidence 
implies that on-going ICWs, specifically the company-level ICWs, limit tax avoidance, 
consistent with earlier results, but that remediation appears to completely moderate this relation. 
Thus firms that remediate their ICWs have a similar level of tax avoidance to those firms that 
have never reported an ICW. 
Although tests that use annual variables are best suited for this remediation analysis, 
Dyreng et al. (2008) argue that Cash ETR does not provide consistent results as an annual 
variable, relative to other tax avoidance proxies. With this caveat in mind, I conduct some 
additional analysis reported in Panels B and C of Table 13. First, I test these regressions using 
annual BTD1 as the dependent variable and report the results in Panel B. Results for the tax 
variables are consistent with those reported in Panel A. For the non-tax variables, however, only 
the coefficient of WEAK_OTHER has a statistically significant association with BTD1 that is 
different from zero. Second, I examine the overlapping, annual regressions with CASH_ETR5 as 
the dependent variable and average values of the independent variables, except for the “WEAK” 
and “FIXED” variables. Results of this test are reported in Panel C. All of the “WEAK” tax 
variables and WEAK_OTHER_COMP are statistically significant at conventional levels, but only 
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the coefficient for TAX_ACCT_FIXED is statistically significant. This result provides some 
support for the conjecture that remediation can lead to an immediate improvement in planning 
the current period’s taxes paid but that changes to the longer-run, sustainable tax plans require 
multiple periods to take effect. 
In summary, analysis at the annual level provides evidence that remediation of tax and 
non-tax internal control weaknesses are associated with increases in levels of tax avoidance for 
firms that previously disclosed such weaknesses. These results suggest that improvements in 
internal controls, particularly in the tax function, could reflect improvements in tax planning. 
Additional analysis with overlapping, annual regressions of average variables suggests that it 
may take a number of periods before this remediation improves long-run tax planning, however. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In summary, evidence presented in this chapter is generally consistent with the view that 
tax internal control weaknesses, particularly company-level tax internal control weaknesses, 
constrain long-run tax avoidance. My main analysis shows a positive and statistically significant 
relation between my Cash ETR proxy of tax avoidance and general and company-level tax 
internal control weaknesses, implying higher taxes paid for firms with such issues. Company-
level non-tax internal control weaknesses share a similar constraining relation with tax 
avoidance, potentially suggesting that the same factors that give rise to tax ICWs also contribute 
to non-tax ICWs. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that this main result generally holds across alternative tests. 
Regressions of overlapping, firm-year observations of average data and annual, firm-year 
observations of an alternative, book-tax difference proxy of tax avoidance show similar results. 
Furthermore, consistent results are found when alternative classification methods for aggregating 
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internal control weaknesses are used, when measures of corporate governance are included in my 
empirical regressions, or when resource constraint variables derived from factor analysis are 
included in my regressions. However, not all of my results are consistent with my primary 
analysis. A second alternative book-tax difference proxy of tax avoidance does not show a 
significant relation with company-level tax ICWs. In addition, analysis of the interaction 
between resource constraints and internal control weaknesses suggest that for firms with low 
constraints and company-level tax ICWs, higher levels of tax avoidance can occur. This result 
could relate to the arguments regarding discretionary behaviour in Chapter 3, which also 
contrasts with the argument that firms with tax ICWs pay higher taxes because management’s 
increased attempts at discretionary tax planning are unsuccessful. 
Finally, my analysis of remediation provides some interesting results. On the one hand, in 
panel regressions with annual variables, including annual Cash ETR, I show that firms that 
subsequently remediate their tax-related internal control weaknesses have higher levels of tax 
avoidance in the year following the disclosed internal control weakness. This result is 
corroborated with tests using a book-tax difference proxy of tax avoidance. On the other hand, in 
overlapping, annual regressions of average variables and annual internal control weaknesses, I 
find a positive relation between Cash ETR and the disclosure of tax-related internal control 
weaknesses, but no relation between Cash ETR and remediated tax-related internal control 
weaknesses. Such evidence implies that remediation can lead to improvements in short-run tax 
planning, but, as my main tests suggest, improvements in long-run tax planning require more 




EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS – STOCK RETURNS AND THE INFLUENCE OF TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROL QUALITY 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I test my fourth and fifth hypotheses and thus investigate the empirical 
relation between shareholder returns and the interaction of aggressive tax avoidance and 
company-level tax internal control weaknesses. I empirically examine Equation (4) of Section 
4.6 of this dissertation using cross-sectional analysis of my tax avoidance and internal control 
weakness proxies and monthly Fama-French (1993) factors during my primary 2004-2006 
sample period. My primary analysis includes ranking of in-sample and out-of-sample values of 
my Cash ETR tax avoidance proxy to determine a set of tax aggressive firms. 
In supplemental tests in this chapter I test the sensitivity of this empirical analysis to 
alternative methods. These methods include estimation of regressions with general internal 
control weakness variables, regressions of values obtained from the twelve months preceding 
and following my 2004-2006 sample period, and ranking of alternative annual tax avoidance 
proxies. This chapter includes four sections, including this introduction and a conclusion. 
Section 6.2 of this chapter presents brief descriptive statistics relevant to my primary tests 
of Hypotheses 4 and 5 and provides the main table of analysis, Table 15. Section 6.3 provides 
several additional regressions with multiple internal control weakness classifications, alternative 




6.2 Hypothesis Tests – H4 and H5 
Table 14 provides summary statistics for the new variables of interest that are empirically 
examined in this chapter. In Panel A, similar to the panels in Table 7, I provide the mean, 
standard deviation, median and fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of the sample firms’ monthly 
abnormal returns and Fama-French factors. In Panel B, I provide cut-off values for the 
subsequent construction of tax aggressiveness variable TAG and the respective quintile ranking 
of its tax avoidance proxies. Recall that for Cash ETR proxies, firms ranked below the smallest 
cut-off value are considered tax aggressive, and for BTD and tax shelter proxies, firms ranked 
above the largest cut-off value are considered tax aggressive. 
Table 15 contains the primary results of the test used to investigate Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Recall that, in the null, Hypothesis 4 predicts that firms with tax-related ICWs will show a 
weakly positive association with abnormal returns, and Hypothesis 5 predicts that if Hypothesis 
4 is rejected, the association is less negative for firms that are tax aggressive. Both of Panels A 
and B of Table 15 contain three columns. In the first two columns, the tax aggressiveness and 
internal control weakness variables are based on firm-level average values of CASH_ETR5 and 
TICW3_COMP3, respectively. In column one, the ranking of CASH_ETR5 relies on the 2004-
2006 firm-level values that are analyzed in the main tests of Chapter 5 (see Section 5.2). In 
column two, the quintile ranking of tax aggressiveness (TAG) relies on the firm-level values of 
CASH_ETR5 that are constructed at the end of the 2003 fiscal period, and thus TAG is based on 
out-of-sample values of CASH_ETR5. In column three, the tax aggressiveness and internal 
control weakness variables use annual values of CASH_ETR and TICW_COMP, respectively, 
constructed during the sample period 2004-2006. In Panel A, Equation (4) is empirically 
estimated as shown in Section 4.6. In Panel B, TICWC (i.e. TICW3_COMP3), TAG and their 
 
82 
interaction variable are substituted into the model as an alternative presentation of the group-
wise comparison implicit in Equation (4). 
The results are generally consistent across the three columns in Panel A of Table 15. The 
coefficient on TICWC*TAG is negative and statistically significant in the first column, which 
suggests that, to the detriment of shareholders, tax aggressive firms with a weak set of internal 
controls underperform their tax aggressive, strong internal control counterparts. The coefficient 
of TICSC*NON_TAG is negative and statistically significant in all of the columns and the 
coefficient of TICWC*NON_TAG is negative and statistically significant across all columns. 
These results suggest that firms that are not tax aggressive, regardless of internal control quality, 
underperform relative to the tax aggressive firms with strong internal control quality.  
Related specifically to Hypothesis 4, the negative and statistically significant coefficients 
on both TICWC*TAG and TICWC*NON_TAG in column one imply that tax-related company-
level ICWs are negatively associated with shareholder returns, rejecting the null form of 
Hypothesis 4. As reported in Table 15, an F-test for the joint significance of TICWC*TAG and 
TICWC*NON_TAG is rejected at the 5% level or better across the three columns. In regards to 
Hypothesis 5, the magnitude of the coefficients on TICWC*TAG and on TICWC*NON_TAG do 
not appear much different from one another. An F-test for the equality of TICWC*TAG and 
TICWC*NON_TAG is not rejected at conventional levels in any of the three columns of Table 
15. Overall, these results do not provide support to reject Hypothesis 5, implying that the 
negative association between returns and tax-related company-level ICWs is not different in the 
presence of tax aggressiveness. 
The results in Panel B of Table 16 corroborate those of Panel A. The coefficient of 
TICWC is consistently negative and statistically significant across the three columns of Panel B, 
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providing direct evidence to reject the null of Hypothesis 4. The interaction coefficient of 
TICWC*TAG is not statistically significant, and thus this test fails to reject Hypothesis 5. TAG is 
positive and statistically significant in all three columns, implying a positive influence of tax 
aggressiveness on shareholder returns in this sample of firms. 
In summary, the results in Table 15 consistently support a negative association between 
tax-related ICWs and stock returns. Although these results reject the null form of Hypothesis 4, 
they do not provide support to reject the null form of Hypothesis 5. Thus the empirically 
determined negative association between stock returns and company-level tax ICWs does not 
appear to differ when firms are tax aggressive relative to when they are not tax aggressive. 
6.3 Robustness Checks and Additional Analysis 
6.3.1 Alternative Internal Control Weakness Variables and Alternative Sample Periods 
In Table 16, the analyses of firm-level values that are reported in columns one and two of 
Table 15 are replicated with general ICWs (tax and non-tax combined; columns one and two) 
and general tax-related ICWs (account-level and company-level combined; columns three and 
four) replacing company-level tax ICWs. The results across the two tables are consistent with 
one another and thus also lend support to reject Hypothesis 4. F-tests for joint significance of 
TICWC*TAG and TICWC*NON_TAG continue to reject the null in this table. However, although 
TICWC*TAG is typically negative in Table 16, again, F-tests for equality between TICWC*TAG 
and TICWC*NON_TAG do not reject the null.  
In addition to rejecting the null form of Hypothesis 4, the negative association between 
general ICWs and stock returns in Table 16 is consistent with evidence in Hammersley et al. 
(2008) and Beneish et al. (2008) that is based on the use of daily metrics. However, both of these 
prior studies show negative market reactions or stock returns that are associated with SOX 302 
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disclosures. Furthermore, Beneish et al. (2008) fail to find an association for SOX 404 
disclosures, whereas my analysis suggests that there is indeed a downward market valuation that 
is correlated with ICWs disclosed under SOX 404. Finally, given the consistent results in Table 
15 with company-level tax ICWs and Table 16 with general tax and non-tax ICWs, the influence 
of internal control weaknesses on stock returns appears to be related to the specific impact of 
those weaknesses that exist at the company-level. Such evidence corroborates the relations I 
study and report in Chapter 5. 
I also attempt to show that my findings are not the result of a correlated omitted variable 
by investigating the abnormal returns in the twelve months preceding and the twelve months 
following my sample period. The related tests rely on the out-of-sample construction of 
CASH_ETR5 and firm-level construction of TICW3_COMP3. The results are presented in Table 
17. Overall, this evidence does not support the rejection of Hypotheses 4 or 5, or my 
aforementioned results. The coefficient of TICWC*TAG appears positive, not negative, and 
statistically significant only in the twelve months preceding my sample period. No other 
interaction coefficients are statistically significant in either column of the table. A partial 
explanation for these results is that prior to 2004, internal control disclosures are not mandatory 
and investors would have little public information with which to determine a firm’s internal 
control quality and thus assess the firm’s performance on this dimension.  
In summary, the results in Table 16, with general ICWs and general tax ICWs, 
corroborate the negative association between company-level tax ICWs and stock returns 
identified in the previous section and further suggest that the company-level ICWs are the issues 
that influence this association. Although these results also provide support to reject the null form 
of Hypothesis 4, they do not provide support to reject the null form of Hypothesis 5. In addition, 
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the analysis of the twelve month periods preceding and following the ICW disclosure period of 
2004-2006 does not reject either of the two hypotheses tested in this Chapter. 
6.3.2 Alternative Tax Avoidance Proxies 
 In Equation (4), TAG represents tax aggressiveness and is calculated by ranking 
CASH_ETR5 into quintiles; firms ranked in the lowest quintile are considered to be tax 
aggressive. As an alternative to CASH_ETR5, in this subsection I rank two other annual tax 
avoidance proxies. The first is BTD1, as described in subsection 5.3.2.1, and the second is 
PROB_TS. PROB_TS represents the probability between zero and one that a firm is involved in a 
tax shelter and is calculated using the tax shelter prediction model created by Wilson (2009). The 
probability is estimated as follows: 
PROB_TS = e(TS) / (1 + eTS)) (7). 
To calculate the predicted tax shelter estimate TS, I multiply estimated coefficients (i.e. 
bk’s) from Wilson’s Table 5 (2009, p.988) by my sample firm characteristics in the following 
model. 
TSit = -4.86 + 5.20*BTD1it + 4.08*DAPit – 1.41*LEVit + 0.76*SIZEit + 3.51*ROAit + 
1.72*FOROPSit + 2.43*R&Dit  (8) 
Where: 
TSit = the predicted tax shelter estimate for firm i in current year t; 
 
BTD1it = the Manzon-Plesko (2002) book-tax difference as described in subsection 5.3.2.1; 
 
DAPit = the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals measure based on the modified-Jones 
model as described below; 
 
LEVit = leverage for firm i, measured as long-term debt at year t scaled by lagged assets; 
 
SIZEit = the natural logarithm of firm i’s assets as measured at t-1; 
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ROAit = the Return on Assets for firm i in year t, measured as operating income scaled by lagged 
assets; 
 
FOROPSit = an indicator variable equal to one if foreign income for firm i in year t is non-zero 
or non-missing, zero otherwise; 
 
R&Dit = the research and development expense for firm i in year t scaled by lagged assets. 
 I calculate DAP as the performance-matched discretionary accruals measure of financial 
reporting aggressiveness consistent with Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) and Frank et al. 
(2009a). This measure requires calculation of discretionary accruals, which I base on the 
modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). First, I estimate total accruals 
(TACC) using the following model by two-digit NAICS code and fiscal year, where all variables 
(including the intercept) are scaled by lagged total assets. 
TACCit = β0 + β1(ΔREVit – ΔARit) + β2PPEit + μit  (9) 
Where: 
TACCit = [IBCit + TXTit – (ADJOCFit – XIDOCit)]; 
 
IBCit = income before extraordinary items for firm i from the statement of cash flows in year t; 
 
TXTit = total tax expense for firm i in year t; 
ADJOCFit = operating cash flows less taxes paid from the statement of cash flows for firm i in 
year t; 
 
XIDOCit = extraordinary items and discontinued operations from the statement of cash flows for 
firm i in year t; 
 
ΔREVit = firm i’s sales in year t less its sales in year t-1; 
ΔARit = firm i’s total receivables in year t less its total receivables in year t-1; 
PPE5it = the property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t; 
 
μit = the unadjusted discretionary accruals measure of firm i in year t, a residual value. 
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Second, after estimating the discretionary accruals residual μ from Equation (7) I rank 
ROA by industry-year into deciles and determine the median discretionary accrual value.32 I then 
subtract the median industry-year-ROA_decile discretionary accrual value from each firm’s 
residual value to get the performance-matched discretionary accrual measure DAP.33 Thus DAP 
is an annual value calculated for each firm-year in my sample.34 
Table 18 presents the results of estimating Equation (4) with each of BTD1 and 
PROB_TS. These two additional proxies are firm-year measures and therefore I rely on in-
sample values of each measure. Like prior tables in this Chapter, the intercept is positive and the 
coefficient on TICWC*NON_TAG is negative (both coefficients are significant at the 1% level) 
in column one of Table 18. However, the coefficient for TICWC*TAG is statistically 
insignificant. Despite this insignificant coefficient, an F-test for joint significance between 
TICWC*TAG and TICWC*NON_TAG is rejected, providing some, albeit weaker, evidence to 
reject the null form of Hypothesis 4 when BTD1 substitutes as a proxy for tax avoidance. The 
results in column one do not support a rejection of Hypothesis 5. In addition, the results in 
column two of Table 18 with PROB_TS are not consistent with either alternative forms of 
Hypothesis 5. Although the intercept is statistically significant, and positive, none of the 
interaction coefficients or the F-tests are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
                                                     
32 The individual discretionary accrual values are set to missing if there are less than 10 observations in the 
respective industry-year group. 
33 I adjust the median values of each industry-year-ROA_decile group such that no median value is calculated while 
including the specific firm-year observation for which I am estimating DAP.  
34 Using the estimated coefficients from Wilson’s (2009) prediction model I am likely to induce some imprecision in 
my final DAP estimates, particularly since his model is estimated based on 33 tax shelter firms. Wilson’s (2009) tax 
shelter firms have a mean, median and standard deviation of DAP of -0.01, -0.01 and 0.04, respectively. My sample 




In summary, evidence presented in this chapter is typically consistent with the view that 
company-level tax internal control weaknesses are negatively associated with shareholder 
returns. Contrary to arguments in Chapter 3, however, this negative association does not appear 
to increase for firms that are also tax aggressive. Thus firms with weak tax-related internal 
controls create less wealth for shareholders than tax aggressive firms with strong internal 
controls, regardless of the level of tax aggressiveness in the weak internal control firms. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that this main result holds when general internal control 
weaknesses or general tax internal control weaknesses substitute for company-level tax internal 
control weaknesses. Tests with alternative, annual measures of tax aggressiveness find weak 
evidence to support these results. Furthermore, examining the twelve month periods before and 
after my primary 2004-2006 sample period does not provide evidence consistent with the 





In this dissertation I investigate the association between internal control mechanisms and 
the capacity for strategic tax planning and how these concepts interact to influence stock 
performance. The requirements of SOX 404 provide a unique opportunity to examine publicly-
available firm-level disclosures of internal control quality and its relation with tax avoidance. 
Tax-related internal control weaknesses are frequently disclosed in SOX 404 reports, indicating 
that many firms appear to struggle with their tax function and as I argue, their tax planning.  
Using a firm-level sample of observations from the 2004-2006 post-SOX period, I first 
examine the relation between long-run tax avoidance and hand-collected tax and non-tax ICW 
disclosures. I demonstrate that lower levels of tax avoidance occur in the presence of general tax-
related ICWs. Furthermore, pervasive, company-level ICWs – both tax and non-tax – appear to 
drive this relation and account-level ICWs, as expected, are not associated with tax avoidance. 
Supplemental factor analysis indicates that tax ICWs reflect resource constraint issues as well as 
other problems, such as tax risk management issues, but also that firms with tax ICWs and low 
resource constraints avoid more tax than firms without ICWs. Further supplemental analysis 
provides some evidence that subsequent to remediating ICWs, firms report higher levels of tax 
avoidance, consistent with an improvement in their capacity for tax planning. Overall, these 
results are consistent with disclosed ICWs in the tax function signaling issues beyond financial 
reporting. Specifically, the evidence is generally consistent with weaker strategic tax planning 
for firms with tax ICWs such that in the long-run these firms avoid less tax than firms that do not 
report any ICWs. 
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My analysis of monthly abnormal stock return performance supports these results. Firms 
that have pervasive tax ICWs underperform tax aggressive firms without ICWs. Thus strong 
internal governance coupled with tax aggressiveness generates wealth for shareholders. 
However, I do not find evidence that this underperformance by firms with tax ICWs is greater 
for firms that are also tax aggressive. 
My dissertation is informative to the extant literature of both internal control quality and 
tax avoidance; I believe it also helps to bridge these two literatures. I corroborate prior research 
(e.g. Doyle et al., 2007a & 2007b; Hammersley et al., 2008) and show that the type of disclosed 
ICW matters. ICWs that are less pervasive are not significant in my tests but the pervasive ICWs 
that “call into question management’s ability to govern its operations” (Doyle et al., 2007a, 
p.196) lead to important inferences about tax avoidance in my study, as they lead to important 
inferences in other areas of the prior literature. Furthermore, many studies examine the influence 
of external corporative governance on tax avoidance (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Wilson, 
2009). In this dissertation, I demonstrate how internal governance mechanisms play a key 
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APPENDIX A 
DOYLE ET AL. (2007A) MATERIAL WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
Account-Specific Material Weaknesses  
1. Inadequate internal controls for accounting for loss contingencies, including bad debts 
2. Deficiencies in the documentation of a receivables securitization program  
3. No adequate internal controls over the application of new accounting principles or the application 
of existing accounting principles to new transactions 
Company-Level Material Weaknesses 
1. Override by senior management  




MATERIAL WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME (BASED ON HAMMERSLEY ET 
AL., 2008) 
  
Table 3  Disclosure auditability categories    
  Number of  % of  
  weaknesses weaknesses  
A. Less auditable disclosure categories   
1. Weaknesses in key personnel   
a. Lack of key personnel—CFO, controller, etc.  9  1.1  
b. Evidence of management override of controls or integrity issues  5  0.6  
2. Financial reporting weaknesses   
a. Problems with financial statement closing procedures  16  2.0  
3. Control environment weaknesses   
a. Internal control weaknesses that are red flags for fraud or that  15  1.8  
allowed fraud to occur   
b. Insufficient documentation or policies to support transactions or  47  5.8  
adjusting entries   
c. Inadequate lines of communication between management and  15  1.8  
accounting staff and/or auditors that prevent transactions from  
being recorded correctly. 
 
d. Insufficient risk assessment policies* 
 
      N/A                  N/A 
Total less auditable weaknesses  107   13.1  
 
B. More auditable disclosure categories  
 
1. Personnel weaknesses   
a. Lack of technical knowledge of FAS or SEC filing requirements  36  4.4  
b. Lack of quality corporate governance—Audit committee, BOD, 
etc. 
5  0.6  
c. Inadequate training  14  1.7  
d. Staffing limitations and lack of resources at lower level  52  6.5  
e. Lack of internal audit function or other monitoring  16  2.0  
2. Control system weaknesses   
a. Inadequate or lack of timely review  60  7.3  
b. Incomplete account analysis  17  2.1  
c. Untimely preparation of account reconciliations  44  5.4  
d. Inadequate controls over non-routine transactions  14  1.7  
e. Lack of discipline around financial reporting  6  0.7  
f. Approval procedures not followed  2  0.2  
g. Other procedures not followed  1  0.1  
h. Inadequate general computer controls  5  0.6  
i. Poor segregation of duties  44  5.1  
j. Inadequate access security  21  2.6  
k. Other IT weaknesses  23  2.8  
l. Lack of documentation of control procedures  29  3.7  
m. Lack of documentation of IT systems  8  1.0  
n. Multiple systems or platforms are in use increasing complexity  9  1.1  
o. Use of and lack of control over spreadsheets  8  1.0  







 continued  
Number of  % of  
weaknesses  weaknesses  
3. Transaction accounting weaknesses   
a. Revenue recognition  51  6.4  
b. Expense recognition  14  1.7  
c. Accounts receivable  7  0.9  
d. Tax accounting  21  2.6  
e. Inventory accounting  25  3.1  
f. Debt covenants  2  0.2  
g. Consolidation  15  1.8  
h. Fixed assets  13  1.6  
i. Stock-based compensation  9  1.1  
j. Fair value accounting  3  0.4  
k. Foreign currency  3  0.4  
l. Goodwill  2  0.2  
m. Patents and other intangibles  4  0.5  
n. Software development  4  0.5  
o. Accruals  16  2.0  
p. Minority interest  2  0.2  
q. Deferred revenue  1  0.1  
r. Other assets  5  0.6  
s. Earnings per share  1  0.1  
t. Accounts payable  3  0.4  
u. Payroll  2  0.2  
v. Subsidiaries and related parties  7  0.9  
w. Oil and gas reserves  4  0.5  
x. Loans  6  0.7  
y. Leases  3  0.4  
z. Cash  3  0.4  
aa. Stock issuance  4  0.5  
bb. Pension  2  0.2  
 












C. Not enough information disclosed to categorize  46  5.7  





EXAMPLES OF TAX-RELATED MATERIAL WEAKNESS DISCLOSURES 
Account-Specific Examples  
Intermet Corp 
[W]e conducted an assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of 
December 31, 2004…adjustments were detected during the year-end audit process that resulted in a 
revision of income tax expense and accrued income tax liabilities related to the conversion of foreign 
entity financial statements from local GAAP to United States GAAP during the consolidation process and 
entries related to the write-off of capitalized debt issuance costs associated with our outstanding senior 
notes as required by applicable accounting guidance for companies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
The Pep Boys - Manny, Moe & Jack  
This material weakness, originally determined in the second quarter of fiscal 2007, resulted in errors 
in our supplemental guarantor information note and statements of cash flows presentation, for which 
previously issued annual and interim financial statements were restated, an error in the recording of our 
third quarter fiscal 2007 impairment charge for our store closures and an error in its analyses and 
documentation supporting the realizability of the Company's net deferred tax asset included in the annual 
financial statements. 
Company-Level Examples  
Parametric Technology Corp 
As of September 30, 2007, we identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial 
reporting because we did not maintain effective controls over the accounting for income taxes, including 
the determination and reporting of accrued income taxes, deferred taxes and the related income tax 
provision. Specifically, we did not have adequate personnel to enable us to properly consider and apply 
generally accepted accounting principles for taxes, review and monitor the accuracy and completeness of 
the components of the income tax provision calculations and the related deferred taxes and accrued 
income taxes, ensure that the rationale for certain tax positions was appropriate, and ensure that effective 
oversight of the work performed by our outside tax advisors was exercised. 
j2 Global Communications, Inc. 
An adjustment to the Company’s income tax provision was identified based on the results of the 
annual financial statement audit for the fiscal year 2005. This adjustment resulted from a deficiency in the 
operation of controls requiring the assessment of the income tax impact of the pricing for services 
purchased by j2 Global Communications, Inc. from a subsidiary. This deficiency represents a material 





TABLE D.1 – DETERMINATION OF A PARSIMONIOUS MODEL OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
Equations (2) and (3) in this dissertation are parsimonious models of tax avoidance. Four additional 
variables common to the tax avoidance literature are excluded from the models based on tests reported in 
this Appendix. For simplicity, the following equation with the additional variables included is based on 
Equation (2): 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3it + β2OICW3it + β3ROA5it + β4LEV5it + β5FORINC5it + β6FOROPS5it 
+ β7BM5it + β8AGGR_LOSS5it + β9COCF5it + β10NOL5it + β11SIZE5it + β12PPE5it + β13INTANG5it + 
ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
The additional variables are defined as follows: 
NOL5it = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i’s opening loss carry forward balance is positive 
during any year between year t-4 and t, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE5it = the natural logarithm of firm i’s average assets as measured at t-5 and t-1; 
PPE5it = the average property, plant and equipment (PPE) of firm i for years t-4 through t, measured as 
PPE scaled by lagged assets at t-4 plus the same ratio at t, divided by two; 
INTANG5it = the average intangible assets of firm i for years t-4 through t, measured as intangible assets 
scaled by lagged assets at t-4 plus the same ratio at t, divided by two. 
As reported below in this Appendix, three sets of tests are conducted to validate the exclusion of these 
variables. Panel A reports the primary test, with an analysis of the firm-level sample of this dissertation. 
Panels B and C are secondary tests, with analysis of annual values of the firm-year sample and with 
analysis of a firm-level, complete Compustat sample (subject to data availability), respectively. In Panel 
C, ICW variables are not present in the model because Compustat does not provide such data.  
In each panel, the first column reports the statistics related to the above regression. The subsequent 
columns report the results as the variables are excluded in sequence, beginning with the exclusion of 
INTANG5 and ending with the inclusion of NOL5 only. With NOL5 excluded, the equation matches that 
of Equation (2) in Section 4.5. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within two-digit industry 
and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Significance for all variables with a predicted sign is calculated using a one-tailed test; for all other 
variables, including unreported year and industry effects, two-tailed tests are calculated. 
102 












INTERCEPT ? -0.431  ** -0.432  ** -0.460  ** -0.445  ** 
  (0.226)  (0.222)  (0.193)  (0.191)  
TICW3 ? 0.048  ** 0.043  ** 0.046  ** 0.045  ** 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
OICW3  0.024   0.025   0.026   0.025   
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  
ROA5 - 0.686  *** 0.689  *** 0.721  *** 0.715  *** 
  (0.209)  (0.209)  (0.194)  (0.193)  
LEV5 - -0.037   -0.046  * -0.108  * -0.105  * 
  (0.043)  (0.033)  (0.066)  (0.067)  
FORINC5 - -0.042   -0.111   -0.192  * -0.171  * 
  (0.105)  (0.117)  (0.140)  (0.120)  
FOROPS5 - 0.012  * 0.015  * 0.017  * 0.019  * 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
BM5 - 0.033   0.028   0.027   0.025   
  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.026)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.170  *** 0.175  *** 0.180  *** 0.180  *** 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.055)  
COCF5 + 0.539  *** 0.541  *** 0.546  *** 0.555  *** 
  (0.201)  (0.198)  (0.181)  (0.174)  
NOL5 - -0.022  ** -0.017  * -0.014   -0.015   
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  
SIZE5 ? -0.001   -0.001   0.002     
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)    
PPE5 - 0.017   0.009       
  (0.037)  (0.032)      
INTANG5 - -0.003         
  (0.025)        
                   
Adjusted R2   11.49%   10.85%   13.02%   13.05%  
Number of firms with 
material weaknesses 192   206   208   208  
Number of total 

















INTERCEPT ? -0.178   -0.177   -0.211  ** -0.194  ** 
  (0.127)  (0.130)  (0.098)  (0.084)  
TICW ? 0.086  *** 0.086  ** 0.089  *** 0.089  *** 
  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
OICW  0.037  ** 0.039  ** 0.039  ** 0.037  ** 
  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.016)  
ROA - 0.075   0.077   0.094  * 0.089  * 
  (0.067)  (0.071)  (0.060)  (0.057)  
LEV - -0.080  ** -0.074  *** -0.147  ** -0.145  ** 
  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.071)  (0.073)  
FORINC - -0.177  ** -0.187  ** -0.249  *** -0.233  ** 
  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.097)  (0.097)  
FOROPS - 0.012   0.013   0.011   0.012   
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
BM - -0.019   -0.016   -0.018   -0.019   
  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.018)  
AGGR_LOSS + -0.041  ** -0.044  ** -0.041  ** -0.042  ** 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
COCF + 0.388  *** 0.385  *** 0.396  *** 0.401  *** 
  (0.090)  (0.092)  (0.070)  (0.071)  
NOL - -0.021  *** -0.019  *** -0.014  * -0.014  * 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
SIZE ? -0.002   -0.002   0.002     
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)    
PPE - 0.036   0.030  ***     
  (0.033)  (0.029)      
INTANG - 0.011         
  (0.020)        
                   
Adjusted R2   7.77%   7.87%   8.62%   8.62%  
Number of firms with 
material weaknesses 289   294   299   299  
Number of total 

















INTERCEPT ? -0.227  ** -0.228  ** -0.210  ** -0.236  ** 
  (0.091)  (0.085)  (0.084)  (0.100)  
ROA5 - 0.333  *** 0.331  *** 0.316  *** 0.324  *** 
  (0.092)  (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.081)  
LEV5 - -0.022   -0.039  ** -0.069  * -0.076  ** 
  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.043)  (0.041)  
FORINC5 - -0.058   -0.086   -0.101   -0.128   
  (0.228)  (0.215)  (0.231)  (0.236)  
FOROPS5 - 0.021   0.026  * 0.029  * 0.024  * 
  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
BM5 - 0.010  ** 0.011  *** 0.011  *** 0.012  *** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.190  *** 0.183  *** 0.178  *** 0.180  *** 
  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046)  
COCF5 + 0.408  *** 0.404  *** 0.384  *** 0.381  *** 
  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.098)  (0.103)  
NOL5 - -0.051  ** -0.050  *** -0.048  ** -0.048  ** 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
SIZE5 ? -0.006   -0.005   -0.005     
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)    
PPE5 - 0.007  *** 0.007  ***     
  (0.001)  (0.001)      
INTANG5 - -0.014         
  (0.029)        
                   
Adjusted R2   6.81%   6.42%   6.90%   6.83%  
Number of total 





SAMPLE, INDUSTRY AND WEAKNESS COMPOSITION 
The composition of firms in Panels A and B is based on a firm-level sample of observations from 
2004-2006, with one unique observation per firm. The composition of firms in Panels C, D and E is based 
on a firm-year sample of observations from 2004-2006, with multiple observations per firm. ICW refers 
to internal control weakness. For purposes of Panels A and C, sample firms trade on one of the S&P 500, 
S&P 400 or S&P 600 indices during the sample period. In Panels B and D, industry composition is based 
on a two-digit NAICS classification. In Panel E, the number of firm-year ICWs is totaled by weakness 
category. The weakness categories map to individual or aggregated categories based on Hammersley et al. 
(2008), as shown in greater detail in Appendix B. 
 










 # % # % # % # % 
ICW FIRMS         
2004 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (1.4%) 4 (1.9%) 
2005 3 (1.4%) 2 (1.0%) 6 (2.9%) 11 (5.3%) 
2006 40 (19.2%) 46 (22.1%) 107 (51.4%) 193 (92.8%) 
         
Total 44 (21.2%) 48 (23.1%) 116 (55.8%) 208 (100.0%)
         
NON-ICW FIRMS         
2004 9 (0.8%) 7 (0.6%) 18 (1.7%) 34 (3.2%) 
2005 12 (1.1%) 13 (1.2%) 29 (2.7%) 54 (5.0%) 
2006 372 (34.5%) 286 (26.5%) 332 (30.8%) 990 (91.8%) 
         
Total 393 (36.5%) 306 (28.4%) 379 (35.2%) 1078 (100.0%)
         
TOTAL BY S&P 





Panel B: Industry Composition - Firm-Level Observations     








Mining   7  45  13.5%  
Utilities   7  61  10.3%  
Food, beverage and textiles manufacturing 10  57  14.9%  
Wood, paper, coal, plastic and other 
manufacturing 23  128  15.2%  
Primary metal manufacturing  58  308  15.8%  
Wholesale trade   6  45  11.8%  
Retail trade   13  55  19.1%  
Retail trade: sporting and other  10  22  31.3%  
Transportation and warehousing  3  29  9.4%  
Information   20  77  20.6%  
Finance and insurance   17  128  11.7%  
Real estate and rental and leasing  2  8  20.0%  
Professional, scientific and technical services 14  45  23.7%  
Administrative and support and waste 
management and remediation services  6  30  16.7%  
Educational services   3  3  50.0%  
Accommodation and food services  6  30  16.7%  
Services other than public administration 2  4  33.3%  
















 # % # % # % # % 
ICW FIRMS         
2004 31 (11.4%) 27 (10.0%) 43 (15.9%) 101 (37.3%) 
2005 24 (8.9%) 22 (8.1%) 54 (19.9%) 100 (36.9%) 
2006 17 (6.3%) 16 (5.9%) 37 (13.7%) 70 (25.8%) 
         
Total 72 (26.6%) 65 (24.0%) 134 (49.4%) 271 (100.0%)
         
NON-ICW FIRMS         
2004 328 (10.6%) 247 (8.0%) 294 (9.5%) 869 (28.2%) 
2005 388 (12.6%) 321 (10.4%) 389 (12.6%) 1098 (35.6%) 
2006 395 (12.8%) 316 (10.3%) 402 (13.1%) 1113 (36.1%) 
         
Total 1111 (36.1%) 884 (28.7%) 1085 (35.2%) 3080 (100.0%)
         
TOTAL BY S&P 
INDEX 1183 (35.3%) 949 (28.3%) 1219 (36.4%) 3351 (100.0%)
     
Panel D: Industry Composition - Firm-Year Observations    








Mining  9  123  6.8%  
Utilities  10  181  5.2%  
Food, beverage and textiles manufacturing 14  158  8.1%  
Wood, paper, coal, plastic and other 
manufacturing 
31  372  7.7%  
Primary metal manufacturing 73  842  8.0%  
Wholesale trade  8  123  6.1%  
Retail trade  13  163  7.4%  
Retail trade: sporting and other 16  75  17.6%  
Transportation and warehousing 5  89  5.3%  
Information  28  210  11.8%  
Finance and insurance  24  375  6.0%  
Real estate and rental and leasing 3  26  10.3%  
Professional, scientific and technical 
services 
18  129  12.2%  
Administrative and support and waste 
management and remediation services  
5  92  5.2%  
Educational services  4  12  25.0%  
Accommodation and food services 7  85  7.6%  
Services other than public administration 2  15  11.8%  




Panel E: Internal Control Weakness Categories - Firm-Year Observations    
   # 
ICWs 
 % OF ICWs % OF ICWs TO 
FIRM-YEARS 
COMPANY-LEVEL ICWs        
A1a: Lack of key personnel  25  2.2%  9.2%  
A1b: Management override or integrity 
issues 
15  1.3%  5.5%  
A2a: Financial statement close process issues 51  4.5%  18.8%  
A3a: Fraud or red flags for fraud  24  2.1%  8.9%  
A3b: Insufficient documentation and policies 94  8.4%  34.7%  
A3c: Inadequate lines of communication 38  3.4%  14.0%  
A3d: Insufficient risk assessment policies 19  1.7%  7.0%  
         
Subtotal   266  23.6%    
         
ACCOUNT-LEVEL ICWs        
B1a: Lack of timely reporting/filing 63  5.6%  23.2%  
B1b: Lack of quality corporate governance 51  4.5%  18.8%  
B1cd: Lack of training & staffing/resource 
issues 
160  14.2%  59.0%  
B1e: Internal audit/monitoring issues 48  4.3%  17.7%  
B2a: Lack of timely review  164  14.6%  60.5%  
B2b: Incomplete account analysis  93  8.3%  34.3%  
B2c: Untimely account reconciliations 101  9.0%  37.3%  
B2d: Issues with non-routine transactions 41  3.6%  15.1%  
B2e: Lack of discipline in reporting 1  0.1%  0.4%  
B2f: Approval procedures not followed 7  0.6%  2.6%  
B2g: Other procedures not followed 1  0.1%  0.4%  
B2hjkmno: Issues with IT controls  77  6.8%  28.4%  
B2i: Segregation of duties issues  33  2.9%  12.2%  
B2l: Lack of documentation of controls 10  0.9%  3.7%  
B2p: Issues with manual systems/controls 6  0.5%  2.2%  
B4: Issues with routine transactions 3  0.3%  1.1%  
         
Subtotal   859  76.4%    
       FIRM-YEARS 




SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PRIMARY TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 1 - 3 
The Panel A annual sample and the Panel C overlapping, annual sample consist of 3,351 firm-year observations from the S&P 400, 500 and 
600 (i.e. S&P 1500) between 2004 and 2006. The Panel B average sample consists of 1,286 firm-level observations. CASH_ETR in Panel A 
contains only 3,251 observations because some annual values with negative denominators are set to missing; over a 5-year period, these firms 
report a positive average denominator for CASH_ETR5. Annual variables are simply the one-year value of the average variables. AGGR_LOSS is a 
sum of values at time t-1 and t, BM is measured at t-1, and all other annual values are measured at year t. All continuous annual variables are 
scaled by assets at time t-1. Similarly, all average values are averaged for the five-year period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are 
averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are 
scaled by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 is the five-year average of the annual CASH_ETR (taxes paid/(income less 
special items)). TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness and a company-level internal 
control weakness identified during the sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with OICW 
representing other non-tax internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level internal control weaknesses. ROA5 is average return 
on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-
missing, non-zero; BM5 is average book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of 
accounting losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows; DYR04-DYR06 are indicator variables representing the fiscal years 





Panel A: Annual Values       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
CASH_ETR Annual Cash ETR 3251 0.246 0.219 0.000 0.234 0.528 
TICW_ACCT Account-level tax internal control weakness 3351 0.007 0.081 0 0.000 0 
TICW_COMP Company-level tax internal control weakness 3351 0.029 0.167 0 0.000 0 
OICW_ACCT Account-level non-tax internal control weakness 3351 0.016 0.126 0 0.000 0 
OICW_COMP Company-level non-tax internal control weakness 3351 0.030 0.169 0 0.000 0 
ROA Return on assets 3351 0.110 0.102 -0.014 0.093 0.294 
LEV Leverage 3351 0.200 0.191 0.000 0.169 0.565 
FORINC Foreign Income 3351 0.021 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.107 
FOROPS Existence of foreign operations 3351 0.525 0.499 0 1.000 1 
BM Book-to-market ratio 3351 0.443 0.242 0.118 0.413 0.862 
AGGR_LOSS Two consecutive years of losses 3351 0.065 0.246 0 0.000 1 
COCF One minus operating cash flows 3351 0.878 0.092 0.716 0.892 0.991 
DYR04 Indicator equal to 1 if observation from fiscal 2004 3351 0.289 0.454 0 0.000 1 
DYR05 Indicator equal to 1 if observation from fiscal 2005 3351 0.358 0.479 0 0.000 1 





Panel B: Average Values - Firm-Level Sample       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
CASH_ETR5 Average Cash ETR 1286 0.230 0.173 0.000 0.231 0.426 
TICW3_ACCT3 Account-level tax internal control weakness 1286 0.009 0.096 0 0.000 0 
TICW3_COMP3 Company-level tax internal control weakness 1286 0.055 0.228 0 0.000 1 
OICW3_ACCT3 Account-level non-tax internal control weakness 1286 0.037 0.190 0 0.000 0 
OICW3_COMP3 Company-level non-tax internal control weakness 1286 0.075 0.264 0 0.000 1 
ROA5 Average return on assets 1286 0.099 0.081 0.002 0.085 0.248 
LEV5 Average leverage 1286 0.209 0.175 0.000 0.183 0.546 
FORINC5 Average foreign income 1286 0.018 0.034 0.000 0.001 0.089 
FOROPS5 Existence of foreign operations during 5 years 1286 0.555 0.497 0 1.000 1 
BM5 Average book-to-market ratio 1286 0.466 0.265 0.116 0.431 0.938 
AGGR_LOSS5 Five-year sum of losses 1286 0.069 0.254 0 0.000 1 
COCF5 One minus average operating cash flows 1286 0.881 0.073 0.753 0.895 0.969 
DYR04 Indicator equal to 1 if observation from fiscal 2004 1286 0.030 0.169 0 0.000 0 
DYR05 Indicator equal to 1 if observation from fiscal 2005 1286 0.051 0.219 0 0.000 1 





Panel C: Average Values - Overlapping, Annual Sample       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
CASH_ETR5 Average Cash ETR 3351 0.232 0.187 0.000 0.226 0.429 
TICW3_ACCT3 Account-level tax internal control weakness 3351 0.009 0.096 0 0.000 0 
TICW3_COMP3 Company-level tax internal control weakness 3351 0.047 0.212 0 0.000 0 
OICW3_ACCT3 Account-level non-tax internal control weakness 3351 0.035 0.183 0 0.000 0 
OICW3_COMP3 Company-level non-tax internal control weakness 3351 0.056 0.229 0 0.000 1 
ROA5 Average return on assets 3351 0.095 0.081 -0.001 0.079 0.248 
LEV5 Average leverage 3351 0.215 0.180 0.000 0.188 0.560 
FORINC5 Average foreign income 3351 0.017 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.084 
FOROPS5 Existence of foreign operations during 5 years 3351 0.539 0.499 0 1.000 1 
BM5 Average book-to-market ratio 3351 0.483 0.289 0.113 0.436 1.007 
AGGR_LOSS5 Five-year sum of losses 3351 0.075 0.263 0 0.000 1 
COCF5 One minus average operating cash flows 3351 0.881 0.073 0.752 0.895 0.970 
DYR04 Indicator equal to 1 if observation from fiscal 2004 3351 0.289 0.454 0 0.000 1 
DYR05 Indicator equal to 1 if observation from fiscal 2005 3351 0.358 0.479 0 0.000 1 






SUMMARY STATISTICS BY GROUP FOR PRIMARY TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 1 - 3 (AVERAGE VALUES ONLY) 
The following table provides summary statistics and tests of differences for groups of firms categorized at the firm-level as having a tax ICW, 
any type of ICW, a non-tax ICW or no ICW. Panel A compares the group of firms with any type of ICW to the group of firms with no ICW. Panel 
B compares the group of firms with a tax ICW to the group of firms with no ICW. Panel C compares the group of firms with a tax ICW to the 
group of firms with a non-tax ICW. The total number of observations in this sample across all groups is 1,286 firm-level observations. All average 
values are averaged for the five-year period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 5-
year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are scaled by the average assets from the years t-5 and 
t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items; ROA5 is average return on 
assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-
missing, non-zero; BM5 is average book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of 
accounting losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows; DYR04-DYR06 are indicator variables representing the fiscal years 
2004-2006. Average values for CASH_ETR5, ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The last two columns in each panel 
report the two-sided p-values for the difference between the two groups of interest in means and medians, respectively. T-tests are used to test the 
difference in means and Wilcoxon rank tests, with continuity correction, are used to test the difference in medians. ICW refers to internal control 
weakness. In Panel C, for comparative purposes, the sample of firms with other, non-tax ICWs is constructed such that no firm has a tax ICW also 




Panel A: Firms with internal control weaknesses vs. firms without internal control weaknesses    
VARIABLE  N MEAN MEDIAN  N MEAN MEDIAN  MEAN MEDIAN 
  Firms with ICWs  Firms without ICWs  P-values of differences 
CASH_ETR5  208 0.273 0.243  1078 0.222 0.228  0.01 0.08 
ROA5  208 0.078 0.068  1078 0.103 0.088  0.01 0.01 
LEV5  208 0.186 0.158  1078 0.213 0.189  0.04 0.04 
FORINC5  208 0.013 0.003  1078 0.019 0.000  0.02 0.50 
FOROPS5  208 0.611 1.000  1078 0.545 1.000  0.08 N/A 
BM5  208 0.522 0.478  1078 0.456 0.424  0.01 0.11 
AGGR_LOSS5  208 0.163 0.000  1078 0.051 0.000  0.01 0.01 
COCF5  208 0.891 0.908  1078 0.879 0.893  0.03 0.08 
DYR04  208 0.019 0.000  1078 0.032 0.000  0.34 0.46 
DYR05  208 0.053 0.000  1078 0.050 0.000  0.87 1.00 





Panel B: Firms with tax internal control weaknesses vs. firms without internal control weaknesses    
VARIABLE  N MEAN MEDIAN  N MEAN MEDIAN  MEAN MEDIAN 
  Firms with tax ICWs  Firms without ICWs  P-values of differences 
CASH_ETR5  83 0.308 0.261  1078 0.222 0.228  0.01 0.11 
ROA5  83 0.049 0.044  1078 0.103 0.088  0.01 0.01 
LEV5  83 0.208 0.181  1078 0.213 0.189  0.80 0.83 
FORINC5  83 0.016 0.009  1078 0.019 0.000  0.50 0.01 
FOROPS5  83 0.795 1.000  1078 0.545 1.000  0.01 N/A 
BM5  83 0.560 0.558  1078 0.456 0.424  0.01 0.02 
AGGR_LOSS5  83 0.313 0.000  1078 0.051 0.000  0.01 0.01 
COCF5  83 0.909 0.919  1078 0.879 0.893  0.01 0.01 
DYR04  83 0.024 0.000  1078 0.032 0.000  0.71 0.96 
DYR05  83 0.048 0.000  1078 0.050 0.000  0.94 0.85 





Panel C: Firms with tax internal control weaknesses vs. firms with other non-tax internal control weaknesses    
VARIABLE  N MEAN MEDIAN  N MEAN MEDIAN  MEAN MEDIAN 
  Firms with tax ICWs  Firms with other ICWs  P-values of differences 
CASH_ETR5  83 0.308 0.261  125 0.249 0.233  0.11 0.40 
ROA5  83 0.049 0.044  125 0.097 0.082  0.01 0.01 
LEV5  83 0.208 0.181  125 0.171 0.146  0.12 0.09 
FORINC5  83 0.016 0.009  125 0.010 0.000  0.27 0.01 
FOROPS5  83 0.795 1.000  125 0.488 0.000  0.01 N/A 
BM5  83 0.560 0.558  125 0.496 0.433  0.12 0.02 
AGGR_LOSS5  83 0.313 0.000  125 0.064 0.000  0.01 0.01 
COCF5  83 0.909 0.919  125 0.878 0.892  0.01 0.01 
DYR04  83 0.024 0.000  125 0.016 0.000  0.68 0.92 
DYR05  83 0.048 0.000  125 0.056 0.000  0.81 0.94 






PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX 
The following table provides Pearson correlations for the average variables in my firm-level sample. Correlations of more than 5% in absolute 
values are generally statistically significant at the 5% level or better. All average values are averaged for the five-year period t-4 through t, except 
the ICW variables, which are averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All 
continuous average variables are scaled by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid 
divided by the five-year sum of income less special items. TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control 
weakness and a company-level internal control weakness identified during the sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, OICW3_COMP3 and 
OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with OICW representing other non-tax internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level 
internal control weaknesses. ROA5 is average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; BM5 is average book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of accounting losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows. Average values for 












COMP3 ROA5 LEV5 FORINC5 FOROPS5 BM5 
AGGR 
LOSS5 
TICW3_ACCT3 0.024            
TICW3_COMP3 0.116  -0.024           
OICW3_ACCT3 -0.010  -0.019  -0.048          
OICW3_COMP3 0.084  -0.028  0.189  -0.056         
ROA5 0.055  -0.039  -0.157  0.041  -0.077        
LEV5 -0.138  -0.019  0.007  -0.068  -0.032  -0.268       
FORINC5 -0.016  0.013  -0.019  -0.045  -0.081  0.258  -0.106      
FOROPS5 0.061  0.054  0.114  -0.088  0.042  -0.053  -0.128  0.472     
BM5 0.020  0.025  0.089  0.007  0.049  -0.449  0.050  -0.251  -0.162    
AGGR_LOSS5 0.201  0.037  0.256  -0.038  0.073  -0.402  0.086  -0.092  0.158  0.118   




FIRM ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE & INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES 
Equations (2) and (3) are as follows: 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3it + β2OICW3it + β3ROA5it + β4LEV5it + β5FORINC5it + β6FOROPS5it 
+ β7BM5it + β8AGGR_LOSS5it + β9COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit  (2); 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5ROA5it + β6LEV5it + β7FORINC5it + β8FOROPS5it + β9BM5it + 
β10AGGR_LOSS5it + β11COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit  (3). 
 
The empirical regressions are estimated with one observation per firm during the period 2004-2006. 
Over 90% of the observations are measured as at 2006. All average values are averaged for the five-year 
period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 
5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are scaled 
by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid 
divided by the five-year sum of income less special items. TICW3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm has a tax internal control weakness during the sample period, and OICW3 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm has a non-tax internal control weakness during the sample period (and no tax ICW). 
TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness and a 
company-level internal control weakness identified during the sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, 
OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with OICW representing other non-tax 
internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level internal control weaknesses. ROA5 is 
average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; BM5 is average book-to-market 
ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of accounting 
losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows; DYR04 and DYR05 are indicator variables 
representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The DIND indicator variables represent two-digit NAICS 
industry membership. Average values for CASH_ETR5, ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within two-digit industry and are 
reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Significance for all variables with a predicted sign is calculated using a one-tailed test; for all other 




 PRED. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CASH_ETR5 
VARIABLE SIGN TEST OF H1 TEST OF H2 & H3 
INTERCEPT ? -0.445  ** -0.429  *** 
  (0.191)  (0.189)  
TICW3 ? 0.045  **   
  (0.017)    
OICW3  0.025     
  (0.016)    
TICW3_ACCT3  ?   0.023   
    (0.036)  
TICW3_COMP3 ?   0.043  ** 
    (0.019)  
OICW3_ACCT3    -0.021   
    (0.012)  
OICW3_COMP3    0.048  * 
    (0.023)  
ROA5 - 0.723  *** 0.721  *** 
  (0.197)  (0.196)  
LEV5 - -0.105  * -0.106  * 
  (0.066)  (0.065)  
FORINC5 - -0.187  * -0.169  * 
  (0.121)  (0.123)  
FOROPS5 - 0.018  * 0.016  * 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  
BM5 - 0.026   0.026   
  (0.027)  (0.027)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.180  *** 0.179  *** 
  (0.055)  (0.054)  
COCF5 + 0.552  *** 0.548  *** 
  (0.171)  (0.170)  
           
Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   5511.450  0.130  11837.620  0.140  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.883) (0.000) (0.873) 
Adjusted R2   14.92%   15.30%  
Number of firms with material weaknesses   208   208  






FIRM-YEAR ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE & INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES 
USING OVERLAPPING, AVERAGE VARIABLES 
Equations (2) and (3) are as follows: 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3it + β2OICW3it + β3ROA5it + β4LEV5it + β5FORINC5it + β6FOROPS5it 
+ β7BM5it + β8AGGR_LOSS5it + β9COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit  (2); 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5ROA5it + β6LEV5it + β7FORINC5it + β8FOROPS5it + β9BM5it + 
β10AGGR_LOSS5it + β11COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit  (3). 
 
The empirical regressions are estimated with multiple, overlapping observations per firm during the 
period 2004-2006. Over 90% of the observations are measured as at 2006. All average values are 
averaged for the five-year period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the 
three-year period t-2 through t. 5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All 
continuous average variables are scaled by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 
equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items. TICW3 
is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness during the sample period, 
and OICW3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a non-tax internal control weakness during 
the sample period (and no tax ICW). TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a 
tax internal control weakness and a company-level internal control weakness identified during the sample 
period; TICW3_ACCT3, OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with OICW 
representing other non-tax internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level internal 
control weaknesses. ROA5 is average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average 
foreign income; FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; 
BM5 is average book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a 
five-year sum of accounting losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows; DYR04-
DYR06 are indicator variables representing the fiscal years 2004-2006. Average values for CASH_ETR5, 
ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for 
two-way clustering within two-digit industry and firm, and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables with a predicted 
sign is calculated using a one-tailed test; for all other variables, including unreported year and industry 




 PRED. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CASH_ETR5 
VARIABLE SIGN TEST OF H1 TEST OF H2 & H3 
INTERCEPT ? -0.476  *** -0.465  *** 
  (0.117)  (0.114)  
TICW3 ? 0.052  **   
  (0.021)    
OICW3  0.013     
  (0.018)    
TICW3_ACCT3  ?   0.069   
    (0.047)  
TICW3_COMP3 ?   0.044  ** 
    (0.020)  
OICW3_ACCT3    -0.025   
    (0.016)  
OICW3_COMP3    0.038  * 
    (0.023)  
ROA5 - 0.611  *** 0.606  *** 
  (0.084)  (0.084)  
LEV5 - -0.114  ** -0.115  ** 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  
FORINC5 - -0.075   -0.063   
  (0.127)  (0.129)  
FOROPS5 - 0.003   0.001   
  (0.011)  (0.011)  
BM5 - 0.011   0.011   
  (0.019)  (0.019)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.172  *** 0.171  *** 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  
COCF5 + 0.619  *** 0.613  *** 
  (0.113)  (0.111)  
           
Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   2826.353  0.809  2334.017  0.905  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.446) (0.000) (0.405) 
Adjusted R2   12.01%   12.26%  
Number of firms with material weaknesses   271   271  




SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN SECTION 5.4 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Panels A and B present summary statistics for the firm-level sample of observations, and Panels C and D present summary statistics for the 
annual sample and overlapping, annual sample of observations. Panels A and C represent all observations in the respective samples, Panels B and 
D represent the observations with ICWs in the respective samples.  
 
In Panels A and B, GOVERN is a proxy for corporate governance that is calculated as the mean value of a firm's available Gompers et al. 
(2003) G-Index ratings. Higher values of GOVERN indicate weaker corporate governance. POOR_GOV is an indicator variable equal to one for 
firms with above median GOVERN scores and zero for firms with at or below median GOVERN scores. CC15 and CC25 are values derived from 
factor analysis on five proxies of resource constraints: a continuous measure of AGGR_LOSS5 (one minus five-year average income before 
extraordinary items), COCF5, CLEV5 (one minus LEV5), DEBT5 (one minus five-year average debt-to assets ratio) and NRATING5 (indicator of 
no public bond rating during the five year period from t-4 to t). CC15 is a proxy for constrained resource flows (income and cash) and CC25 is a 
proxy for constrained debt capacity. CC15_HIGH represents firms with the most constrained resources and is equal to one if an observation is in 
the top third of the range of CC15 and zero otherwise. Variables for the interaction between CC15 and each of the account-level and company-
level internal control weakness variables are TACCT3*CC15, TCOMP3*CC15, OACCT3*CC15 and OCOMP3*CC15. Variables for the 
interaction between CC15_HIGH and each of the account-level and company-level internal control weakness variables are 
TACCT3*CC15_HIGH, TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH, OACCT3*CC15_HIGH, OCOMP3*CC15_HIGH. 
 
In Panels C and D, BTD1 is the Manzon-Plesko (2002) BTD measure, equal to [US domestic pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax 
expense / US statutory rate) – state income taxes – other income taxes – equity in earnings] / lagged assets. BTD2 is the total BTD measure as 
described in Table 1 of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), equal to [pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense + current foreign tax expense) / 
US statutory rate – change in NOL from t-1 to t] / lagged assets. "WEAK" and "FIXED" variables, based on Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), are 
included in the table below. The "FIXED" variables represent remediation of ICWs. WEAK_TAX and WEAK_OTHER are indicator variables equal 
to one if a firm has a tax ICW or other (non-tax) ICW, respectively, in the current or prior year, and zero otherwise. WEAK_TAX_ACCT, 
WEAK_TAX_COMP, WEAK_OTHER_ACCT and WEAK_OTHER_COMP are measured similarly, where the general ICWs are separated into 
account-level and company-level components. TAX_FIXED and OTHER_FIXED are indicator variables equal to one if a firm has a tax ICW or 
other ICW, respectively, in the prior year but not the current year, and zero otherwise. TAX_ACCT_FIXED, TAX_COMP_FIXED, 





Panel A: Average Variables for Full Firm-Level Sample       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
GOVERN Mean G-Index score 1181 8.936 2.456 5.000 9.000 13.000 
POOR_GOV Indicator equal to 1 if mean G-Index above median  1181 0.406 0.491 0 0.000 1 
CC15 Factor for constrained resource flows 1286 -0.161 0.790 -1 0.007 1 
CC25 Factor for constrained debt capacity 1286 0.031 0.898 -1 -0.113 1 
CC15_HIGH Indicator equal to 1 if CC15 is in the top percentile 1286 0.333 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TACCT3*CC15 Interaction term: TICW3_ACCT3 & CC15 1286 0.002 0.048 0 0.000 0 
TCOMP3*CC15 Interaction term: TICW3_COMP3 & CC15 1286 0.015 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OACCT3*CC15 Interaction term: OICW3_ACCT3 & CC15 1286 -0.012 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OCOMP3*CC15 Interaction term: OICW3_COMP3 & CC15 1286 0.002 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TACCT3*CC15_HIGH Interaction term: TICW3_ACCT3 & CC15_HIGH 1286 0.004 0.062 0 0.000 0 
TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH Interaction term: TICW3_COMP3 & CC15_HIGH 1286 0.031 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OACCT3*CC15_HIGH Interaction term: OICW3_ACCT3 & CC15_HIGH 1286 0.009 0.092 0 0.000 0 




Panel B: Average Variables for Firm-Level ICW Sample       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
GOVERN Mean G-Index score 185 8.551 2.465 5.000 8.000 13.000 
POOR_GOV Indicator equal to 1 if mean G-Index above median  185 0.351 0.479 0 0.000 1 
CC15 Factor for constrained resource flows 208 0.020 0.794 -1 0.159 1 
CC25 Factor for constrained debt capacity 208 0.208 0.924 -1 0.153 1 
CC15_HIGH Indicator equal to 1 if CC15 is in the top percentile 208 0.428 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TACCT3*CC15 Interaction term: TICW3_ACCT3 & CC15 208 0.011 0.119 0 0.000 0 
TCOMP3*CC15 Interaction term: TICW3_COMP3 & CC15 208 0.094 0.454 -0.310 0.000 0.840 
OACCT3*CC15 Interaction term: OICW3_ACCT3 & CC15 208 -0.073 0.385 -0.906 0.000 0.375 
OCOMP3*CC15 Interaction term: OICW3_COMP3 & CC15 208 0.013 0.564 -0.940 0.000 0.695 
TACCT3*CC15_HIGH Interaction term: TICW3_ACCT3 & CC15_HIGH 208 0.024 0.154 0 0.000 0 
TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH Interaction term: TICW3_COMP3 & CC15_HIGH 208 0.192 0.395 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OACCT3*CC15_HIGH Interaction term: OICW3_ACCT3 & CC15_HIGH 208 0.053 0.224 0 0.000 1 





Panel C: Annual Variables for Full Sample re: Tests of BTDs and Remediation       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
BTD1 Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference 3355 -0.042 0.094 -0.229 -0.012 0.061 
BTD2 Alternative book-tax difference 2077 0.008 0.114 0 0.016 0 
WEAK_TAX TICW in the current or prior year 3355 0.055 0.228 0 0.000 1 
WEAK_OTHER OICW in the current or prior year 3355 0.078 0.269 0 0.000 1 
TAX_FIXED TICW in the prior year only 3355 0.018 0.133 0 0.000 0 
OTHER_FIXED OICW in the prior year only 3355 0.029 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WEAK_TAX_ACCT TICW_ACCT in the current or prior year 3355 0.014 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WEAK_TAX_COMP TICW_COMP in the current or prior year 3355 0.043 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WEAK_OTHER_ACCT OICW_ACCT in the current or prior year 3355 0.031 0.173 0 0.000 0 
WEAK_OTHER_COMP OICW_COMP in the current or prior year 3355 0.049 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TAX_ACCT_FIXED TICW_ACCT in the prior year only 3355 0.005 0.071 0 0.000 0 
TAX_COMP_FIXED TICW_COMP in the prior year only 3355 0.015 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OTHER_ACCT_FIXED OICW_ACCT in the prior year only 3355 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Panel D: Annual Variables for ICW Sample re: Tests of BTDs and Remediation       
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
BTD1 Manzon-Plesko book-tax difference 289 -0.044 0.093 -0.209 -0.015 0.056 
BTD2 Alternative book-tax difference 172 -0.031 0.154 0 -0.006 0 
WEAK_TAX TICW in the current or prior year 289 0.464 0.500 0 0.000 1 
WEAK_OTHER OICW in the current or prior year 289 0.606 0.490 0 1.000 1 
TAX_FIXED TICW in the prior year only 289 0.035 0.183 0 0.000 0 
OTHER_FIXED OICW in the prior year only 289 0.035 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WEAK_TAX_ACCT TICW_ACCT in the current or prior year 289 0.111 0.314 0.000 0.000 1.000 
WEAK_TAX_COMP TICW_COMP in the current or prior year 289 0.374 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 
WEAK_OTHER_ACCT OICW_ACCT in the current or prior year 289 0.228 0.421 0 0.000 1 
WEAK_OTHER_COMP OICW_COMP in the current or prior year 289 0.398 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TAX_ACCT_FIXED TICW_ACCT in the prior year only 289 0.010 0.102 0 0.000 0 
TAX_COMP_FIXED TICW_COMP in the prior year only 289 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OTHER_ACCT_FIXED OICW_ACCT in the prior year only 289 0.021 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 




ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE & INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES WITH BTD 
PROXIES 
The regression equations are as follows:  
 
BTDit = β0 + β1TICWit + β2OICWit + β3ROAit + β4LEVit + β5FORINCit + β6FOROPSit + β7BMit + 
β8AGGR_LOSSit + β9COCFit + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit; 
 
BTDit = β0 + β1TICW_ACCTit + β2TICW_COMPit + β3OICW_ACCTit + β4OICW_COMPit + β5ROAit 
+ β6LEVit + β7FORINCit + β8FOROPSit + β9BMit + β10AGGR_LOSSit + β11COCFit + ΣtDYEARt + 
ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
The empirical regressions are estimated with annual observations during the period 2004-2006. BTD 
refers to one of the two book-tax difference (BTD) proxies, BTD1 and BTD2, which replace CASH_ETR 
as the dependent variable in the regressions. BTD1 is the Manzon-Plesko (2002) BTD measure, equal to 
[US domestic pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense / US statutory rate) – state income taxes 
– other income taxes – equity in earnings] / lagged assets. BTD2 is the total BTD measure as described in 
Table 1 of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), equal to [pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense + 
current foreign tax expense) / US statutory rate – change in NOL from t-1 to t] / lagged assets. Annual 
variables are simply the one-year value of the average variables described in previous tables. All 
continuous annual variables are scaled by assets at time t-1. Other than AGGR_LOSS and BM, annual 
values are measured at year t. TICW is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal 
control weakness in the current period, and OICW is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a non-
tax internal control weakness in the current period (and no tax ICW). TICW_COMP is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness and a company-level internal control 
weakness identified during the current period; TICW_ACCT, OICW_COMP and OICW_ACCT are 
similarly measured, with OICW representing other non-tax internal control weaknesses and ACCT 
representing account-level internal control weaknesses. ROA is return on assets; LEV is leverage, 
FORINC is foreign income; FOROPS is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC is non-missing, 
non-zero; BM is book-to-market ratio, measured at t-1; AGGR_LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one 
if a firm has a sum of pre-tax accounting losses at time t-1 and t; COCF is one minus operating cash 
flows; DYR04 and DYR05 are indicator variables representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The DIND 
indicator variables represent two-digit NAICS industry membership. Annual values for BTD1, BTD2, 
ROA, LEV and BM are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for two-
way clustering within two-digit industry and firm, and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables with a predicted 
sign is calculated using a one-tailed test; for all other variables, including unreported year and industry 




 PRED. DV = BTD1 DV = BTD2 
VARIABLE SIGN TEST OF H2 & H3 TEST OF H2 & H3 
INTERCEPT ? -0.093  ** -0.067   
  (0.051)  (0.053)  
TICW_ACCT ? -0.002   -0.010   
  (0.013)  (0.037)  
TICW_COMP ? -0.033  *** -0.009   
  (0.011)  (0.014)  
OICW_ACCT  -0.005   0.001   
  (0.009)  (0.015)  
OICW_COMP  0.000   0.010   
  (0.009)  (0.015)  
ROA + -0.274  *** 0.448  *** 
  (0.047)  (0.050)  
LEV + 0.043  *** 0.025  ** 
  (0.010)  (0.012)  
FORINC + 0.217  *** 0.092   
  (0.054)  (0.090)  
FOROPS + 0.083  *** -0.003   
  (0.004)  (0.006)  
BM + 0.013   0.047  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.013)  
AGGR_LOSS - -0.063  *** -0.083  *** 
  (0.007)  (0.010)  
COCF - 0.063  * 0.030   
  (0.039)  (0.055)  
           
Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   5.250  9.460  5.340  0.290  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.746) 
Adjusted R2   39.06%   34.18%  
Number of material weakness observations 289   199  






FIRM ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE WITH ALTERNATIVE INTERNAL CONTROL 
WEAKNESS CATEGORIZATIONS 
Equation (3) is as follows: 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5ROA5it + β6LEV5it + β7FORINC5it + β8FOROPS5it + β9BM5it + 
β10AGGR_LOSS5it + β11COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
In this table, the empirical regressions are estimated with two alternative classification methods for 
distinguishing account-level and company-level ICWs. Alternative 1 does not aggregate multiple account-
level issues (i.e. three or more individual account-level issues) into a company-level ICW. Alternative 2 
uses a classification scheme based on guidance from Moody's Investor Group. Alternative 3 uses the 
Moody's classification scheme but like Alternative 1, does not aggregate multiple account-level issues. 
These alternatives do not alter the total number of ICWs, simply the classification across account-level 
and company-level ICW variables.  
 
The regressions use one observation per firm during the period 2004-2006 and over 90% of the 
observations are measured as at 2006. All average values are averaged for the five-year period t-4 through 
t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 5-year average 
variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are scaled by the average 
assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-
year sum of income less special items. TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has 
a tax internal control weakness and a company-level internal control weakness identified during the 
sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with 
OICW representing other non-tax internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level 
internal control weaknesses. ROA5 is average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is 
average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-
zero; BM5 is average book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm 
has a five-year sum of accounting losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows; DYR04 
and DYR05 are indicator variables representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The DIND indicator 
variables represent two-digit NAICS industry membership. Average values for CASH_ETR5, ROA5, 
LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for 
clustering within two-digit industry and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables with a predicted sign is calculated 
using a one-tailed test; for all other variables, including unreported year and industry effects, two-tailed 




 PRED. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CASH_ETR5 
VARIABLE SIGN ALTERNATIVE 1 ALTERNATIVE 2 ALTERNATIVE 3 
INTERCEPT ? -0.445  ** -0.429  ** -0.446  ** 
  (0.196)  (0.190)  (0.194)  
TICW3_ACCT3  ? 0.037   0.023   -0.011   
  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.032)  
TICW3_COMP3 ? 0.051  * 0.043  ** 0.067  ** 
  (0.027)  (0.019)  (0.027)  
OICW3_ACCT3  0.027   -0.021   0.015   
  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
OICW3_COMP3  0.023   0.047  * 0.030   
  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.024)  
ROA5 - 0.722  *** 0.720  *** 0.723  *** 
  (0.201)  (0.195)  (0.196)  
LEV5 - -0.105  * -0.106  * -0.104  * 
  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.065)  
FORINC5 - -0.191  * -0.170  * -0.181  * 
  (0.114)  (0.123)  (0.122)  
FOROPS5 - 0.018  * 0.016  * 0.018  * 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  
BM5 - 0.026   0.026   0.028   
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.180  *** 0.179  *** 0.175  *** 
  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.053)  
COCF5 + 0.551  *** 0.548  *** 0.555  *** 
  (0.173)  (0.170)  (0.174)  
               
Industry and Year indicators Industry Year Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   15058.980 0.120  11600.370 0.140  > 20000 0.102  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.891) (0.000) (0.872) (0.000) (0.903) 
Adjusted R2   14.93%   15.29%   15.34%  
Number of firms with material 
weaknesses 208   208   208  




FIRM ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE, INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The regression equations are as follows: 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3it + β2OICW3it + β3ROA5it + β4LEV5it + β5FORINC5it + β6FOROPS5it + β7BM5it + β8AGGR_LOSS5it + 
β9COCF5it + β10GOVit + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit; 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5ROA5it + β6LEV5it + 
β7FORINC5it + β8FOROPS5it + β9BM5it + β10AGGR_LOSS5it + β11COCF5it + β12GOVit + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
The empirical regressions are estimated with one observation per firm during the period 2004-2006. Over 90% of the observations are 
measured as at 2006. All average values are averaged for the five-year period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the 
three-year period t-2 through t. 5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are scaled by the 
average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special 
items. TICW3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness during the sample period, and OICW3 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a non-tax internal control weakness during the sample period (and no tax ICW). TICW3_COMP3 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness and a company-level internal control weakness identified during the 
sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with OICW representing other non-tax internal 
control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level internal control weaknesses. ROA5 is average return on assets; LEV5 is average 
leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; BM5 is 
average book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of accounting losses; COCF5 is one 
minus the average operating cash flows. GOV represents one of the two corporate governance variables used in the table below, which are 
GOVERN and POOR_GOV. GOVERN is a proxy for corporate governance that is calculated as the mean value of a firm's available Gompers et al. 
(2003) G-Index ratings. Higher values of GOVERN indicate weaker corporate governance. POOR_GOV is an indicator variable equal to one for 
firms with above median GOVERN scores and zero for firms with at or below median GOVERN scores. DYR04 and DYR05 are indicator variables 
representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and the DIND indicator variables represent two-digit NAICS industry membership. Average values for 
CASH_ETR5, ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within two-digit 
industry and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables 





 PRED. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CASH_ETR5 
VARIABLE SIGN TEST OF H1 TEST OF H2 & H3 TEST OF H1 TEST OF H2 & H3 
INTERCEPT ? -0.548  ** -0.429  ** -0.530  ** -0.513  ** 
  (0.235)  (0.189)  (0.230)  (0.228)  
TICW3 ? 0.050  **   0.049  **   
  (0.019)    (0.019)    
OICW3  0.035  **   0.035  **   
  (0.016)    (0.016)    
TICW3_ACCT3  ?   0.023     -0.002   
    (0.036)    (0.034)  
TICW3_COMP3 ?   0.043  **   0.050  ** 
    (0.019)    (0.020)  
OICW3_ACCT3    -0.021     -0.022   
    (0.012)    (0.016)  
OICW3_COMP3    0.048  **   0.060  ** 
    (0.023)    (0.022)  
ROA5 - 0.793  *** 0.721  *** 0.793  *** 0.796  *** 
  (0.217)  (0.196)  (0.218)  (0.214)  
LEV5 - -0.110  ** -0.106  ** -0.111  ** -0.115  ** 
  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.062)  
FORINC5 - -0.220  * -0.169  * -0.223  * -0.205  * 
  (0.137)  (0.123)  (0.137)  (0.139)  
FOROPS5 - 0.013   0.016   0.013   0.012   
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
BM5 - 0.028   0.026   0.027   0.028   
  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.024)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.182  *** 0.179  *** 0.181  *** 0.180  *** 
  (0.060)  (0.054)  (0.059)  (0.058)  
COCF5 + 0.636  *** 0.633  *** 0.637  *** 0.635  *** 
  (0.216)  (0.215)  (0.217)  (0.217)  
GOVERN + 0.002  ** 0.003  **     
  (0.001)  (0.001)      
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POOR_GOV +     0.013  ** 0.015  ** 
      (0.005)  (0.006)  
                   
Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   7821.480  1.370  > 20000 1.200  12083.638 0.000  > 20000 1.230  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.326) (0.000) (1.408) (0.000) (0.317) 
Adjusted R2   14.64%   15.22%   14.66%   15.22%  
Number of firms with material 
weaknesses 185   185   185   185  




ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE, INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES & RESOURCE 
CONSTRAINT FACTORS 
In Panel A of the table below, CC15 and CC25 are derived from factor analysis on five proxies of 
resource constraints: a continuous measure of AGGR_LOSS5 (one minus five-year average income before 
extraordinary items), COCF5, CLEV5 (one minus LEV5), DEBT5 (one minus five-year average debt-to 
assets ratio) and NRATING5 (indicator of no public bond rating during the five year period from t-4 to t). 
CC15 is a proxy for constrained resource flows (income and cash) and CC25 is a proxy for constrained 
debt capacity. 
 
In Panel B of the table below, CC15 and CC25 are included in the following regression equations: 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3it + β2OICW3it + β3ROA5it + β4LEV5it + β5FORINC5it + β6FOROPS5it 
+ β7BM5it + β8AGGR_LOSS5it + β9COCF5it + β10CC15it + β11CC25it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit; 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5ROA5it + β6LEV5it + β7FORINC5it + β8FOROPS5it + β9BM5it + 
β10AGGR_LOSS5it + β11COCF5it + β12CC15it + β13CC25it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
The empirical regressions are estimated with one observation per firm during the period 2004-2006. 
Over 90% of the observations are measured as at 2006. All average values are averaged for the five-year 
period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 
5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are scaled 
by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid 
divided by the five-year sum of income less special items. TICW3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm has a tax internal control weakness during the sample period, and OICW3 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm has a non-tax internal control weakness during the sample period (and no tax ICW). 
TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness and a 
company-level internal control weakness identified during the sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, 
OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly measured, with OICW representing other non-tax 
internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing account-level internal control weaknesses. ROA5 is 
average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; BM5 is average book-to-market 
ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of accounting 
losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows. CC15 and CC25 are as described above. 
DYR04 and DYR05 are indicator variables representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and the DIND 
indicator variables represent two-digit NAICS industry membership. Average values for CASH_ETR5, 
ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for 
clustering within two-digit industry and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables with a predicted sign is calculated 
using a one-tailed test; for all other variables, including unreported year and industry effects, two-tailed 




Panel A - Factor Analysis (Principal-Component Factors) of Resource Constraint Proxies  
VARIABLE  
CC15 - RESOURCE 
FLOWS 
CC25 - DEBT 
CAPACITY 
Factor loadings (rotated):      
AGGR_LOSS5 (continuous)  0.925   -0.030   
COCF5  0.919   -0.093   
CLEV5  -0.099   0.804   
DEBT5  0.019   0.534   
NRATING5  -0.090   0.742   
      
Eigenvalue  1.720   1.492   
      
Scoring coefficients:      
AGGR_LOSS5 (continuous)  0.548   0.071   
COCF5  0.539   0.028   
CLEV5  0.021   0.543   
DEBT5   0.064   0.369   





Panel B - Estimation of Equations (2) and (3) with Factors    
 PRED DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CASH_ETR5 
VARIABLE SIGN TEST OF H1 TEST OF H2 & H3 
INTERCEPT ? 0.024   0.037   
  (0.033)  (0.034)  
TICW3 ? 0.076  ***   
  (0.026)    
OICW3  0.024     
  (0.016)    
TICW3_ACCT3 ?   0.029  ** 
    (0.012)  
TICW3_COMP3 ?   0.078  ** 
    (0.033)  
OICW3_ACCT3    -0.022  * 
    (0.011)  
OICW3_COMP3    0.046  * 
    (0.024)  
ROA5 - 0.847  *** 0.850  *** 
  (0.247)  (0.247)  
FORINC5 - -0.198   -0.179   
  (0.133)  (0.137)  
FOROPS5 - 0.026  ** 0.024  ** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  
BM5 - 0.021   0.021   
  (0.025)  (0.025)  
CC15 + 0.080  *** 0.080  *** 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  
CC25 + 0.012   0.012   
  (0.012)  (0.011)  
           
Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   6600.850  0.120  10374.140  0.110  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.891) (0.000) (0.894) 
Adjusted R2   10.40%   10.90%  
Number of firms with material weaknesses   208   208  





ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERNAL 
CONTROL WEAKNESSES & RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS 
The regression equations are as follows: 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5CC15it + β6TACCT3*CC15it + β7TCOMP3*CC15it + β8OACCT3*CC15it + 
β9OCOMP3*CC15it + β10ROA5it + β11LEV5it + β12FORINC5it + β13FOROPS5it + β14BM5it + 
β15AGGR_LOSS5it + β16COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit; 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1TICW3_ACCT3it + β2TICW3_COMP3it + β3OICW3_ACCT3it + 
β4OICW3_COMP3it + β5CC15_HIGHit + β6TACCT3*CC15_HIGHit + β7TCOMP3*CC15_HIGHit + 
β8OACCT3*CC15_HIGHit + β9OCOMP3*CC15_HIGHit + β10ROA5it + β11LEV5it + β12FORINC5it + 
β13FOROPS5it + β14BM5it + β15AGGR_LOSS5it + β16COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
The empirical regressions are estimated with one observation per firm during the period 2004-2006. 
Over 90% of the observations are measured as at 2006. All average values are averaged for the five-year 
period t-4 through t, except the ICW variables, which are averaged for the three-year period t-2 through t. 
5-year average variables include data for years prior to 2004. All continuous average variables are scaled 
by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid 
divided by the five-year sum of income less special items. TICW3_COMP3 is an indicator variable equal 
to one if a firm has a tax internal control weakness and a company-level internal control weakness 
identified during the sample period; TICW3_ACCT3, OICW3_COMP3 and OICW3_ACCT3 are similarly 
measured, with OICW representing other non-tax internal control weaknesses and ACCT representing 
account-level internal control weaknesses. CC15 is a continuous proxy for constrained resource flows 
(income and cash) derived from factor analysis presented in Table 11. CC15_HIGH is a discrete proxy 
that represents firms with the most constrained resources and is equal to one if an observation is in the top 
third of the range of CC15 and zero otherwise. Variables for the interaction between CC15 and each of 
the account-level and company-level internal control weakness variables are TACCT3*CC15, 
TCOMP3*CC15, OACCT3*CC15 and OCOMP3*CC15. Variables for the interaction between 
CC15_HIGH and each of the account-level and company-level internal control weakness variables are 
TACCT3*CC15_HIGH, TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH, OACCT3*CC15_HIGH, OCOMP3*CC15_HIGH. For 
the regression including CC15, all observations with available data are included. For the regression 
including CC15_HIGH, firms with the least constrained resources (i.e. the bottom third of the range of 
CC15) are also included in this analysis but firms with an intermediate level of constrained resources (i.e. 
the middle third of the range of CC15) are excluded from the regression. 
 
ROA5 is average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; 
FOROPS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; BM5 is average 
book-to-market ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of 
accounting losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows. DYR04 and DYR05 are 
indicator variables representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and the DIND indicator variables represent 
two-digit NAICS industry membership. Average values for CASH_ETR5, ROA5, LEV5 and BM5 are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for clustering within two-digit 
industry and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Significance for all variables with a predicted sign is calculated using a one-tailed test; for 
all other variables, including unreported year and industry effects, two-tailed tests are calculated.
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 PRED. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = CASH_ETR5 
VARIABLE SIGN CONTINUOUS CC15 HIGH vs. LOW CC15 
INTERCEPT ? 0.058   0.052   
  (0.039)  (0.030)  
TICW3_ACCT3 ? 0.008   -0.007   
  (0.035)  (0.077)  
TICW3_COMP3 ? 0.048  * -0.083  *** 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  
OICW3_ACCT3  -0.027   -0.011   
  (0.017)  (0.018)  
OICW3_COMP3  0.049  * 0.007   
  (0.026)  (0.013)  
CC15 + 0.076  ***   
  (0.028)    
CC15_HIGH +   0.020   
    (0.020)  
TACCT3*CC15 ? 0.138     
   (0.083)    
TCOMP3*CC15 ? 0.122  **   
   (0.049)    
OACCT3*CC15  -0.009     
   (0.025)    
OCOMP3*CC15  0.044     
   (0.036)    
TACCT3*CC15_HIGH ?   0.123   
     (0.099)  
TCOMP3*CC15_HIGH ?   0.213  ** 
     (0.076)  
OACCT3*CC15_HIGH    -0.008   
     (0.042)  
OCOMP3*CC15_HIGH    0.061   
    (0.045)  
ROA5  0.881  *** 0.250  *** 
  (0.261)  (0.096)  
LEV5  -0.082   -0.067   
  (0.074)  (0.078)  
FORINC5  -0.035   -0.291  * 
  (0.186)  (0.209)  
FORINC5  0.013   0.019   
  (0.013)  (0.016)  
BM5  0.019   0.025   
  (0.023)  (0.034)  
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Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   > 20000 0.005  > 20000 0.057 
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.995) (0.000) (0.944) 
Adjusted R2   13.18%   10.03%  
Number of firms with material weaknesses   208   145  






ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE & REMEDIATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
WEAKNESSES 
The regression equations for Panels A and B are as follows: 
DVit = β0 + β1WEAK_TAXit + β2WEAK_OTHERit + β3TAX_FIXEDit + β4OTHER_FIXEDit + β5ROAit 
+ β6LEVit + β7FORINCit + β8FOROPSit + β9BMit + β10AGGR_LOSSit + β11COCFit + ΣtDYEARt + 
ΣjDINDj + εit; 
 
DVit = β0 + β1WEAK_TAX_ACCTit + β2WEAK_TAX_COMPit + β3WEAK_OTHER_ACCTit + 
β4WEAK_OTHER_COMPit + β5TAX_ACCT_FIXEDit + β6TAX_COMP_FIXEDit + 
β7OTHER_ACCT_FIXEDit + β8OTHER_COMP_FIXEDit + β9ROAit + β10LEVit + β11FORINCit + 
β12FOROPSit + β13BMit + β14AGGR_LOSSit + β15COCFit + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
The regression equations for Panel C are as follows: 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1WEAK_TAXit + β2WEAK_OTHERit + β3TAX_FIXEDit + β4OTHER_FIXEDit 
+ β5ROAit + β6LEVit + β7FORINCit + β8FOROPSit + β9BMit + β10AGGR_LOSSit + β11COCFit + 
ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit; 
 
CASH_ETR5it = β0 + β1WEAK_TAX_ACCTit + β2WEAK_TAX_COMPit + β3WEAK_OTHER_ACCTit 
+ β4WEAK_OTHER_COMPit + β5TAX_ACCT_FIXEDit + β6TAX_COMP_FIXEDit + 
β7OTHER_ACCT_FIXEDit + β8OTHER_COMP_FIXEDit + β9ROA5it + β10LEV5it + β11FORINC5it + 
β12FOROPS5it + β13BM5it + β14AGGR_LOSS5it + β15COCF5it + ΣtDYEARt + ΣjDINDj + εit. 
 
In Panels A and B, the first two empirical regressions are estimated with annual observations during 
the period 2004-2006. In Panel C, the second two empirical regressions are estimated with annual, 
overlapping observations of average values during the period 2004-2006. The “WEAK” and “FIXED” 
variables are based on annual or two-year values, however. DV refers to one of two annual tax avoidance 
proxies, which are BTD1 or CASH_ETR. BTD1 is the Manzon-Plesko (2002) BTD measure, equal to [US 
domestic pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense / US statutory rate) – state income taxes – 
other income taxes – equity in earnings] / lagged assets. CASH_ETR equals taxes paid divided by [income 
less special items]. CASH_ETR5 equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of 
income less special items. "WEAK" and "FIXED" variables are based on Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008). 
The "FIXED" variables represent remediation of ICWs. WEAK_TAX and WEAK_OTHER are indicator 
variables equal to one if a firm has a tax ICW or other (non-tax) ICW, respectively, in the current or prior 
year, and zero otherwise. WEAK_TAX_ACCT, WEAK_TAX_COMP, WEAK_OTHER_ACCT and 
WEAK_OTHER_COMP are measured similarly, where the general ICWs are separated into account-level 
and company-level components. TAX_FIXED and OTHER_FIXED are indicator variables equal to one if 
a firm has a tax ICW or other ICW, respectively, in the prior year but not the current year, and zero 
otherwise. TAX_ACCT_FIXED, TAX_COMP_FIXED, OTHER_ACCT_FIXED and 
OTHER_COMP_FIXED are measured similarly, again where general ICWs are separated into account-
level and company-level components. 
 
Annual independent variables are simply the one-year value of the average variables. AGGR_LOSS is 
a sum of values at time t-1 and t, BM is measured at t-1, and all other annual values are measured at year 
t. All continuous annual variables are scaled by assets at time t-1. Similarly, all average values are 
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averaged for the five-year period t-4 through t. 5-year average variables include data for years prior to 
2004. All continuous average variables are scaled by the average assets from the years t-5 and t-1. ROA5 
is average return on assets; LEV5 is average leverage, FORINC5 is average foreign income; FOROPS5 is 
an indicator variable equal to one if FORINC5 is non-missing, non-zero; BM5 is average book-to-market 
ratio; AGGR_LOSS5 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a five-year sum of accounting 
losses; COCF5 is one minus the average operating cash flows. DYR04 and DYR05 are indicator variables 
representing the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 and the DIND indicator variables represent two-digit NAICS 
industry membership. Annual and average values for CASH_ETR/CASH_ETR5, BTD1, ROA/ROA5, 
LEV/LEV5 and BM/BM5 are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Standard errors have been adjusted for 
clustering within two-digit industry and are reported in parentheses. * ** *** refer to significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables with a predicted sign is calculated 
using a one-tailed test; for all other variables, including unreported year and industry effects, two-tailed 




Panel A - Annual Tests with CASH_ETR as DV     
 PRED.   
VARIABLE SIGN GENERAL ICWs ACCT & COMP ICWs 
INTERCEPT ? -0.258  ** -0.251  ** 
  (0.104)  (0.102)  
WEAK_TAX ? 0.074  ***   
  (0.022)    
WEAK_OTHER  0.033  **   
  (0.015)    
TAX_FIXED ? -0.073  ***   
  (0.025)    
OTHER_FIXED  -0.036     
  (0.025)    
WEAK_TAX_ACCT ?   0.018   
    (0.019)  
WEAK_TAX_COMP ?   0.095  *** 
    (0.029)  
WEAK_OTHER_ACCT    -0.006   
    (0.035)  
WEAK_OTHER_COMP    0.056  *** 
    (0.017)  
TAX_ACCT_FIXED ?   -0.059   
    (0.035)  
TAX_COMP_FIXED ?   -0.092  * 
    (0.044)  
OTHER_ACCT_FIXED    0.014   
    (0.057)  
OTHER_COMP_FIXED    -0.080  ** 
    (0.032)  
ROA - 0.234  *** 0.721  *** 
  (0.075)  (0.196)  
LEV - -0.151  ** -0.106  ** 
  (0.073)  (0.065)  
FORINC - -0.177  ** -0.169  ** 
  (0.091)  (0.123)  
FOROPS - 0.007   0.016  * 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  
BM - -0.016   0.026   
  (0.018)  (0.027)  
AGGR_LOSS + 0.101  *** 0.179  *** 
  (0.036)  (0.054)  
COCF + 0.458  *** 0.548  *** 
  (0.088)  (0.170)  
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Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   > 20000 43.752  > 20000 39.076  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2   9.86%   10.04%  
Number of material weakness observations 300   300  




Panel B - Annual Tests with BTD1 as DV      
 PRED.   
VARIABLE SIGN GENERAL ICWs ACCT & COMP ICWs 
INTERCEPT ? -0.091  ** -0.093  ** 
  (0.039)  (0.038)  
WEAK_TAX ? -0.026  ***   
  (0.008)    
WEAK_OTHER  -0.002  **   
  (0.005)    
TAX_FIXED ? 0.020  *   
  (0.010)    
OTHER_FIXED  -0.007     
  (0.009)    
WEAK_TAX_ACCT ?   -0.002   
    (0.010)  
WEAK_TAX_COMP ?   -0.033  *** 
    (0.010)  
WEAK_OTHER_ACCT    -0.005   
    (0.011)  
WEAK_OTHER_COMP    0.000  *** 
    (0.007)  
TAX_ACCT_FIXED ?   0.019   
    (0.031)  
TAX_COMP_FIXED ?   0.030  *** 
    (0.010)  
OTHER_ACCT_FIXED    -0.010   
    (0.013)  
OTHER_COMP_FIXED    -0.004   
    (0.010)  
ROA + -0.276  *** -0.274  *** 
  (0.080)  (0.079)  
LEV + 0.043  *** 0.043  *** 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  
FORINC + 0.216  ** 0.217  ** 
  (0.091)  (0.091)  
FOROPS + 0.084  *** 0.083  *** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  
BM + 0.013  * 0.012  * 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  
AGGR_LOSS - -0.063  *** -0.063  *** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  
COCF - 0.062  * 0.064  * 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  
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Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   > 20000 12.278  > 20000 16.225  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2   39.02%   39.12%  
Number of material weakness observations 289   289  




Panel C - Overlapping, Annual Tests with CASH_ETR5 as DV    
 PRED.   
VARIABLE SIGN GENERAL ICWs ACCT & COMP ICWs 
INTERCEPT ? -0.475  *** -0.462  ** 
  (0.115)  (0.111)  
WEAK_TAX ? 0.070  **   
  (0.032)    
WEAK_OTHER  0.008     
  (0.014)    
TAX_FIXED ? -0.035     
  (0.046)    
OTHER_FIXED  0.011     
  (0.023)    
WEAK_TAX_ACCT ?   0.142  * 
    (0.073)  
WEAK_TAX_COMP ?   0.051  ** 
    (0.024)  
WEAK_OTHER_ACCT    -0.029   
    (0.020)  
WEAK_OTHER_COMP    0.029   
    (0.017)  
TAX_ACCT_FIXED ?   -0.134  * 
    (0.077)  
TAX_COMP_FIXED ?   -0.019   
    (0.046)  
OTHER_ACCT_FIXED    -0.003   
    (0.017)  
OTHER_COMP_FIXED    0.029   
    (0.039)  
ROA5 - 0.613  *** 0.607  *** 
  (0.084)  (0.082)  
LEV5 - -0.115  ** -0.115  ** 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  
FORINC5 - -0.082   -0.074   
  (0.127)  (0.129)  
FOROPS5 - 0.003   0.002   
  (0.011)  (0.012)  
BM5 - 0.011   0.011   
  (0.019)  (0.019)  
AGGR_LOSS5 + 0.171  *** 0.169  *** 
  (0.055)  (0.055)  
COCF5 + 0.621  *** 0.611  *** 
  (0.113)  (0.109)  
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Industry and Year indicators   Industry Year Industry Year 
   F-stat   > 20000 0.717  > 20000 0.811  
   (Probability)   (0.000) (0.502) (0.000) (0.461) 
Adjusted R2   12.12%   12.50%  
Number of material weakness observations 271   271  




SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN CHAPTER 6 TESTS 
Panels A and B present summary statistics for the monthly abnormal returns (R) and Fama-French (1993) four factors used in Chapter 6 tests. 
Panel C presents mean, median and quintile cut-off values (C1-C4) for the tax avoidance proxies that are ranked to give tax aggressiveness 
indicator variables.  
 
XRET is the firm's monthly stock return less the monthly risk-free rate. The MRF, SMB, HML and UMD variables are the Fama-French factor 
loadings representing the excess market return, the size premium, the book-to-market premium and the momentum premium, respectively. 
CASH_ETR5 (in-sample) equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items, estimated with one 
observation per firm during the period 2004-2006. Over 90% of the observations are measured as at 2006. CASH_ETR5 (out-of-sample) equals the 
five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items, estimated based on the firm-level value as at 2003. 
CASH_ETR equals taxes paid divided by [income less special items] estimated annually. BTD1 is the Manzon-Plesko (2002) BTD measure, also 
estimated annually, equal to [US domestic pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense / US statutory rate) – state income taxes – other 
income taxes – equity in earnings] / lagged assets. PROB_TS is the predicted probability that a firm engages in tax sheltering, based on Wilson's 
(2009) tax shelter prediction model. Values of PROB_TS range from 0 to 1. Additional description of Wilson's (2009) tax shelter prediction model 
is available in subsection 6.2.1 of this dissertation. 
 
Panel A: Monthly Variables for Sample Firms (with Available In-Sample CASH_ETR5)    
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
XRET A firm's excess return (over risk-free rate) 48477 0.014 0.093 -0.128 0.011 0.163 
MRF Fama-French factor: market premium 48477 0.008 0.023 0 0.014 0 
SMB Fama-French factor: size premium 48477 0.002 0.023 -0.039 -0.004 0.041 
HML Fama-French factor: book-to-market premium  48477 0.008 0.016 0 0.005 0 





Panel B: Monthly Variables for Sample Firms (with Available Out-Of-Sample CASH_ETR5)    
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION N MEAN STD DEV 5th % MEDIAN 95th % 
XRET A firm's excess return (over risk-free rate) 40363 0.013 0.089 -0.124 0.011 0.156 
MRF Fama-French factor: market premium 40363 0.008 0.023 0 0.014 0 
SMB Fama-French factor: size premium 40363 0.002 0.023 -0.039 -0.004 0.041 
HML Fama-French factor: book-to-market premium  40363 0.008 0.016 0 0.005 0 
UMD Fama-French factor: momentum premium 40363 0.002 0.024 -0.037 0.004 0.035 
 
Panel C: Mean, Median and Quintile Cut-off (C#) Values for Tax Aggressiveness     
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEAN MEDIAN C1 C2 C3 C4 
CASH_ETR5 
(in-sample) 
Firm-level CASH_ETR5 value in 2004-2006 
period 0.230 0.231 0.109 0.198 0.261 0.326 
CASH_ETR5 
(out-of-sample) 
Firm-level CASH_ETR5 value at end of 2003 
fiscal period 0.249 0.243 0.112 0.206 0.271 0.337 
CASH_ETR 
Annual CASH_ETR value during 2004-2006 
period 0.245 0.235 0.084 0.188 0.273 0.354 
BTD1 Annual Manzon-Plesko BTD -0.046 -0.015 -0.106 -0.032 -0.004 0.015 




ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON TAX 
AGGRESSIVENESS AND COMPANY-LEVEL TAX-RELATED INTERNAL CONTROL 
QUALITY 
Equation (4), presented in Panel A, is as follows: 
 
Rit = β0 + β1TICWC*TAGi + β2TICWC*NON_TAGi + β3TICSC*NON_TAGi + bMRFt + sSMBt + 
hHMLt + wUMDt + εit  (4). 
 
In Panel B, the following alternative regression to Equation (4) is presented: 
 
Rit = β0 + β1TICWCi + β2TAGi + β3TICWC*TAGi + bMRFt + sSMBt + hHMLt + wUMDt + εit. 
 
R is measured with XRET, a firm's monthly stock return less the monthly risk-free rate during the 
period 2004-2006. Tax aggressiveness is determined by ranking firms according to their value of 
CASH_ETR5 or CASH_ETR. TAG is a dichotomous variable representing tax aggressiveness, equal to 1 if 
a firm’s CASH_ETR5 or CASH_ETR estimate is in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. NON_TAG 
represents “control firms” that are not highly tax aggressive and is coded as 1 if a firm’s CASH_ETR5 or 
CASH_ETR estimate is not in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. For column 1 of the table, CASH_ETR5 
(in-sample) equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special 
items, estimated with one observation per firm during the period 2004-2006. Over 90% of the 
observations are measured as at 2006. For column 2 of the table, CASH_ETR5 (out-of-sample) equals the 
five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items, estimated based on 
the firm-level value as at 2003. For column 3 of the table, CASH_ETR equals taxes paid divided by 
[income less special items] estimated annually for the period 2004-2006. In columns 1 and 2, TICWC 
equals the firm-level value of TICW5_COMP5 during the period 2004-2006. In column 3, TICWC equals 
the annual firm-year value of TICW_COMP for each year during the sample period 2004-2006. TICSC is 
equal to one minus TICWC.  
 
The intercept in the Panel A regression represents tax aggressive firms that do not disclose a 
company-level tax ICW at the firm or firm-year level. TICWC*TAG is an interaction variable that 
represents tax aggressive firms that disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm or firm-year level. 
TICWC*NON_TAG is also an interaction variable that represents non-tax aggressive firms that disclose a 
company-level tax ICW at the firm or firm-year level. TICSC*NON_TAG is an interaction variable that 
represents non-tax aggressive firms that do not disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm or firm-year 
level (i.e. TICSC reflects strong internal control). The MRF, SMB, HML and UMD variables are the 
Fama-French (1993) factor loadings representing the excess market return, the size premium, the book-to-
market premium and the momentum premium, respectively. * ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables is calculated using a two-tailed test. For Panel 




Panel A - Regressions of Equation (4)      








INTERCEPT 0.0066  *** 0.0057  *** 0.0083  *** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0011)  
TICWC*TAG -0.0095  ** -0.0043   -0.0064   
 (0.0045)  (0.0052)  (0.0049)  
TICWC*NON_TAG -0.0101  *** -0.0096  *** -0.0049  ** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0021)  
TICSC*NON_TAG -0.0023  ** -0.0024  ** -0.0034  *** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
MRF 1.0030  *** 0.9834  *** 0.9913  *** 
 (0.0257)  (0.0270)  (0.0255)  
SMB 0.5797  *** 0.5557  *** 0.5713  *** 
 (0.0299)  (0.0316)  (0.0299)  
HML 0.0387   0.0485   0.0067   
 (0.0307)  (0.0319)  (0.0305)  
UMD -0.0344   -0.0402  * -0.0176   
 (0.0223)  (0.0234)  (0.0221)  
       
F-tests for Hypotheses 4 & 5 H4 H5 H4 H5 H4 H5 
   F-stat 10.302  0.012  7.254  0.885  3.602  0.080  
   (Probability) (0.000) (0.912) (0.001) (0.347) (0.027) (0.777) 
Adjusted R2 13.30%   13.60%   13.62%  




Panel B - Regressions of Alternative Equation (4)     








INTERCEPT 0.0044  *** 0.0033  *** 0.0048  *** 
 (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  
TICWC -0.0078  *** -0.0071  *** -0.0036  * 
 (0.0022)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)  
TAG 0.0023  ** 0.0024  ** 0.0038  *** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  
TICWC*TAG -0.0017   0.0028   -0.0031   
 (0.0050)  (0.0057)  (0.0053)  
MRF 1.0030  *** 0.9834  *** 0.9912  *** 
 (0.0257)  (0.0270)  (0.0255)  
SMB 0.5797  *** 0.5557  *** 0.5713  *** 
 (0.0299)  (0.0316)  (0.0299)  
HML 0.0387   0.0485   0.0067   
 (0.0307)  (0.0319)  (0.0305)  
UMD -0.0344   -0.0402  * -0.0175   
 (0.0223)  (0.0234)  (0.0221)  
       
Adjusted R2 13.30%   13.60%   13.62%  




ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON TAX AGGRESSIVENESS AND GENERAL/TAX-
RELATED INTERNAL CONTROL QUALITY 
The regression equations are as follows: 
 
Rit = β0 + β1ICW*TAGi + β2ICW*NON_TAGi + β3ICS*NON_TAGi + bMRFt + sSMBt + hHMLt + wUMDt + εit; 
 
Rit = β0 + β1TICW*TAGi + β2TICW*NON_TAGi + β3TICS*NON_TAGi + bMRFt + sSMBt + hHMLt + wUMDt + εit. 
 
R is measured with XRET, a firm's monthly stock return less the monthly risk-free rate during the period 2004-2006. Tax aggressiveness is 
determined by ranking firms according to their value of CASH_ETR5. TAG is a dichotomous variable representing tax aggressiveness, equal to 1 if 
a firm’s CASH_ETR5 estimate is in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. NON_TAG represents “control firms” that are not highly tax aggressive and is 
coded as 1 if a firm’s CASH_ETR5 estimate is not in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. For columns 1 and 3 of the table, CASH_ETR5 (in-sample) 
equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items, estimated with one observation per firm during 
the period 2004-2006. Over 90% of the observations are measured as at 2006. For columns 2 and 4 of the table, CASH_ETR5 (out-of-sample) 
equals the five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items, estimated based on the firm-level value as at 
2003. In columns 1 and 2, ICW equals one if the firm-level value of TICW3 or OICW3 equals one during the 2004-2006 period, zero otherwise. In 
columns 3 and 4, TICW equals the firm-level value of TICW3 during the period 2004-2006. 
 
The intercept in the regression represents tax aggressive firms that do not disclose an ICW or a tax ICW, respectively at the firm-level. 
ICW/TICW*TAG are interaction variables that represent tax aggressive firms that disclose any ICW or a tax ICW, respectively, at the firm-level. 
ICW/TICW*NON_TAG are also interaction variables that represent non-tax aggressive firms that disclose any ICW or a tax ICW, respectively, at 
the firm-level. ICS/TICS*NON_TAG are interaction variables that represent non-tax aggressive firms that do not disclose a general ICW or a tax 
ICW, respectively, at the firm-level (i.e. TICSC reflects strong internal control). The MRF, SMB, HML and UMD variables are the Fama-French 
(1993) factor loadings representing the excess market return, the size premium, the book-to-market premium and the momentum premium, 
respectively. * ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables is calculated using a two-




 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = R = EXCESS RETURN (RET - RF) 
VARIABLE 
IN-SAMPLE 
CASH_ETR5 - ICW 
OUT-OF-SAMPLE 
CASH_ETR5 - ICW 
IN-SAMPLE 
CASH_ETR5 - TICW 
OUT-OF-SAMPLE 
CASH_ETR5 - TICW 
INTERCEPT 0.0069  *** 0.0066  *** 0.0066  *** 0.0058  *** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  
ICW/TICW*TAG -0.0054  * -0.0061  ** -0.0091  ** -0.0040   
 (0.0030)  (0.0029)  (0.0043)  (0.0047)  
ICW/TICW*NON_TAG -0.0054  *** -0.0061  *** -0.0094  *** -0.0091  *** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0022)  (0.0024)  
ICS/TICS*NON_TAG -0.0025  ** -0.0032  *** -0.0022  ** -0.0024  ** 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
MRF 1.0031  *** 0.9835  *** 1.0031  *** 0.9835  *** 
 (0.0257)  (0.0270)  (0.0257)  (0.0270)  
SMB 0.5796  *** 0.5555  *** 0.5796  *** 0.5556  *** 
 (0.0300)  (0.0316)  (0.0299)  (0.0316)  
HML 0.0387   0.0485   0.0387   0.0485   
 (0.0307)  (0.0319)  (0.0307)  (0.0319)  
UMD -0.0344   -0.0401  * -0.0343   -0.0401  * 
 (0.0223)  (0.0235)  (0.0223)  (0.0234)  
         
F-tests for Hypotheses 4 & 5 H4 H5 H4 H5 H4 H5 H4 H5 
   F-stat 6.218  0.000  7.336  0.000  10.232  0.005  7.273  0.996  
   (Probability) (0.002) (0.991) (0.001) (0.986) (0.000) (0.944) (0.001) (0.318) 
Adjusted R2 13.30%   13.60%   13.30%   13.60%  




ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON TAX 
AGGRESSIVENESS AND COMPANY-LEVEL TAX-RELATED INTERNAL CONTROL 
QUALITY (12 MONTHS PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING 2004-2006 SOX PERIOD) 
Equation (4) is estimated as follows: 
 
Rit = β0 + β1TICWC*TAGi + β2TICWC*NON_TAGi + β3TICSC*NON_TAGi + bMRFt + sSMBt + 
hHMLt + wUMDt + εit  (4). 
 
R is measured with XRET, a firm's monthly stock return less the monthly risk-free rate observed 
during the twelve months prior to the firm's 2004 fiscal year-end (for column 1) and the twelve months 
following the firm's 2006 fiscal year-end (for column 2). Tax aggressiveness is determined by ranking 
firms according to their value of CASH_ETR5. TAG is a dichotomous variable representing tax 
aggressiveness, equal to 1 if a firm’s CASH_ETR5 estimate is in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. 
NON_TAG represents “control firms” that are not highly tax aggressive and is coded as 1 if a firm’s 
CASH_ETR5 estimate is not in the bottom quintile, 0 otherwise. CASH_ETR5 (out-of-sample) equals the 
five-year sum of taxes paid divided by the five-year sum of income less special items, estimated based on 
the firm-level value as at 2003. TICWC equals the firm-level value of TICW5_COMP5 during the period 
2004-2006. 
 
The intercept in the regression represents tax aggressive firms that do not disclose a company-level 
tax ICW at the firm-level. TICWC*TAG is an interaction variable that represents tax aggressive firms that 
disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm-level. TICWC*NON_TAG is also an interaction variable 
that represents non-tax aggressive firms that disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm-level. 
TICSC*NON_TAG is an interaction variable that represents non-tax aggressive firms that do not disclose 
a company-level tax ICW at the firm-level (i.e. TICSC reflects strong internal control). The MRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD variables are the Fama-French (1993) factor loadings representing the excess market 
return, the size premium, the book-to-market premium and the momentum premium, respectively. * ** 
*** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables is 
calculated using a two-tailed test. Post-estimation F-tests are presented in the table below to examine 





DEPENDENT VARIABLE = R = EXCESS RETURN 
(RET - RF) 
VARIABLE 
OUT-OF-SAMPLE 
CASH_ETR5 - 12 
MONTHS PRIOR 
OUT-OF-SAMPLE 
CASH_ETR5 - 12 
MONTHS AFTER 
INTERCEPT -0.0004   0.0045  ** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0019)  
TICWC*TAG 0.0165  * -0.0022   
 (0.0098)  (0.0091)  
TICWC*NON_TAG -0.0034   0.0009   
 (0.0051)  (0.0052)  
TICSC*NON_TAG -0.0029   0.0002   
 (0.0024)  (0.0020)  
MRF 1.2053  *** 0.9789  *** 
 (0.0480)  (0.0280)  
SMB 0.5191  *** 0.5376  *** 
 (0.0515)  (0.0695)  
HML 0.0418   0.4225  *** 
 (0.0768)  (0.0790)  
UMD 0.0717  ** -0.1360  *** 
 (0.0298)  (0.0357)  
     
F-tests for Hypotheses 4 & 5 H4 H5 H4 H5 
   F-stat 1.779  3.550  0.047  0.093  
   (Probability) (0.169) (0.060) (0.954) (0.760) 
Adjusted R2 13.93%   11.13%  






ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS CONDITIONAL ON ALTERNATIVE TAX 
AGGRESSIVENESS PROXIES AND COMPANY-LEVEL TAX-RELATED INTERNAL 
CONTROL QUALITY 
Equation (4) is estimated as follows: 
 
Rit = β0 + β1TICWC*TAGi + β2TICWC*NON_TAGi + β3TICSC*NON_TAGi + bMRFt + sSMBt + 
hHMLt + wUMDt + εit  (4). 
 
R is measured with XRET, a firm's monthly stock return less the monthly risk-free rate during the 
period 2004-2006. Tax aggressiveness is determined by ranking firms according to their annual value of 
BTD1 or PROB_TS. BTD1 is the Manzon-Plesko (2002) BTD measure, also estimated annually, equal to 
[US domestic pre-tax income – (current US domestic tax expense / US statutory rate) – state income taxes 
– other income taxes – equity in earnings] / lagged assets. PROB_TS is the predicted probability that a 
firm engages in tax sheltering, based on Wilson's (2009) tax shelter prediction model. Values of 
PROB_TS range from 0 to 1. Additional description of Wilson's (2009) tax shelter prediction model is 
available in subsection 6.2.1 of this dissertation. In the regressions, TAG is a dichotomous variable 
representing tax aggressive firms, equal to 1 if a firm’s BTD1 or PROB_TS estimate is in the top quintile, 
0 otherwise. NON_TAG represents “control firms” that are not highly tax aggressive and is coded as 1 if a 
firm’s BTD1 or PROB_TS estimate is not in the top quintile, 0 otherwise. For purposes of ranking tax 
aggressiveness, BTD1 and PROB_TS are estimated for each available firm-year observation in the period 
2004-2006. TICWC equals the firm-year value of TICW_COMP during the period 2004-2006. 
 
The intercept in the regression represents tax aggressive firms that do not disclose a company-level 
tax ICW at the firm-year level. TICWC*TAG is an interaction variable that represents tax aggressive firms 
that disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm-year level. TICWC*NON_TAG is also an interaction 
variable that represents non-tax aggressive firms that disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm-year 
level. TICSC*NON_TAG is an interaction variable that represents non-tax aggressive firms that do not 
disclose a company-level tax ICW at the firm-year level (i.e. TICSC reflects strong internal control). The 
MRF, SMB, HML and UMD variables are the Fama-French (1993) factor loadings representing the excess 
market return, the size premium, the book-to-market premium and the momentum premium, respectively. 
* ** *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Significance for all variables is 
calculated using a two-tailed test. Post-estimation F-tests are presented in the table below to examine 





DEPENDENT VARIABLE = R = EXCESS RETURN 
(RET - RF) 
VARIABLE IN-SAMPLE BTD1 IN-SAMPLE PROB_TS 
INTERCEPT 0.0059  *** 0.0044  *** 
 (0.0012)  (0.0013)  
TICWC*TAG -0.0008   -0.0033   
 (0.0063)  (0.0048)  
TICWC*NON_TAG -0.0095  *** -0.0056   
 (0.0024)  (0.0036)  
TICSC*NON_TAG -0.0015   -0.0007   
 (0.0012)  (0.0014)  
MRF 1.0051  *** 1.1168  *** 
 (0.0298)  (0.0407)  
SMB 0.6081  *** 0.6518  *** 
 (0.0348)  (0.0472)  
HML -0.0096   -0.1919  *** 
 (0.0359)  (0.0497)  
UMD -0.0363   -0.0378   
 (0.0258)  (0.0354)  
     
F-tests for Hypotheses 4 & 5 H4 H5 H4 H5 
   F-stat 8.024  1.678  1.421  0.157  
   (Probability) (0.000) (0.195) (0.242) (0.692) 
Adjusted R2 13.33%   15.23%  
Number of total observations 37296   20843  
 
